LUNDY'S LANE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF NIAGARA FALLS,
25 July 1814

By

Joseph Choate Monsanto, B.A.,
New Mexico Highlands University,
1992

A THESIS

Submitted to Adams State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

M.A. in United States History

April 2017

ADAMS STATE UNIVERSITY
COLORADO
Great Stories Begin Here

Adams State University
History, Anthropology, Philosophy, Political Science
Signed Title Page
Signifying Completion of Thesis

Lundy's Lane: An Analysis of the Battle of Niagara Falls, 25 July 1814
(Title)

A thesis prepared by: Joseph Choate Monsanto
(Student's Name)

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Masters of Arts in Humanities: United States History, has been approved and accepted by the following:

Dr. Penny Sanders, LPC, NCC
Assistant Vice President of Graduate Studies

Dr. Edward R. Crowther
Chairperson of Thesis Committee

5/3/17
Date

Thesis Committee Members:

Edward R. Crowther, Ph.D.

Richard D. Loosbrock, Ph.D.

Charles Nichols Saenz, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT

LUNDY'S LANE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE OF NIAGARA FALLS,
25 July1814

By

Joseph Choate Monsanto

This thesis involves discovering how the actors who participated in this event, and the historians who interpreted its outcome from the nineteenth century to present-day remembered the War of 1812's Battle of Niagara Falls, or, the Battle of Lundy's Lane. The goal is to show that competing militaristic narratives, which proposed victory for their respective sides, chronicled the consequences of that fray. By examining the Battle of Niagara Falls through a fresh perspective, it becomes clear that it was a stalemate. Through showing that this armed conflict lives on in parallel nationalistic memories, this thesis highlights the importance of the intersection of these accounts, which offers an alternative to these recollections.

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to my late parents, Sarah and Buddy Monsanto. My Mother always gave me books on art and history when I was a child. It was something as a young boy I did not appreciate until I first attended college in the 1960s. My Father had a penchant for reading books that were only factual, although, he believed that many facts in history were not included in its entirety as a whole. Both of them instilled a passion for knowledge in this author, which I now appreciate very much. Furthermore, I dedicate my work to my wife Stephanie Lee, our seven adult children, and their spouses, and our two grandchildren in our merged family: Joseph and Xiao Wei; Max; Quintin and Taina; Evan and Blue; Jordan and Sonia; Christina and Tony; Adrian and Eurika; and to our grandchildren, Tyler and Chloe. They all share the same ardor for erudition. And last, this thesis is dedicated to the remembrance of the soldiers and sailors on both sides that fought and died in the War of 1812, and specifically, at the Battle of Niagara Falls, or, the Battle of Lundy's Lane.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

There are a number of people without whom this thesis might not have been written, and to whom I am greatly indebted. First, I am most grateful to my best friend, partner, confidant, and wife, Stephanie Lee, for her understanding, support, and endless sacrifices throughout this lengthy endeavor. Second, I wish to thank my committee members who were more than generous with their expertise and precious time, Drs. Edward R. Crowther, Richard D. Loosbrock, and C. Nicholas Saenz. A special thanks to Dr. Crowther, my committee chairman for his countless hours of reflecting, reading, encouraging, and most of all patience throughout the entire process. Throughout my graduate quest, Dr. Crowther has been an excellent mentor, teacher, and guide. His passion and seemingly boundless energy for History has been inspiring. Also, Dr. Loosbrock and Dr. Saenz whose fervor in the same discipline is on an even parity with Dr. Crowther, have been instrumental as well. I am very grateful that you all agreed to serve on my committee. Third, I would also like to express gratitude for all of the librarians, archivists, on either side of the northern border that was pivotal in my research throughout the years. Noteworthy, Library Director Kathleen Knoth, Assistant Librarian Kari Hauge, and Library Information Specialist Rose Leon of the UNM-Taos Library. Without their valued assistance in accessing the Inter-library book loans of primary and secondary sources, and online sources, my thesis would have been inadequate. Moreover, my appreciation to the Distance Learning Librarian Rosanna Ensley-Backen at the ASU Nielsen Library, who was also of immense succor in my accessing many online sources. Last, but not the least, my thanks to Amber Gordon; the Writing Studio Director at UNM-Taos, whose critique in reviewing my thesis was extremely encouraging.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Page

Note: All maps are cited in Richard V. Barbuto, *The Canadian Theater of 1814,* Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington D.C. 2014.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

THIS COULD BE THE LAST TIME

> In these ways, successive generations of American and Canadian historians developed two parallel streams of historiography about the place of the War of 1812 in their national narratives, with little thought being given to the possibility that the streams might, or should intersect. In the case of Great Britain, the other main party to the war, the situation is rather different, and its historians have contributed much less to our understanding of the conflict.
>
> J.C.A. Stagg

In 1814, the war with Great Britain, which so many in the infant United States had embraced, seemed precariously at its ending point, likely to terminate with a United States defeat. Apart from engaging the world's most powerful nation in a war, the United States' military was composed mostly of militia and unskilled leaders. Ironically, in that same year, there was a turning point in the American Army's training procedures. Indeed, near the burnt devastation of Buffalo, New York, United States Army troops were trained in all aspects of military protocol.[1] Consequently, these warriors were at the ready for any contingency on the battlefield with their former colonial masters.

A measure of the United States improved military was the Battle of Niagara Falls, called the Battle of Lundy's Lane in British and Canadian History. What follows is a fresh analysis of the battle in which both sides claimed victory. For many Canadian historians, they perceived the conflict as their "Gettysburg," which eventually led to Canada becoming a sovereign nation, whereas many American historians viewed it as a pinnacle triumph that granted the United States status as an independent nation throughout the world. But neither of these postulations was accurate, since neither side

won the engagement—it was a drawn battle. Why the perspectives of these historians are the diametric opposite of one another? It is because of a nationalistic military narrative that requires a rationalization for their existence, or in the words of Historian Donald R. Hickey, the diverse narratives "construct a history that we are comfortable with that meets certain deep-seated needs."[2] Similarly, the Battle of Niagara Falls will be examined in light of the idealized history between Canada and the United States. This narrative paradox began in 1814.

Secretary of War, John Armstrong Jr. (1758-1843) initially outlined nine military districts of the United States and its territories. Of the three districts that bordered Canada, the 8th and 9th District experienced the most land combat during the war.[3] Indeed, specifically, the 9th with its location adjacent to Kingston, Ontario, and Montreal Quebec made it a highway for failed invasions earlier in the war, and it would serve the same purpose in 1814.

The American endeavors in British Canada were regarded as problematic, as the first two years of the war showcased the ill-prepared state of the United States Army. The American Army's high command was inundated with politically appointed commanders. Others were simply aged, having begun their military service in the Revolutionary War, some forty years earlier. Irrespective of how they obtained their commands, all of these men lacked the military experience necessary in commanding armies. And their mean age was fifty-seven, long past the military prime of field commanders in that epoch. Moreover, logistics and communications between the United States Army and the United States Navy were inadequate even by standards of 1814; as well as, in the schism between the American Army and the American Militia. In a letter written to President

James Madison on 19 December 1813, Camilus M. Mann, then editor of the *Baltimore National Museum and Weekly Gazette* stated that:

> The land military force of our confederated country is not commensurate with the emergency. This is acknowledged, avowed, known now, at home, after an experience which has in the execution of details defeated plans which were dictated by wisdom in the whole. The militia is, as it is at present constituted, declared, on official authorities, to be inefficient. The enemy knows all this. France too knows all this. And they know it long. And they calculate, have acted, and act accordingly.[4]

This resulted from Madison's choice of undistinguished ineffective American generals, including William Hull (1753-1825), Henry Dearborn (1751-1829), Wade Hampton (1752-1835), Stephen Van Rensselaer (1764-1839), and James Wilkinson (1757-1825), none of whom distinguished themselves in the war other than through consistent failure. Fortunately, Britain was preoccupied with a massive war against Napoleon. The war in Europe allowed the American Army to replace its "Hulls" and "Wilkinsons" with "Perrys" and "Jacksons" before Great Britain gained its advantage after Napoleon's defeat in 1814. Among the "Jacksons" were Generals Jacob Brown (1775-1828), Winfield Scott (1786-1866), Eleazer Ripley (1782-1839), and Andrew Jackson (1767-1845). They were the "young Turks" of the American army; although, there were some conditions that needed to be addressed for the third Niagara Campaign to yield a victory for the United States. A major point of reference was the American military chain-of-command in 1814.

Secretary Armstrong was determined to make the U.S. Army more efficient than it had been in the first year of the war. Military communications at that time were limited to hand written missives delivered by courier on horseback, wagon, or by naval ship, and it was one of the major obstacles in the conduct of the war on both sides. Therefore, an

attempt by Armstrong to manage his generals was contingent on which ones he selected for command positions. They had to function successfully with marginal oversight, and not challenge Armstrong who was also the *de facto* General in Chief of the U.S. Army. In fact it was probably furthest from Congress' intention to bestow upon a civil officer subordinate to the President the right to exercise military command.[5]

Armstrong needed a general he could trust and not challenge his authority as Secretary of War. He needed to rid himself of disreputable characters like Major General James Wilkinson, whom John Randolph (1773-1833) of Roanoke considered "from the very bark to the core a villain."[6] And Randolph was not alone in his opinion of Wilkinson. Wilkinson's reputation was based on his governorship of the Louisiana territory (1805), a covert political relationship with Aaron Burr (1756-1836) circa 1806,[7] and his two failed campaigns during the War of 1812, one at Crysler's Farm in 1813,[8] and the second battle at *Lacolle* Mills in 1814.[9] Hence, many historians have criticized Wilkinson throughout the years before, during, and since the ending of the war. Daniel Clark Jr., a contemporary of Wilkinson claims, " The General was intelligent enough to never be convicted of treason or abuse of power while obviously careless enough in his actions to be under suspicion by many including George Washington."[10] Theodore Roosevelt states of him, "In all our history, there is no more a despicable character."[11] In James Ripley Jacobs' view, "Wilkinson was able to clear his own name by darkening those of his accusers."[12] Clark had animosity toward Wilkinson, along the same lines, Roosevelt later used the primary revelations that Wilkinson had been a double agent for the Spanish Empire; Jacobs' lens had Wilkinson merely as a political opportunist who was constantly trying to justify any of his actions.

Accordingly, Armstrong did not want a general who might repeat Wilkinson's folly and challenged him by default, so, he created two separate commands at the division level: A Right Division, commanded by Major General George Izard (1776-1828) at Plattsburg, New York, and a Left Division, under Major General Jacob Brown (1775-1828) at Sacketts Harbor, New York. Both generals directly reported to the Secretary of War, illustrating Armstrong's desire for total control that was exacerbated by the anachronistic communications modality of that time period.

Political intrigue aside, the training of American troops that was the *de rigueur* for any professional army did not exist at the start of 1814. Indeed, the army, for example, lacked a standard operations manual. Winfield Scott, who created an operations manual, which modeled operations on what he called the "French System." Later, many historians concluded that Scott had largely translated (and plagiarized the) *Règlement Concernant L'exercise Et Les Manoeurves. Du Premier Aout 1791.*[13]

It was paramount to use a specific manual, not only for the lower ranks, but also for the officer corps, which was due to their qualifications as army officers. Scott described the political environment of general appointments when he joined the U.S. Army in 1808, in his *Memoirs*:

> It may… be safely said that many of the appointments were positively bad, and a majority of the remainder indifferent. Party spirit of that day knew no bounds, and, of course, was blind to policy. Federalists were almost entirely excluded from selection, though great numbers were eager for the field, and in New England and some other States, there were but few educated Republicans. Hence, the selections from those communities consisted mainly of coarse and ignorant men. In the other States, where there was no lack of educated men in the dominant party, the appointments consisted, generally, of swaggerers, dependants, decayed gentlemen, and others—"fit for nothing else," which always turned out utterly unfit for any military purpose whatever.[14]

Therefore, Armstrong's promotions in appointing general officers in 1813 and 1814 were based on merit, intelligence, competence, and a respect for the chain of command.

Due to intelligence reports on the British troop reinforced strength at Fort Niagara, it was apparent to Brown by March 1814, that he would instead invade Canada through the Niagara Peninsula. In April 1814, Scott under orders of Brown led his troops to the desolate and smoldering remains of Buffalo, New York, which had been destroyed by the British in December 1813. Not unlike the rage at the destruction of 9-11 inspired in the Americans who watched the televised scenes of carnage, those troops who physically witnessed the ashes of Buffalo were obviously traumatized in stress, and then inspired to bloodlust.[15]

Lieutenant-Colonel Richard V. Barbuto, USA (Ret.) one of the most illustrious scholars of military history for the War of 1812, cites Private Jarvis Hanks (1799-1858), a young drummer boy, "When we came and saw the smoldering ruins, it gave us deep sympathy for the desolate and plundered inhabitants; and sharpened our courage to prepare for an effectual retaliation when we should enter Canada upon the anticipated campaign."[16] Consequently, it heightened the American troops resolve and prepared them for basic training. With Scott as their taskmaster, the troops needed that resolve.

Winfield Scott and his troops set up camp just south of the burnt village of Buffalo. The encampment embraced the normal aspects of military life, including frequent exercises of "close order drill" and the essentials of sanitation and hygiene. A testament to the new emphasis on training in the United States Army, close order drill continuously reinforced the first lesson a new soldier learned, regardless, was how to turn right, left, and turn to face the rear. And now, thanks to Scott's appropriation of the

"French System," the Left Division jettisoned the three manuals, *Smyth's Regulations*, *Duane's Handbook*, and *Steuben's Blue Book*, despite the fact that *Smyth's Regulations* was an extremely abridged version of *Règlement.* For almost three months, the soldiers were drilled ten hours a day, seven days a week.[17]

Scott took great pains to improve the standard of living for his men, and his focus on discipline made one of his captains declare that "General Scott Drills and Damns, Drills and Damns, and Drills again…I hope he will drive something into the noodles of his Yankee soldiers."[18] Moreover, Scott was the progenitor for all future training for all American armed forces—basic training would become the norm. According to the U.S. Army War College: "Early each morning squads of twelve to twenty men were drilled by their Sergeants, followed by Captains drilling their companies later in the morning. In the early afternoon, the whole brigade was drilled for several hours under the watchful eyes of Scott."[19]

Donald E. Graves, perhaps, the foremost historian on Canadian Military history, and the editor of *Soldiers of 1814: American Enlisted Men's Memoirs Of The Niagara Campaign*, writes of the American soldiers' basic training:

> If they had not already received them, they were now issued uniforms, complete with a leather stock or neckband that held the soldier's head rigidly upright. They also received the tools of their trade—usually a variant of the .69 caliber Springfield muskets with its attendant 15-inch bayonet—and set about learning how to use them. At Winfield Scott's camp of instruction in the spring of 1814, such training was incessant, beginning at first light and continuing until dark.[20]

Due to a supply shortage of standard blue uniform jackets, Scott had to substitute the grey under jacket for his troops that was used by the American Militia. In a letter to Armstrong Scott relayed:

> It is a fact that ten or fifteen men of each company of infantry are destitute of both coats and shoes and are in other respects wretchedly clad. That this state of things may be attributed to the neglect of the commanding officers I can have no doubt. I cannot correct the past, but hold myself responsible for the future. In the meantime, the rank & file, who are not to blame, ought not to suffer.[21]

Scott realized it was the grey tunics and white trousers, or not anything to clothe his troops. He logically chose the former.

Scott's two biggest supporters in his training edict were his commanding officer General Brown, and the Secretary of War Armstrong. In 1814, Armstrong reported to Congress that since the beginning of the war, "no system of discipline has heretofore been practiced in training the armies of the United States either in line, by battalion, or by battalion, or by company."[22] His political influence guaranteed a standardized military training manual by the end of 1814, and it was a translated (and plagiarized) version of the 1791 *Règlement.* The resulting regulations became the *Rules and Regulations for the Field Exercise and Manœuvres of Infantry* published in 1815.[23] Therefore, it took the War of 1812 to begin the process of standardized military training, which assisted Brown exponentially in his preparations for Niagara.

Brown had won a decisive victory in defense of Sacketts Harbor on 29 May 1813 that garnered him promotion to a brigadier general rank in the U.S. Army, then he was promoted to major general in 1814.[24] He was a Quaker, and had worked as a school-teacher, a judge, and a merchant prior to the war. He knew Scott was a voracious reader of all military topics, therefore, he deferred to Scott's expertise and zeal in training the troops. Pulitzer Prize winning Historian Alan Taylor cited an American Army captain, "General Brown is a very industrious officer, but I consider General Scott as the life & soul of that army. . . . General Brown knows how to profit by the services of those

intelligent men who know how to fight."[25] In fact, in an age where germs might have been considered evil spirits, Scott's tactical hygiene regimen affected all aspects from the personal grooming to preparation of food:

> The 1st is the health of the troops. To effect this important object, no exertions are to be spared. The camp will be kept in an elegant order…the men are sometimes to bathe in the lake…the tents will be struck the first full day after every rain…but above all the first attention is to be paid the cooking of the messes… one officer per company shall inspect every meal before the men are permitted to eat. Salt meats are invariably to be boiled and not cooked in any other way.[26]

Scott followed the criteria set by the first Surgeon General of the United States, Dr. James Tilton (1745-1822) who achieved his post based on his treatise *Economical Observations; and the Prevention and Cure Of Diseases Incident to an Army.*[27] Scott's due diligence of Tilton's guideline paid off handsomely, as death by being unclean, or consuming improperly cooked food, or drinking dirty water kept the troops healthy for most of the majority. Accordingly, one of Scott's surgeons remarked, "… even the demon diarrhoea appeared to have been exorcised by the mystical power of strict discipline and rigid police."[28] It was remarkable since Louis Pasteur's (1822-1895) final proof of the "Germ Theory of Disease" would not occur for a few decades. On the other side, "confidence translated into coin," as the British government was now ready to concentrate their efforts against the United States.

Unlike Madison's Administration, which had three successive and undistinguished secretaries of war, the British had but one counterpart during those war years; Lord Henry Bathurst (1762-1834), who served as Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, a British cabinet position for the army, navy, and for the British colonies other than India.[29] Lord Bathurst answered to the Prime Minister Lord Liverpool, Robert B. Jenkinson (1770-1828),[30] and in Canada, Lieutenant-General Sir George Prévost

(1767-1816) was under the command of Bathurst. He was commander-in-chief of all British troops in Canada, and the governor-general of the Canadian colonies. Historian John K. Mahon describes the culture of British military administration:

> In common with most of the British government, the administration of the army was cumbersome and riddled with peculation. Its flaws in organization reflected a government which was weakened by powerful countervailing forces, such as the independent aristocracy, strong commercial interests, the almost holy sanctity of property, and the innumerable civil liberties imbedded in the common law. In theory strategic decisions had to be made by King in Council…in practice a informal inner cabinet made them, or often single ministers or other officers who were knowledgeable and willing to accept responsibility. Lord Bathurst was one of these.[31]

In the royal chain of command, the final decision rested with the Prince Regent George Augustus Frederick (1762-1830), the future King George IV. Bathurst gave Prévost orders to defend the Canadian colonies with the resources at hand for the first two years of the war. For most of the War of 1812, Prévost's strategy was defensive and cautious, as the British troop complement in Canada was on an even parity with the Americans. Despite having a much better trained army, one that was able to deter invading United States forces time and time again, Prévost maintained his defensive posture. The war with Napoleon had taxed the British manpower to its limits, but that changed with Napoleon's first abdication in April 1814. Shortly afterword, Bathurst ordered Prévost to prepare to receive additional British troops from Europe and use them to invade the United States.[32] Furthermore, Bathurst explicates, "The object of your [Prévost's] operations will be; first, to give immediate protection [to Canada], secondly, to obtain if possible ultimate security to His Majesty's Possessions in America."[33] In making these goals, Bathurst urged Prévost to continue the defense of British Canada while preparing for a major invasion of the United States, or in contemporary military argot, "hurry up and wait!"

Prévost was an able administrator, but his military command skills were questionable. He was born in the then Province of New Jersey, and his father Augustine Prévost (1723-1786) was a Swiss born and a lieutenant colonel in the British army. His son was a late eighteen-century "military brat," who received his first commission as an ensign in his father's regiment. Whereas the American army officer corps advanced through mostly political patronage, while the British army officers were usually promoted by purchase of their ranks. Therefore, it was either politics or the class system of purchase that was the *status quo* for these armies' officer corps.

It was fortunate for Prévost that he had as his second in command, Lieutenant General Sir Gordon Drummond (1772-1854). Drummond was unique among the British army senior officers, for he was born in Canada at Québec. His family was from Scotland. Four years after Drummond's father died, the family moved to England. Drummond joined the Royal Army in 1789, and he also rose through the ranks by purchase. He commanded British forces in Canada before Prévost and was then ordered to Ulster, Ireland in 1811, where he was placed in command of a military district.[34]

Late in 1813, Drummond was sent back to Upper Canada as lieutenant governor and replaced Major General Francis de Rottenberg (1757-1832) who himself, had succeeded Major General Sir Roger H. Sheaffe (1763-1851) early in 1813.[35] Rottenberg was considered over-cautious, and consistently proved reluctant to send reinforcements to vital areas, as an illustration, he refused to send reinforcements to General Henry Proctor (1763-1822) in Detroit that became the catalyst for British defeats at the Battle of Lake Erie, and the Battle of Moraviantown. Sheaffe was in charge of British troops that poorly defended the capitol of York (present-day Toronto) against American forces under

command of General Zebulon Pike (1779-1813).). It must be noted that both of these commanders followed Prévost's edict that viewed Upper Canada as expendable as long as Montreal and Québec in Lower Canada remained safe.[36]

Drummond had some points in his favor: the first was his Canadian born status along with his being commander-in-chief of British forces in Canada, the second was his younger age, and finally, he was fighting for his home territory—he was the second worst enemy one could fight after a mother defending her offspring. His efficacy hinged only in part on his skills and knowledge of Canada. He would also have to depend on arms and troops. Both proved to be of sufficient quality and quantity.[37]

The British soldier's primary weapon in the War of 1812, was the ' India Pattern flintlock. It was slightly over six feet with fixed bayonet, and it weighed ten pounds eleven ounces. The trooper's secondary weapon was the bayonet, which was a fourteen to sixteen-inch blade in a triangular cross-section that locked onto its muzzle.[38]
The musket consisted of three major components: the "lock," the "stock," and the "barrel" (hence the origin of the expression).[39] It was a larger caliber than its American Army's equivalent in the .69 Springfield, which was just less than four feet in length.[40] Unlike the American military, the British Army also possessed a single, uniform drill system, *Dundas's 18 Manoeuvers*, which was adopted in 1792 and continued to be use many years after the war.[41] Drummond had guns and soldiers. And it was fortunate that he was a determined leader, filling a gap left in the British high command in Canada. There was a political vacuum with the Canadian civilian population along the Niagara Frontier.

The politics of the Canadian civilians in the early nineteenth century, was not as monolithic as some historians might have believed, Taylor writes:

> Most inhabitants of Canada were equally pessimistic and far more apathetic when it came to defending the British Empire. But then Canada was hardly "British" in 1812. In Lower Canada, the descendants of French colonists were in the majority, and in sparsely populated Upper Canada, three-fifths of the inhabitants were "late loyalists"—Americans who had arrived in the 1790s or later in search of cheap land. Neither was especially loyal to the British government, but neither had an established opposition either.[42]

As the war continued, some immigrant Canadians either became loyal to the British Crown or treasonous to it, specifically the latter, Joseph Willcocks (1773-1814) and the Canadian Volunteers. How they chose sides, consequently, depended on the efforts of the British or American Armies in their "winning hearts and minds" of the local population. For the "Loyalist" civilian segments, who were not "newcomers," many of them joined the Canadian Militia.

In Upper Canada, there was a regiment called the Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles, and in Lower Canada, a regiment was named Canadian *Voltigeurs,* among others. Since they were hunters and woodsmen, they augmented British troops with their specialty in fighting a *guerrilla* war, or as skirmishers. These skirmishers were the primogenitors of present day special forces, such as, Canadian Special Operations Forces, U.S. Army Green Berets, U.K. Army Special Air Service, and U.S. Navy Seals.
The British skirmishers prime mission was to delay an enemy advance by harassment that included scouting, ambushes and sniping. The Americans used skirmishers as well, but, only in a limited capacity. Their primary functions were to garrison outposts, repair roads and bridges, guard prisoners, and as scouts. As to the upper echelons of the nineteenth-century British military, there was another point of contention by their major hero.

Arthur Wellesley (1769-1852), the First Duke of Wellington, and later victor against Napoleon at Waterloo, wrote a letter to Bathurst in February 1814:

> America was no place to wage a war with large bodies of troops, because the lack of transportation and communications facilities was appalling. Furthermore, the United States was a political jellyfish; it could not be hurt in one spot. I don't know where you could carry on … an operation which would be so injurious to the Americans as to force them to sue for peace, which is what one wishes to see…. the prospect in regard to America is not consoling.[43]

The British public's opinion was the exact opposite of Wellington's when Napoleon was first defeated in April, 1814. Admittedly, as the *Aberdeen Journal* editorialized, "The Americans are now likely to feel the full might of British vengeance; and now every preparation is made for inflicting with severity proportionate to the delay, the vengeance which has so long been suspended over them."[44] Therefore, it was the rigid dichotomy between the British populace and the British military, which shaped the British Crown's policy on the war. Victories on land must come soon, or the British populace would become disenchanted.

On the United States' side, there was another scenario that was prevalent in that era—inter-service rivalry between the American Army and the American Navy. It was ubiquitous throughout the war, and it was on Niagara frontier because of two personalities with their specific agendas on how to conduct the war—General Brown and Commodore Isaac Chauncey (1772-1840). Chauncey being the commandant of the third largest naval yard in the nation at Sacketts Harbor, (New York City and Albany New York were the first and second) had two goals: the first was to build the largest fleet of frigates and gunboats, and the second, to dominate all of Lake Ontario by the defeat of the Royal Navy commanded by Sir James Yeo (1782-1818).[45]

The concept of the U.S. Navy's aiding and abetting the U.S. Army in the invasion of Canada, was not included in Chauncey's orders from Armstrong, or the Secretary of the Navy William Jones (1760-1831). The success of any invasion of the Niagara frontier would be compromised without the navy's assistance in resupplying the army with troops, ordnance, and provisions of food and drink. The schism between those services was exacerbated by Chauncey's claim that it was the U.S. Navy that was solely responsible for the American victory at Sandy Creek. According to John D. Morris, Brown was appalled by Chauncey's *hubris*, and protested to Armstrong in a letter, "I feel more tender upon this subject as I do know that the Navy of Ontario is under great obligation to the Army for its preservation and support."[46]

Accordingly, by 21 June 1814, Chauncey still had never received orders from Armstrong, or Jones that he was to participate in the July invasion. Therefore, his focus was still on engaging Yeo and the Royal Navy in their defeat, and he responded to Brown's letter of that date demanding "upon receipt of this you will have the goodness to let me know by express when you will be out and if I may expect you in the neighborhood of Fort George by the 10th of July or by what day,"[47] with his missive as to his prime target, Yeo, "If he visits the head of the lake with his fleet, you may expect to see me there also, if he retires to Kingston, I shall be in the vicinity to watch his movements."[48]

Because of Chauncey's lackluster letter of support, Brown found himself and his Left Division in a dilemma of not being resupplied. Moreover, Chauncey's orders to engage and defeat Yeo's command never resulted in a decisive battle for either side. Scott, in his *Memoirs*, wrote about Yeo and Chauncey, "the two naval *heroes of*

defeat [*sic*] held each other a little more than at arm's length – neither being willing to risk a battle without a decided superiority in guns and men."[49] In the first two years of the war, that dynamic between opposing navies on Lake Ontario was standard operating procedure, and it probably increased Brown's anxiety as he planned the third invasion of Canada.

In hindsight, both navies, American and British, had a major logistical problem, although they had enough trees and personnel to manufacture their frigates and gunboats—it was their ability to supply them with cannons, sails, mastheads that were problematic. For Chauncey, he had to wait on ordnance from New York City via Albany New York, and for Yeo, that was contingent upon whether or not; Halifax and Montreal had received enough armament from England. Time was not on either side, as the moment of the invasion was near.

Brown, Scott, and Ripley were all prepared for the campaign despite the unknown quantity of Chauncey and his "never ready" fleet. Brown was pleased at Scott's results with his troops of the First and Second Brigade when he returned to Buffalo in June 1814. The troops had met the goals that Scott had instigated when training began weeks earlier. The only drawback during the nineteenth-century "basic training," was the problem of deserters. The consequences for desertion varied, and in extreme instances, it resulted in execution of the offenders. Madison preferred a more cautious policy. In the same month of June 1814, he issued a proclamation promising to pardon all deserters who surrendered within three months.[50] Unfortunately, due to the nineteenth century version of "snail mail," Madison's notification was late in reaching Buffalo. Thus, in a letter to his wife Sarah dated 8 June 1814, U.S. Army Captain George Howard writes:

> On the 4th of the month the whole army were under arms to witness the execution of six men who had been guilty of desertion, mutiny etc. They were marched out, placed before their graves with coffins in front, the signal was given and five of them were shot dead. One, a boy was reprieved having been strongly recommended to mercy by the court of which I was a member, his name is William Fairchild.[51]

This incident, even though, heinous and illegal by contemporary standards negated any future desertions in Brown's Left Division. (It should be noted that a lack of overdue wages was one of the main reasons for desertion, which was due to the United States being close to bankruptcy.) For minor offenses, flogging or incarceration in the stockade was the norm on either side of the border. The Left Division was ready for battle with the enemy, although, the British Army already had very little respect for their American cousins.

Graves wrote that the American troops were condescendingly referred to as "Cousin Jonathan," and prior to the British victory at Crysler's Farm in 1813, the British officers echoed, "This was Jonathan's debut on the open plain, and I think, for the future, he would prefer his old mode of acting in the bush."[52] In 1814, by contrast, the Royal Armed forces would face a different U.S Army, and in the end, it was all up to Chauncey, and his fleet. The last campaign between British Canada and the United States was on, and Washington and London awaited news of victory or defeat.

On 2 July 1814, Brown, acting on orders from Armstrong, ordered his senior officers that they would cross the river and attack Fort Erie "to give immediate occupation to your troops and prevent them from stagnating, why not take Fort Erie." It was Armstrong's premise that Brown and his troops would have a foothold in Niagara when Chauncey's fleet would join them. Brown's Left Division had three brigades.

The chain of command structure was as follows: Scott commanded the First Brigade, Ripley led the Second Brigade, and Major Jacob Hindman (1789-1827) commanded the four artillery companies of the consolidated Corps of Artillery. Brigadier General Peter B. Porter (1773-1844), formerly a war hawk United States Congressman from Black Rock New York, commanded the Third Brigade of Pennsylvania and New York volunteers, plus about three hundred to six hundred Iroquois led by the *Seneca* Chief, *Sachem* Red Jacket (c.1750-1830). Additionally, Porter's brigade had a platoon of the Canadian Volunteers, led by Joseph Willcocks.[53]

These volunteers were composed of American immigrants and disgruntled Canadians. They are the group that torched Newark, Upper Canada, which led to the British retaliation in the burnings of Buffalo and other American villages. When they were not committing crimes of rape, homicide, kidnapping, and arson of their former Canadian neighbors, the Canadian Volunteers were regarded highly by the Americans as scouts. Present-day Canadians use Joseph Willcocks in the same vernacular as Americans use the name Benedict Arnold.[54]

With the sole exception of Brown, who had originally come from the militia ranks, Scott's opinion of American militia and their officers were equivalent to his feelings for most American officer in the ranks from 1808 up until 1814. Therefore, Scott and Porter's relationship was adversarial in private, and congenial in the open ranks. Moreover, in a letter to Armstrong, Scott called Porter, "an officer whose steady zeal & perseverance I highly respect."[55] Although In private, Scott, in another letter to Brown, wrote:

> By the way, I suspect Gov. Tompkins and P.B. Porter of a stratagem against myself and the other brigadiers of this army. He (Porter) is very ingeniously styled general in all official communications between them, but whether he has the commission of a Lieut. General or a Major General in his pocket is very cautiously concealed. I wish not to conceal my determination never to submit to the orders of a militiaman whilst I hold a commission on the line. I hold myself prepared to leave the service on that point.[56]

Unlike many recent twenty-first century war hawks whose bravado remained only in their speeches, Porter resigned from the U.S. Congress to fight in the war that he clamored for vehemently, and he was determined that the militia volunteers from New York and Pennsylvania were on an even parity with regular American troops. Consequently, he and Scott were both equal in their determination to defeat the British Army.

Brown, Scott, and Porter reconnoitered the opposite side from their vantage point to where Lake Erie abruptly narrowed into the Niagara River. Brown's transport situation was precarious, because the boats he required from the U.S. Navy fleet at Lake Erie were diverted to Lake Huron. This shifting was based on faulty intelligence reports that British were building a new fleet, which threatened not only Lake Erie, but Fort Detroit as well, that had been recaptured by the American Army in 1813; it was also due to Armstrong's position as Secretary of War being uncertain.

Historian C. Edward Skeen noted that "Madison had permitted him wide latitude in the conduct of the office, in fact, almost a completely free hand, but forbearance ended in the spring of 1814, and pre-emptory orders began to flow from the President's office."[57] In other words, Skeen believes that Madison's *carte blanche* to Armstrong directly led to given by Madison ended the combined defeats ensued from the British Army at Crysler's Farm, La Colle, Quebec, and the defeat and capture of the USS Essex

by the Royal Navy, all of them on Armstrong's "watch." Brown's Niagara sortie would have to be successful, or Armstrong's cabinet position would be terminated.

Around midnight on 2 July 1814, the American troops marched to a rally point at Buffalo Creek where the limited amount of boats awaited. The troops were surprised by the order, as well were the junior officers. Historian Samuel White explains, "So unexpected was this order, and so completely had General Brown concealed his intentions that his officers, not all suspecting the mediated movement, had actually made preparations for… the fourth of July."[58] Hence, the third invasion, for better or worse, was on. The supply of boats were adequate for Scott and his First Brigade, but, were inadequate for Ripley and his Second Brigade:

> ON the night of the 3d of July, 1814, General Ripley crossed the Niagara River with his Brigade, above Fort Erie, and landed his men in good order notwithstanding the embarrassing situation the General had been placed in for want of means of transportation, having only two gun boats, and two small boats, for the crossing of his whole brigade. The gun boats could not get nearer the Canada shore than about three quarters of a mile, and the small boats would not contain more than about fifty men each fortunate for the General, the enemy made no resistance on our landing, or he must have lost a great many of his men, as, he could not land at a time more than one hundred men.[59]

There were British sentries on the Canadian shore, nevertheless, as Scott and the First Brigade approached in the first wave of attack. Scott was six feet five inches tall, and weighed approximately two hundred and forty pounds. It made him an obvious target as one British sentry fired at him. Historian *Pierre* Berton detailed the event:

> As musket ball whiz above his head, Scott leaps over the side and is about to shout "Follow me!" when the boat swerves in the current and he steps into a hole. "Too deep!" gurgles Scott, as he disappears below the surface. The warning cry prevents 150 men from drowning…her crew struggles to haul the big brigadier general…by cloak, high boots, sword, and pistols aboard. No one laughs…in the shallows of a small cove near Fort Erie…goes over the side again. His men follow. The British pickets galloped away.[60]

In other accounts, Scott thrust his sword into the water to measure its depth, and when the British picket fired the musket ball, the current had already moved Scott's boat over to deep waters. Regardless, Scott's 1st Brigade touched land just north of Fort Erie, while Ripley's 2nd Brigade landed a few hours later southwest of that same fort. As for Porter and his Third Brigade, Scott and Ripley had used all of the available boats. Therefore, the 3rd Brigade was stranded on the American side for almost another day, much to Porter's consternation. Over in the Niagara Peninsula, both brigades formed an "Anaconda" formation around Fort Erie, leaving no avenue of retreat for the British forces. Brown's immediate objective of the securing of Fort Erie was only a matter of "hurry up and wait," for the British commander to realized the futility of his position.

The only casualties were a few American troops. Captain George Howard wrote: "A heavy shot followed by a shrapnel burst directly over our standard—borne by Ensign Pheneas Andrews—and wounded four of six corporals who comprised the color guard."[61] Led by their officers, some of the Americans troops dispersed among the nearby woods for cover. The artillery shot was a token resistance by the Fort Erie's commander Major Thomas Buck. Buck had only three artillery pieces and was convinced that he could withstand neither a bombardment nor an assault.[62] Therefore, he came to a command decision that was fiercely argued by his fellow officers—that they all would surrender Fort Erie.

According to Graves, Buck did make some preparations, "One part of Buck's command that escaped captivity was the small detachment of the 19th Light Dragoons posted at the fort. As soon as word of the American crossing had reached him the night before, Buck had dispatched them to warn Riall."[63] Graves is corroborating the age-old

adage that one's duty is essential, even in the premise of defeat—Buck wisely alerted the rest of the British regiments prior to his surrender of Fort Erie.

As for the surrender, it was peaceful and according to military protocol of the time. In Howard's view, "An officer came out, terms were negotiated and at the head of my company at 5 P.M. I marched in, hauled down the British flag and planted the standard of the 25th U.S. Infantry upon the antient [sic] ramparts of Fort Erie."[64] It was the only time in the third Niagara Campaign that neither side experienced loss of life due to combat. All of that would change in a short time at Chippewa, which was the site where Scott and the 1st Brigade bivouacked on 4 July 1814. Close by were British troops.

Major General Phineas Riall (1775-1850) had been in command of the assault on Fort Niagara and the subsequent burnings of Buffalo and other villages. He was second in command to Drummond, and had travelled with him from England where he took command of the British Right Division. Riall was an Irish born British subject, had some combat experience during the Irish Rebellion of 1798-1799, commanded a regiment in the West Indies, and prior to 1813 had never been to Canada. His fighting experience was congruous with Drummond, as American Military Historian John R. Etling points out: "…had only limited combat experience and undistinguished records, but were both energetic and ambitious."[65] He was in command of Fort George when he received news of the American invasion on Sunday morning, 3 July 1814, the communiqué, did not report that Fort Erie had been captured. Riall's counter measures were based previous contact with the American Army, and he decided to attack them quickly and decisively.[66]

It was the British Army's *modus operandi,* which had been used time and time again with overall success. On 23 March 1814, Riall received a secret communication from one of his senior officers, Lieutenant Colonel John Harvey (1778-1852):

> The Lieut. -General concurs with you as to the probability of the enemy's acting on the offensive as soon as the season permits Having, unfortunately, no accurate information as to his plans of attack, general defensive arrangements can alone be suggested. It is highly probable that independent of the siege of Fort Niagara, or rather in combination with the attack on that place the enemy will invade the District of Niagara by the western road,' and that he may at the same time land a force at Long Point and' perhaps at Point Abino or Fort Erie…With your whole force thus concentrated in an advantageous and open position, the Lieut-General has no apprehension of your not being equal or superior to anything the enemy can bring against you…[67]

Harvey's reference for the Lieutenant General Drummond's assumption that Riall's troops on being more than a match for their American opposite was based on previous encounters that ended in British victories. Furthermore, Riall was in concurrence with Drummond's analysis of their American enemy, and he did not send reconnaissance patrols to ascertain the U.S. Army's troop strength. He also, in all probability, never read a translated old *adage* from *Lao Tzu*, "There is no greater danger than underestimating your opponent."[68]

Riall ordered a few companies to counter the Americans at Chippewa, 1st Foot, or Royal Scots. He also ordered the 8th Foot, or King's Own, to quick-time march from York, along with several companies of the 100th Foot, or Prince Regent County of Dublin Regiment.[69] Riall arrived at Chippewa on Monday the 4th of July, the King's Own from York were fatigued from the march from York, so Riall postponed the attack until 5 July 1814. Moreover, he did send an advanced guard, also on 4 July 1814, led by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Pearson (1782-1847), and it is ironic that, Pearson had captured Winfield Scott early in the war at the Battle of Queenston Heights.

Pearson was aware that Fort Erie, had been captured by the Americans, and he was ready to contest them, since he was a seasoned combat veteran of nearly twenty years. (He was wounded in 1811 at the Battle of *Albuera*; he was then transferred to Canada in the same year with constant pain in his thighbone that had been shattered by a musket ball.[70]) His posting in British Canada was supposed to have been "light duty," as opposed to a war—it made him more aggressive and determined to defeat the American invaders.

That same day, Pearson, three light companies, dragoons, some militiamen, and a small number of Grand River Natives went south towards Chippewa. They intercepted the Americans' quick march north to seize the important bridge over the Chippewa River. Pearson's opponent was General Winfield Scott, who was his prisoner-of-war, now his deadly opponent. Scott's brigade had been ordered north by Brown to secure that same bridge. For the next twelve hours or so, a running battle occurred between Scott's troops and Pearson's forces that covered sixteen miles. Scott later remarked, "It was the first and only time that he [Scott] ever found himself at the head of a force superior to that of the enemy in his front: their relative numbers being, on that occasion, about four to three."[71]

Due to the rear-guard action by Pearson they were able to destroy the bridge, which blocked Scott's egress. Around dusk, with physically spent troops, Scott ended his monotonous quest for Pearson and his troops. Later that evening, the American Army, bivouacked on the left bank of Chippewa Creek, noted the British on the opposite side, posted extra pickets, sent out patrols, and collapsed in their own exhaustion. The one *caveat* for Scott in that encounter with Pearson was that in his training of his troops, for he did not include the "skirmisher" paradigm—Pearson used that tactic to his advantage.

Nevertheless, Scott and his troops had just gone through the preliminary for the Battle of Chippewa, where their basic training would be tested.

Brown, upon gathering his brigades together, planned to attack the British on 6 July 1814. Conversely, Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) argues, "No operation extends with any certainty beyond the first encounter with the main body of the enemy."[72] Prior to the American planned attack, Brown sent Porter and the 3rd Brigade into the west of Chippewa "to scour the woods with my Indians, sustained by the Volunteers, and drive the enemy across the *Chippewa*."[73] Iroquois Natives, who had been neutral in the war until 1814, even though, they displayed the most enthusiasm for the coming battle, augmented Porter's brigade; which had exhausted volunteers who marched eighteen miles to Chippewa without food rations.

Porter assembled his brigade late in the afternoon and issued his orders just before 4 P.M. He formed a long thin line perpendicular to the Niagara River with 150 Iroquois on the left and approximately the same number of Pennsylvania Militiamen on the right.[74] In addition, there were fifty American Army regulars that brought up the rear, and they were making headway in engaging their Canadian militia and Great Lakes warriors, but for unexpectedly encountering Riall's regular troops—they quickly retreated almost back to American lines. Barbuto himself writes, "Although defeated in their attempt to clear the forest, Porter's men inflicted more than 100 casualties, mostly KIA, upon the Indians and Canadian militia, suffering only 35, themselves."[75]

With the retorts of musket fire from the woods, and determining that the situation was dire, Brown rode horseback to Scott who was already in the process of forming his regiments for drill. Brown ordered Scott to move his brigade onto the plain. Scott, who

had as low an opinion of the British as Riall had of the Americans, doubted he would "find 300 of the enemy."[76] Scott sent his artillery off to the right flank, positioning it beside the Niagara on Portage Road so that it could not be outflanked, and moved his infantry units into a line extending out from the artillery. If Scott was confident, Riall was even more so.

Riall reconnoitered the American camp late in the morning of the 5th with Pearson and Norton.[77] As he looked at the invaders across the open plain, he could see their gray cloth uniforms and was relieved; these were merely militia, the men who could not stand up to the first artillery shell, let alone face a bayonet charge by the British veterans. In the late afternoon, when British artillery that consisted of two 24-pounder guns and one 5.5 inch howitzer volleys, failed to scatter the American troops, Riall allegedly exclaimed, "Why, those are regulars, by God!"[78]

The American regulars included Captain Nathaniel Towson's (1784-1854) artillery company. The ordinance consisted of three 12-pounder guns that destroyed Riall's ammunition wagon, which put most of the British cannons out of commission. The fighting was fierce and lasted about an hour, and neither side was going to give ground to the other. Indeed, the British Army advanced with Lieutenant Colonel John Gordon's (? -1814) 1st Foot and Lieutenant Colonel George Hay's also known as Marquis de Tweedale (1787-1876) 100th Foot, and with the fatigued marched 8th Foot in the rear. Jarvis Hanks states:

> Soon we were formed into a line, through the enemy's fire, in a meadow, where the grass was about three feet high and very thrifty. The firing continued on both sides without the least cessation, or the less distraction, in either army for 75 or 80 minutes, when the British soldiers and officers…turned their backs upon the grey-coated American Militia, as they supposed we were, and fled in terror and precipitation to their fortress.[79]

Curiously, Riall had his troops in a line, instead of the standard marching column, and combined with tall uneven grass, it made their headway sluggish in harm's way of the American artillery. There was an advantage, to the use of a line instead of a column, was that it increased the infantry's firepower. Riall negated that benefit by his order of his soldiers to fire only one volley before a bayonets fixed charge.[80]

Meanwhile, Scott's troops deployed into line with Major Thomas Jesup's (1788-1860) 25th U.S. Infantry on the left flank near the woods, Major John McNeil's (1784-1850) 11th Infantry and Major Henry Leavenworth's (1783-1834) 9th U.S. Infantry in the center and also Leavenworth's 22nd U.S. Infantry on the right flank with Towson's guns. According to Berton:

> The British, only two hundred yards from the American line, attempt a charge through the deep furrows and three-foot grass of the meadow. They are beaten back. Gordon, the colonel of the Royals, falls, shot in the mouth, unable to speak… A ball ploughs into Tweedale's game leg, cutting his Achilles tendon; he cannot move. His men hoist him onto his horse and begin to take down a fence to let him through to the rear.[81]

Although both sides were evenly matched in troop strength, the American Army had the psychological advantage of being well trained and covered in a grey and white facade. This combination placed the British Army in a quandary, although the American troops resembled American militia, they were well disciplined and not inferior at all to their British opposite. Barbuto states:

> For his part, Jesup had eliminated the British threat in the forest and now brought his men into the meadow on Riall's flank. The 25th fired three volleys and charged. Scott's other two battalions, surged forward as well. The red line broke. The British infantry maintained cohesion but fell back through the defile formed by the tongue of woods and the Niagara, crossing the bridge across the Chippawa and removing the planking so that the Americans could not pursue. The British suffered approximately 500 casualties, the Americans 325.[82]

Among the wounded casualties, was one Private Jacob Dexter, an African-American in Jesup's 25th Infantry, who had enlisted in the 25th on 28 March 1814.[83] Although African-Americans served in the U.S. Navy in many tasks and in many of the state militias, the Militia Act of 1792 had forbid them enlistment in the U.S. Army. In 1814, that *status quo* changed as the enlistment of other African-Americans were desperately needed in this critical year. Historian Robert Ewell Greene elucidates, "During the 1814 Niagara campaign, black regulars fought with the 1st U.S., 11th U.S., 23rd U.S., and 25th Infantry Regiments, and also with the U.S. Corps of Artillery.[84] While the British Empire again, as in the Revolutionary War, recruited African-Americans and African-Canadians to join their combat ranks; it reinforced the premise, which many Canadian historians have often referred to the War of 1812, as a family dispute. Historian Victor Suthren explains:

> In Lower Canada, what is now the Province of Quebec, the French-speaking majority had little love for the British colonial overlords, who had governed them since the conquest of New France, fifty years earlier. As with the American War of Independence, they viewed this new war as another fratricidal struggle between Anglo-Saxons, in which the people of Quebec had little interest. The British government, however, had guaranteed their freedom of language and religion, and it was not clear that the Americans would do the same if they were to control Canada. Picking the lesser of two evils, French Canadians served willingly in regular British regiments and militia formations, and fought well in the successful repulse of American forces.[85]

The essence of Suthren's argument is that it was a civil war for mostly Anglo-Saxon and French on either side of the American/Canadian border. Even though the U.S. Constitution guarantees freedom of religion, speech, and assembly in the First Amendment; consequently, the British overlords did an excellent propaganda in establishing fear in French-Canadians to justify in fighting the Americans. Regardless, there was still the problem of parallel cultures.

In fact, a British lieutenant, John Le Couteur (1794-1875) who upon meeting American officers at their camp in the autumn of 1813, "Strange indeed did it appear to me to find so many names, 'familiar household words,' as enemies—the very names of Officers in our own army. How uncomfortably like a civil war." But a month later, an atrocity by American troops led Le Couteur to denounce them as deserving no mercy in battle: "The rascals, they are worst than Frenchmen." So said the British officer with a French name.[86] Hence, the dichotomy between American and Canadian narratives is an ongoing process. Indeed, their respective historiographies of military history had its origins during and at the end of the war, and it is an ongoing process that continues to present day. The thesis answers the American and Canadian postulations about the Battle of Niagara Falls and its consequences, by contradicting both of their conceptual filters.

The four chapters demonstrate this alternative narrative: Chapter One is a strategic overview of war in Canada from late 1813 to the summer of 1814, and provides a detailed examination of the opposing military forces, their strengths and weaknesses; the appraisal of the political-military structure on both sides, which ends with the Battle of Chippewa. Chapter Two involves the interlude from the Battle of Chippewa until the first phase of the Battle of Niagara Falls; the lack of an American uniform command structure compounded by inter-service rivalry, and varied political agendas. Chapter Three covers the remaining phases of the engagement with the opposing armies' status until its terminus. Chapter Four considers the disengagement of the fray, with troop movements on both sides, and substantiates that the outcomes proposed by the parallel historiographies were both popular national misconceptions.

As a result, all of these chapters deliver the acute shortcomings surrounding these two historic narratives. Indeed, their presumptions on who won or lost the Battle of Niagara Falls brings this thesis as an appurtenance to the historic discourse for future generations of historians.


BATTLE OF CHIPPEWA
5 July 1814
Initial U.S. movement
Initial British movement
Main U.S. Attack
Main British Attack
0
1
Mile
Niagara River
Manchester
Falls
Fort Schlosser
Goat Island
Rapids
Niagara River
RIALL
Chippewa
Navy Island
Chippewa River
8th
100th
ROYAL SCOTS
9th/22d
25th
11th
SCOTT
Lyon's Creek
Indians Militia
PA Militia
Iroquois
PORTER
Street's Creek

CHAPTER TWO

BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE

> Indeed, we were all young soldiers, and the wonder should be,
> not that we blundered, but that we did not blunder more, and
> that our talented and veteran enemy should have out blundered us.
> U.S. Army Major Thomas S. Jesup
> Memoir

Centuries after *Machivelli's* treatise, *The Art of War*, many of his concepts were still used in the nineteenth century, and some scholars would argued that those theories are still being used in the present day. Indeed, one of Machivelli's aphorisms applied to the start of the third Niagara Campaign, "To know in war how to recognize an opportunity and seize it is better than anything else."[1] The Left Division was extremely fortunate that the capture of Fort Erie was undemanding for military forces on either side, and that was due to Major Buck making the best possible decision for all concerned. General Riall, even so, misjudged the grey-jacketed American enemy, which was one of the many reasons for his defeat at Chippewa. While acknowledging these controlled parallel historiographical military narratives, this chapter identifies the alternate story of the chaotic logistical and political state that existed for both sides during the Battle of Niagara Falls.

For three days after the Battle of Chippewa, the Left Division was tasked with the burial of the dead, rebuilding a bridge across the Chippewa River, and in Captain Howard's words, " dressing the wounded, sending off prisoners and shipping the lame ducks to Buffaloe [sic] and a market."[2] (The lame ducks that Howard described were some Pennsylvania militia who did not want to continue fighting the war.[3]) Riall, not

wanting to repeat his defeat at Chippewa, ordered his troops to retreat to Queenston Heights, and their pace according to American prisoner-of-war Captain Samuel White, "… set off at full trot, and some in a gallop, not delaying to pick up the camp kettles, which were dropping along the road, one here, one there, shaken from the wagons by the unususally [sic] rapid motion."[4] In Graves' words:

> These actions did not escape the notice of Riall's Indian allies, who had been augmented after the battle by a large contingent led by *Tenskawata*, and almost all the warriors disappeared from camp in the space of a few hours. Riall sent Norton to bring them back but even that able leader could only gather fifty of the more aggressive. At the same time, the 2nd Lincolns, their morale sapped by the heavy casualties they had suffered on 5 July and worried about the safety of their families, began to drift away.[5]

The heavy casualties endured by the 2nd Lincoln Militia included the loss of all of their senior officers. In the early nineteenth century, a military chain of command where a Private First Class could command troops in lieu of officers and non-commissioned officers was nonexistent. Graves overlooked what would be considered an important point of his narrative: the Iroquois' Nation had been fighting many of their same people on the British side; individually, they decided it was a "white man's war," and many returned to neutrality that they had prior to 1814. It was a great loss of a majority of skirmisher troop strength for both sides. It made Riall's location unresolved; also, it was another of the reasons that Riall evacuated Queenston Heights to Fort George, unbeknownst to Brown and his Left Division when they arrived to engage the British on 10 July 1814.

Riall's paramount engrossment, conversely, was dwindling food supplies for the British soldiers, which intensified their low morale. Thus, Upper Assemblyman Thomas Ridout (1754-1829) remarked, "unless some of the thousands now in the Lower Province

are speedily sent up and arrive that the enemy's fleet be kept in check, the game is up for this quarter."[6]

Ironically, the weather was an essential component in Drummond's defense of Canada. Despite the victories that the British accomplished against the Americans, there had been a severe drought that began circa 1812, and it was a matter of survival for the Canadian farmers, and their families. Although Drummond would probably not quote Napoleon, his example of a line of argument that "An army marches on its stomach," was applicable in Drummond's situation. Historian John C. Fredericksen puts it:

> The British position at Niagara was somewhat precarious, despite British victories of the previous winter…The Niagara peninsula, sandwiched between lakes Erie and Ontario, was vulnerable to amphibious assaults on either flank because his command was scattered in detachments in an arc stretching from Fort Erie in the south to Kingston in the northeast. Drummond's most pressing concern was food. When farmers refused to sell their stock to the military, the Right Division faced a critical shortage of sustenance…On April 5, 1814 he proclaimed martial law for the purpose of collecting supplies…These strict measures occasioned much grumbling among the populace, but the army was at the point of famine and might have to abandon the province without firing a shot.[7]

Drummond's declaration of martial law to obtain food was draconian; nevertheless, it was necessary for the survival and morale of his troops, many of them came from poverty stricken areas in Scotland and Ireland. Had Drummond not acted as he did the desertion rate, which was high among his troops, would have increased exponentially. A logistical quagmire bogged down both forces.

Brown's objective of occupying the Niagara Peninsula was dependent on Chauncey and his fleet joining him in the offensive at a rally point on Lake Ontario's shoreline. He expected Chauncey by 10 July 1814. Without the mass of the U.S. Navy Lake Ontario fleet, after all, it focused the exact mix of combined arms (artillery, infantry, cavalry, and naval power) to overcome even an otherwise superior enemy force.

In July 1814, the British Army and the British Navy were that greater adversarial body, and Drummond was not going to be dissuaded by the loss of one battle. He immediately ordered forces, but logistically, he still could not supply them, despite his declaration of martial law. He wrote to Prévost: "I am apprehensive, I shall not have it my power to forward any further reinforcements to the Right Division, from the inability of the commissariat to supply provisions. And in fact I even dread their failing in due supplies to those already there."[8] Drummond did sent whatever troops he could muster to Riall.

Consider the situation. The British under Riall's command, had no intention of being stationary until troops, and supplies, from Burlington or York, reinforced them whereas the American Left Division remained somewhat immobile as they waited for Chauncey's arrival. It would have been a "comedy of errors," if not for the loss of life or limb on both sides. Brown and Riall were both in an "economy of force, where a commander may use his forces in one area to defend, deceive, or delay the enemy or even to conduct retrograde operations to free up the necessary forces for decisive operations in another area."[9]

After fortifying the captured Queenston Heights, Brown surveillance of Lake Ontario still did not show Chauncey's fleet. Brown's decision to besieged Fort George was proactive and deceptive. Although his troop strength was supplemented by Lieutenant Colonel Philetus Swift (1763-1828) and his regiment of six hundred New York volunteers, Brown still lacked the proper amount for his battering train that had only two eighteen pound cannons.[10] Therefore, a reconnaissance of Fort George, and the recently constructed Fort Mississauga was necessary for the American Army to be successful. Brown ordered Porter and Ripley to take that mission, which both generals

found that the Canadian civilian population was contentious against them and their troops. An American regular complained, "The whole population is [now] against us; not a foraging party but is fired on, and not infrequently returns with missing numbers."[11] Most of the hostility on the part of the Canadian population started with the torching of Newark, Upper Canada (present-day Niagara-on-the Lake) back in December 1813. Newark's population at that time consisted of:

> Only women, children, and sick old men remain. Two babies are born this night in the light of leaping flames…Mrs. Alex McKee, whose husband is a prisoner at Niagara…Eliza Campbell, widow of the fort major, cannot leave her home because she has three small children to care for…John Rogers, a boy of nine, watches his mother carry a beautiful mantelpiece out into the street before her house is reduced to ashes…Mrs. William Dickson is carried out of her house, bed and all, and plumped down in the snow while Willcocks's men put the torch to the building…[12]

Although government buildings, had been burned mostly by both American and British forces previously, this action against defenseless Canadian civilians was considered heinous by Drummond and he ordered retaliation—the initial result were the burnings of Buffalo, Black Rock, Lewiston, and the capture of Fort Niagara. It set off raids and counter raids through the spring of 1814 culminating in a massive raid by several hundred American troops at Port Dover, Upper Canada on 14 May 1814. There, before withdrawing, the American troops set fire to mills, storehouses and private dwellings in retribution for the British raid at Black Rock and Buffalo in December, 1813.[13] After that assault, and the minor court martial punishment for its American commander Colonel John B. Campbell (1777-1814) a *petite guerre* erupted. (Ironically, Campbell was mortally wounded at Chippewa, died from that trauma on 28 August 1814.)

The Americans had lost the "winning of hearts and minds" of the Canadians along the Niagara Frontier. Graves describes the situation:

> The hostility shown by the Canadians and the losses they inflicted on the enemy raiding parties, provoked extreme reaction on the part of some troops. On 18 July, the village of St. David's was burned by Colonel Stone's New York regiment from Porter's brigade. Brown had rebuked Stone for this action and dismissed from the army but the flourishing little village of St. David's was no more…The burning continued, Riall reporting that there wasn't a house standing between Queenston Heights and the Falls.[14]

In Taylor's view, Porter's mission: "To arrest "Tories" suspected of recent ambushes, Porter sent mounted volunteers to St. Davids…four miles west of Queenston…After a skirmish, the volunteers seized and plundered the village and burned down fourteen homes, two shops, and a gristmill."[15] Even if the U.S. Army succeeded in the conquest of the Niagara Peninsula, they would still be an occupation army subject to *guerrilla* activity from the *partisan* civilians. Brown originally, just wanted a basic reconnaissance of the immediate area close to Fort George, and he received much more intelligence than he bargained for. His situation was extremely dire because the navy was not there to augment and support the army.

The gathering of Canadian Militia troops increased, as did their bloodlust for the Americans. According to Barbuto:

> By mid-July, Riall had over 1,000 militiamen from the London and Lincoln districts under arms on the Niagara Peninsula. this exceeded the number he could feed, and all but the most suitable were sent back to their homes. He was also concerned about their crops...On 15 July, Riall reported 1,436 regulars and eight guns in camp, with the Glengarries expected soon…To make his supply operations more efficient, Drummond ordered the families of soldiers to move eastward to Kingston and the families of Indians to be put on half rations. Drummond was concentrating his forces to attack the Americans, and on 17 July. He departed Kingston to take command of the army in the field.[16]

While Drummond was en route to Niagara, Brown paraded his troops in a psychological ploy to aggravate the British forces into leaving Fort George to engage the American troops—it did not happen. The Fort George commander, Lieutenant Colonel

John Tucker, fired all available artillery at the Americans in his deception that the fort was better equipped than it actually was. Tucker's defense by deception worked, and Brown abandoned the siege of Fort George on 22 July 1814. Chauncey's fleet never appeared! Captain Howard wrote:

> ...After having a fair look at the three forts, viz., Fort George, Missasauga and Niagara, we fell back and took positions one mile, as above stated, when a constant skirmish was kept up during the day and many rockets and heavy shells reached and fell within our lines, we held this position, waiting for Commodore Chauncey and his fleet to make themselves on the lake, until the morning of the 22'd when we up stakes and returned to this place...[17]

(Congreve Rockets were first used by the British in the War of 1812, although, their accuracy was usually questionable.) Official *communiqués* from Brown to Armstrong were often reticent, as it was the case in the description of the withdrawal from Fort George, according to Lieutenant Colonel George McFeely (1780-1854):

> General Brown has stated to the Secretary of War that his objective in falling back from Fort George was to attack the enemy on Burlington Heights. This was not the fact; General Brown fell back in order to gain a better position as the British had received strong reinforcements, and would have gained his rear and cut off his retreat in all probability in a few hours...It might satisfy the Secretary of War who knew nothing of the geography. So far from going to Burlington Heights, we had actually turned our backs on Burlington Heights as well as Fort George... The enemy gained the heights in our rear with some light troops and Indians, but were dispersed by our riflemen before the heavy columns came up.[18]

McFeely was unique as he was one of only two West Point graduates in the Niagara campaign; it was a scenario that would not be resolved until after the was ended.

Newspaper reports of Brown's expedition reached Madison's cabinet where Secretary of the Navy Jones was appalled at Chauncey's continuous delay in launching the Lake Ontario fleet. Chauncey had promised Jones that the fleet would launch the First of July. On 23 July 1814, when Brown and the Left Division returned to Chippewa, the

news of Chauncey being sick reached them, and later Jones. The concept of succession of officers in a chain of command, when the senior officer was incapacitated was not protocol in 1814. Moreover, Jones ordered Captain Stephen Decatur Jr. (1779-1820), who was stationed at New London, to take command at Sackett's Harbor if Chauncey was still indisposed. Due to a blockade by the Royal Navy, Decatur was delayed-in-route to his new command. By the time Decatur arrived, Chauncey was recovered and finally set sail on, or about 1st August, which was too late for the Left Division at the cemetery ridge of the church off Lundy's Lane, a week earlier.[19]

On 24 July 1814, the American Army bivouacked at Chippewa south of the creek. Scott's command, the First Brigade, again consisted of the Ninth, Eleventh, Twenty-Second and Twenty-Fifth Regiments of United States Infantry, all troops of the regular army, numbering perhaps about 1,000 men. Towson's battery was also attached to this brigade. During the night of the twenty-fourth, a large British force, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pearson, moved south and took up position along Lundy's Lane, from the left east of the Queenston road, to the right extending toward the south somewhat diagonally, with a battery of artillery placed on a knoll in front of the center stationed along the lane. The troop complement were approximately 800 and broke down into components of Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles, 19th Light Dragoons, the Incorporated Militia battalion, and two six pounder guns.[20]The "proscenium" for the British in the coming armed conflict was in effect, and it was unknown to Brown and his senior officers.

Scott, meanwhile, fueled by his victories at Fort Erie and Chippewa was ready for more successful action. Historian Benson J. Lossing described Scott's impatience: "On the night of the 24th, General Scott… requested leave to lead his brigade immediately in a

search for Riall, not doubting his ability to win victory for his troops, glory for himself, and renown for the army. He repeated the request on the morning of the 25th, and was vexed because General brown would not consent to divide his army."[21]

Although Scott did not know otherwise, he would by that evening of the 25th, meet Riall on the battlefield. Preparations on both sides increased proportionally based on the intelligence reports that were received. One of the British officers, Lieutenant John Le Couteur wrote on 24th July in his journal:

> Started early and marched to the position at Shipman's. Found the Glengarry Light Inf[antr]y and about one hundred Indians encamped there. March on to the roar of the Artillery. We were not long under their protection, but were moved on eleven miles and passed the Incorporated Militia, the 8th, 103rd, and the 1st Royals [Regiments} in succession...halted at Pratt's over the ravine, all wet through, drenched with perspiration and rain...Pitched our tents in the very advance...and ate a hearty and frugal dinner of bread and butter! Nought else to be had![22]

He also noted in his journal that he believed American troop strength to be from "six thousand to ten thousand." That figure was due to faulty intelligence reports that the British officer corps had circulated; it was approximately one third of what the British perceived to be accurate. Another aspect of the reports was that all of the Native Peoples: "the *Tuscaroras*, *Oneidas*, some *Hurons*, and their Militia have left them."[23] That intelligence error was due to cultural differences between British and Natives on group decisions—the former was rigid, while the latter was individualistic; a majority of the different Native Nations did leave, but a sizeable amount remained; also, the American Militia was still an adjunct of the Left Division. These reports would soon affect British command decisions at the cataract of Niagara Falls.

The weather on morning of the 25th of July 1814 was pleasant according to some of the U.S. soldiers encamped at Chippewa. Lossing writes:

> It was serene and sultry. Not a cloud in the heavens, nor a flake of mist on the waters. The fatigued American Army lay reposing upon the field of its late victory, with the village of Chippewa in front, and had enjoyed half of a day of needed rest, when a courier came in haste with intelligence from Colonel Philetus Swift at Lewiston that the enemy were in considerable force at Queenston and on the Heights…A few minutes later another courier arrived from Captain Denman…with a report that the enemy, a thousand strong, were landing at Lewiston, and that the American baggage and stores at Schlosser were doubtless in imminent danger of capture.[24]

(Besides the current definition, the baggage was also an early nineteenth century idiomatic term for women and children.) Lossing added that those reports were rumors, and only partly true, nevertheless, Drummond had ordered Colonel Tucker and his troops south to Lewiston from Fort Niagara where they captured the depot.[25] It was a deception on Drummond's part, as he led the 89th Foot to rally with Riall.

Brown, due to a lack of transportation, did not take more than cursory action. Graves detailed Brown's dilemma:

> There was not much he could do to counter this threat—he had neither boats enough to transport troops over the river to defend Schlosser nor to remove its supplies to a place of safety. He discussed the problem with Colonel Charles Gardner…[who] was certain that the British move on Lewiston was a feint and that their main strength was probably on the Canadian side of Niagara around the falls…Brown ordered Second Lieutenant Edward Randolph…to proceed "with all dispatch" to Lewiston, access the situation and report back.[26]

He had hoped for Riall to follow the Left Division down to Chippewa, so he could feint and attack. He did not include Scott, Ripley, and Porter in his strategy. It was an extreme act of desperation on Brown, since the naval support would not arrive in the foreseeable future. Riall forces stopped at the smoldering ruins of St. David nearby Queenston Heights, where he and his troops felt the same vexation that the American forces experienced when they first saw the wreckage of Buffalo.

Leaving the 103rd Foot in the rear at Twelve Mile Creek, Riall and his forces arrived at the junction of Lundy's Lane and Portage Road about 7 A.M. Their march had been at a reduced pace, inasmuch as no action was anticipated in the immediate future, and in addition to the 800, Riall had 1,200 additional bayonets.[27] It is very hard to keep troop movements quiet from one's enemy in the early nineteenth century.

Just before the two couriers arrived to debrief Brown about British attacks on the American side of the Niagara River, the camp perimeter was guarded under command of Captain Azariah W. Odell (-1822). As stated by Graves:

> Odell was the first soldier in the division to become aware that the British were much closer than anyone in Chippawa realized that bright and peaceful morning. Between 8:00 and 9:00 A.M., he observed British troops at Willson's Tavern, some two miles north of his position. He immediately reported it to the field officer of the day Major Leavenworth, who informed Brown. The commanding general was somewhat skeptical that the enemy could be in strength so close to the camp…[28]

Brown sent out a company to patrol the area around Wilson's Tavern just before noon. Despite later reports from Majors Leavenworth and Jesup that were companies of British dragoons and infantry at Wilson's Tavern (Leavenworth's report) and a large formation of British troops near Niagara Falls (Jesup's Report); Brown believed Drummond's ruse to be accurate that Schlosser was the main objective, not Brown's troops at Chippewa.[29] With all of these intelligence reports, Scott's impatience with Brown was akin to a racehorse at a starting gate. His primal impetus in all likelihood was reinforced by his incarceration as a prisoner of war after the Battle of Queenston Heights. Historian Alan Taylor writes:

> In October 1812 Winfield Scott arrived at Montreal as a British prisoner. He and his fellow captives, were paraded through the streets by "a large escort of troops" with the band playing "The Rogue March" and "Yankee Doodle," while a crowd jeered. Shocked by capture, disarmed, stripped of their outer clothes by Indians, unshaved and unwashed, hungry and prodded by guards, the prisoners invited contempt. The display culminated with a presentation to Sir George Prévost at the government house, where the band played "God Save the King" while guards compelled the prisoners to remove their hats in homage. Infuriated, denounced Prévost as a turncoat: "being of an American family, he behaved like a renegade."[30]

In that era prior to any of the Geneva Convention's tenets on treatment of prisoners of war, parading captured troops in a shaming fashion was standard procedure for both sides during the war. Scott remained a prisoner until January 1813 when he was paroled in a prisoner exchange. During his incarceration he witnessed the execution of Irish-American prisoners who were deemed traitors by the British. Therefore Scott was livid about defeating an enemy that disrespected him and his fellow soldiers, and once free he petitioned Madison to reciprocate with British prisoners being executed on an even parity—Madison refused Scott's petition. Moreover, according to Taylor:

> The British gave captured subjects a grim choice: enlist in their military or face trial and execution as traitors. By confessing and enlisting, they could "atone for their past delinquency." *Prévost* claimed that he spurned offers by captured subjects "to expiate their Treason by turning arms against their recent employers."—but this was pure propaganda, refuted by his actual practice. Desperate for men, the British preferred conversions to executions.[31]

Twenty-three of thirty-nine Irish-American prisoners of war were executed. For Scott, it was extremely personal, and vengeance was his *modus operandi.* Vengeance, still, can often be a "double-edged sword," especially in any combat situation.

In the late afternoon of 25 July 1814, Brown finally ordered Scott and his one thousand troops north to Queenston, and to report back for assistance if they encounter the enemy. For Brown, it was a deception to have British troops on the American side

return to engage the Left Division, leaving Schlosser intact. In Scott's lenses, Brown's meaning was "to find the enemy and beat him."[32] The rumor in the ranks was that they were called out to disperse some Canadian Militia and Indians who had been annoying the American pickets. In their march north the troops could hear the constant roar of Niagara Falls, in spite of that, this was not a sight seeing trip—it was a military march in force to met and defeat the enemy. Certainly no one expected serious fighting.[33]

As Scott's troops approached Niagara Falls, Scott sent ahead a patrol, and as they rode to Wilson's Tavern—owned by an American widow and her two daughters, and it was on Portage Road near the Horseshoe Falls Overlook.[34] It was one of the few buildings that were not torched on either side of the Niagara Frontier by the British or the Americans. The patrol saw a group of British officers leave the tavern, and the last officer paused and saluted before galloping off to join his comrades.[35] The Americans double timed their pace, arrived at the tavern, and interrogated Wilson along with her two teenage daughters who respectively remained silent.

Deborah Wilson, an American, told Scott's junior officers, Lieutenant David Douglas (1790-1849) and Captain Eleazer Wood (1783-1814), that the British "General Riall was nearby with eight hundred regulars, three hundred Canadian militia and two guns…"[36] Because the Widow Wilson served food and drink to both Americans and British alike, Scott was dubious as to the veracity of Wilson's account of British troop strength, having said that, she directed him toward Lundy's Lane. (a "paved" dirt road named for a Quaker Loyalist settler named William Lundy [1742-1829]).[37] Scott sent Douglas to update Brown on the questionable information, and ordered his brigade to advance toward the British line. Scott again, as just before the Battle of Chippewa,

expected minor resistance from the British Army, their Canadian Militia, and Native adjuncts.

When Scott and the 1st Brigade initially encountered Riall's dragoons, Riall was surprised. Due to their faulty intelligence reports, Riall believed Scott's brigade was larger than his own troop complement. Not desirous of another defeat from a larger force of Americans he ordered a retreat from his knoll at the church cemetery at Lundy's Lane. It is an axiom of warfare that one does not engaged an enemy with superior numbers, and Riall's mindset was probably in that modality. He also sent a message by courier to Drummond of his command decision to retreat.[38]

Thanks to a recalcitrant and ill Commodore Chauncey, Drummond and his troops of the 89th Foot arrived by boats at Fort George from York on 25 July 1814. He received the message on Riall's retreat, and rode at breakneck speed to countermand Riall's order. Upon reaching some of the retreating British troops, Drummond quickly invalidated Riall's order, ordered the troops back to Lundy's Lane, and he also sent a messenger to that effect.[39] No time could be lost as quick theatrics on the part of Drummond, Riall, and their troops re-acquired the exact position on the knoll just prior to the full entrance of Scott's brigade. Hence, Lundy's Lane, the nineteenth-century version of a paved country road would become the stage for the bloodiest battle on Canadian soil in the War of 1812. Historian Robert P. Watson states, "and it almost didn't happen."[40] Had Drummond not retaken the Lundy's Lane knoll there would have not been a battle.

The knoll of Lundy's Lane was from thirty to approximately forty feet higher than the field it dwarfed. The clear field was the southern perimeter of what was to be a killing zone. Barbuto described its features and ordnance:

> Lundy's Lane itself was a tree-lined sunken road atop the dominant terrain feature, a low, long ridge. This ridgeline was about a mile long and fifty feet above the surrounding plain. On the highest point of the ridge stood a log meetinghouse and a small cemetery. Near the cemetery were positioned five guns of the Royal Artillery. Southeast of the ridge was an orchard bounded on the east by Portage Road.[41]

Because of the topography, the 1st Brigade would be fighting the battle uphill—advantage was to the British in that place which was just about a mile from Niagara Falls. The beauty of the falls has always been a natural "wonder of the world" for current-day visitors. It had the same effect in 1814, as one American Army officer described it:

> When the battle was about to begin, just as the setting sun sent his red beams from the west, they fell upon the spray, which continually goes up, like incense, from the deep, dashing torrent of Niagara. The bright light was divided into its primal hues, and a rainbow rose from the waters, encircling the head of the advancing column! In a more superstitious age, such a sign would have been regarded, like the Roman auguries, as a precursor of victory.[42]

That evening of the 25th's weather forecast was intense heat and a moon in its first quarter. Prior to their entry onto the battlefield, Scott sent his fellow Virginian Jesup, and the 25th Infantry to outflank the British left flank by attacking on Scott's right flank. Jesup carried out Scott's order with stealth and determination. He and the 25th went through the woods, from the southeast of the open field below Lundy's Lane to northeast a half-mile east of Portage Road with the falls to their rear. From that point, Jesup and his troops diagonally circumvented the British left flank of the Incorporated Militia, the 8th Foot, and 41st Foot. Simultaneously, as Jesup's forces attacked Drummond's left flank from the rear, Scott committed the remaining brigade on a frontal assault, after a brief pause by the British who still believed Scott's forces were much larger. Drummond's right flank had Glengarry Fencibles, some Canadian Militia, and Great Lakes Natives and of the five British artillery cannons, two were 24 pounders at the center of the battery,

also at the center in front of the battery were detachments of the 1st, 8th, and the 41st Foot. Scott and the 1st Brigade did not retreat.

Many current historians believed Scott acted foolishly to attack a superior entrenched enemy. Wesley B. Turner writes that Scott "had placed his infantry regiments within range of Maclachlan's guns, so his men suffered severely and even the American artillery and dragoons took casualties."[43] Graves claims, " Scott's three regiments kept up their ineffective fire of musketry but the range was far too great and only the occasional round took effect. In return, the British gunners subjected the brigade to a warm and destructive fire."[44] Barbuto himself writes:

> Certainly Scott knew it would take an hour or longer for Brown to receive Douglass's report and to get help on the way. Perhaps Scott expected to win another quick victory before Brown arrived. In any event, his rash decision to attack without personally viewing the enemy position resulted in the unnecessary drubbing of his well-trained veteran brigade.[45]

In his *Memoirs*, Scott wrote, "Being but half seasoned to war, some danger of confusion in its ranks, with the certainty of throwing the whole reserve (coming up) into a panic, were to be apprehended; for an extravagant opinion generally prevailed throughout the army in respect to the prowess—nay, invincibility of Scott's brigade."[46] The first American casualties occurred after the momentary suspension of British artillery barrage, and musket balls. Jarvis Hanks recounted:

> We endeavored to form a line in the face and the eyes of all their infantry and artillery, but they opened up such a deadly and destructive fire upon us we were compelled to retire a few paces and form in the skirts of the woods, and before we opened upon them more than two thirds of the regiments were cut down.[47]

Anyone familiar with any traumatic situation should agree that a person's adrenalin is on overload, and that it heightens and skews perception of that event. Granted, all of these

troops have been dead for a mean of 170 years; their stress response would be identical to contemporary soldiers in an equivalent sequence of events. An article in *The New York Times* enumerates this stress component:

> The stress response also affects the heart, lungs, and circulation:
>
> 1. As the bear comes closer, the heart rate and blood pressure increase instantaneously.
>
> 2. Breathing becomes rapid, and the lungs take in more oxygen.
>
> 3.The spleen discharges red and white blood cells, allowing the blood to transport more oxygen throughout the body. Blood flow may actually increase 300 - 400%, priming the muscles, lungs, and brain for added demands.[48]

The image of the bear in the *Times'* article exemplifies a vicious enemy that human beings would face under extreme stress. Combat is a classic example of this scenario, as in the case where Hanks reported two thirds, when it was actually one third—still a significant loss of life. His stress levels played a significant part in his memory of decades earlier. One of the reasons for the high killed-in-action and wounded-in-action rate, was that the 1st Brigade entered the open field going over a rail fence that bordered it on the southeastern corner of that zone; They did not have time to form the three-line firing order that they learned at Scott's basic training,[49] and even if they did they would have been at odds with the British two-line fire technique.

This distinction is important because it allowed the British not only to defeat the American Army for most of the war, and also to have an empire that lasted until the mid-twentieth century. Historian Jeffrey Kimball outlines the British firing line as opposed to the American paradigm:

> Because all 1200 men of the battalion could use their weapons in an elongated front of 600 files, the greater firepower of the two-deep line more than compensated for the superior depth of the three-deep line. The latter was only two-thirds as wide as a thin red line of the same number of men, and third rank was useless except to load and pass muskets to the second rank or to fill gaps in the line due to battle losses.[50]

Thus, the British artillery barrage augmented by their two-line firing order, pounded Scott's brigade with unfailing accuracy. Scott's formation of the regiments at that time: Major Henry Leavenworth's 9th Infantry was on the right flank, Major John McNeil's and his Eleventh Infantry on the left flank, and Colonel High Brady's 22nd in center. As before at Chippewa, Major Jesup's 25th Infantry was the outlier, northeast of the right flank. Captain Nathan Towson had a small artillery battery of two six-pounder cannons, and one howitzer.[51] Generals in 1814, unlike in present day, led their forces in attacks against the enemy. Scott was not exempt from that curious *de rigueur.* Historian Thomas O'Connor (1770-1855) recounted Scott's assaults:

> At half past 4, P.M. the battle commenced with the enemy. The enemy, being numerically superior to the Americans, he was able to extend his line so as to attempt a flank. In order to counteract the apparent views of Gen. Riall, he was *fought in detachments—he was charged in column*, Gen. Scott being at the head of his troops in almost every charge.[52]

O'Connor was an extremely patriotic Irish-American, with no love loss for the British, which probably jaded his historic "prism," as many historians later concurred the battle started between six and six-thirty P.M. (It could also have been a printing typographical error.) Nevertheless, Scott and the 1st Brigade's situation at this juncture were appalling.

Even with poor visibility, the British cannon shot and musket fire hammered Scott and his troops relentlessly, and accurately. Moreover, as Scott and his infantry advanced towards the British line, the British gunners changed their cannon balls from the standard round shot to grapeshot and canister. Grapeshot was devastatingly effective against

massed troops at short range. It was used to neutralize massed infantry charges quickly. Cannons would fire solid shot to attack enemy artillery and troops at longer range and switch to "grape" when they or nearby troops were charged. Each grapeshot contained small iron balls the size of grapes packed tightly into a canvas bag.[53] Canister, also known as case shot included many smaller iron balls packed tightly into tin or brass case.[54] Both of these anti-personal devices, although crude by twenty-first century standards, thus it had deleterious effects on Scott's forces.

Scott ordered Towson and his artillery to counter Drummond and Riall's barrage. Due to the eminence of British battery train' elevation, Towson's volleys fell short of their designated targets. It was tenuous as to whether the Americans would survive, and the sole reason why Scott's brigade was not annihilated *in toto*, was because of Jesup, *inter alios*, and his 25th Infantry. Equally, Barbuto writes:

> While the victor of Chippawa was losing his brigade minute by minute, Jesup and the Twenty-fifth Infantry were enjoying considerable success east of the Portage Road. Well suited to independent command, Jesup brought his men northward slowly with stealth. Spotting the Volunteer Battalion of Incorporated Militia across their front, the Twenty-Fifth charged out of the wood line. Surprised by the suddenness of the attack, the volunteer militiamen broke.[55]

Indeed, one Canadian Militiaman relayed that the Americans, "mowed our men down at a dreadful rate."[56] The British and the Canadians were driven off the Portage Road and rallied just west of it. Jesup, at that time, still did not know Scott's forces were being decimated, and would not find out until after he sent Captain Daniel Ketchum and his company to secure the junction of Portage Road and Lundy's Lane, with orders to seize all parties attempting to pass there.[57] Ketchum and his troops did not have to wait very long.

General Riall had been shot in his right arm with a musket ball, and he was being escorted to the rear when his escorts announced, "Make room there, men, way for General Riall!" Ketchum responded in a pseudo-British idiolect, "Aye, aye sir!" His troops made way for Riall and his escorts then surrounded them with fixed bayonets.[58] Berton described what happened next: "What does this mean?" asked the astonished Riall. "You are prisoners, Sir," comes the answer. "But I am GeneraL Riall!" "There can be no doubt on that point; and I, Sir, am Captain Ketcham of the United States Army."[59] The capture of Riall and his subordinates did not end with them, as nearly two hundred British soldiers and a dozen of their officers are taken prisoner.

Jesup had not planned for this state of affairs. It did reduce the number of enemy hostiles momentarily for the 1st Brigade that was being wiped out by British artillery and musket fire. Most of the prisoners save Riall, and some of his officers, either escaped, or were released with their suspenders cut. The historic records are skewed to whichever historian's perspective one wishes to believe as fact. Graves recounted:

> …a British officer rode out of the darkness and, drawing up beside Riall, managed to say, "General Drummond is impatient for information" before being made prisoner. This was the first knowledge that anyone in the Left Division had of Drummond's presence in Niagara. Jesup ordered Ketchum to escort the prisoners to the rear. Having no muzzle flashes from the American line to orient himself, Ketchum blundered into a British unit which opened fire on both prisoners and escorts…most of the…prisoners escaped although they had lost their arms and equipment. Ketchum subsequently deposited the remainder of his charges with another guard and returned to the battle.[60]

As to the kill-zone, Scott and the 1st Brigade were being still "butchered" by the British, and Jesup, and the 25th rejoined them. En route to rejoining what must have seemed as a "last stand," Jesup encountered fresh American troops and an artillery officer

Captain Thomas Biddle (1790-1831), who relayed that General Brown and reinforcements had arrived.[61] Jesup, and his troops were the unexpected catalyst in this first phase of the Battle of Niagara Falls. According to Graves, "Drummond, because of Jesup's action, and the steadiness of Scott's brigade nevertheless persuaded Drummond to withdraw his centre to maintain alignment with his left flank, and also pull back the Glengarry Light Infantry, who had been harassing Scott's own left flank. The withdrawal of Drummond's centre left the artillery exposed in front of the infantry."[62]

Hence, when Brown and Ripley arrived at the battlefield, and viewed the massive carnage of Scott's 1st Brigade, Brown, saw an opportunity in Drummond's undefended artillery center. Brown might have used the efficacy of Machivelli's aphorism, "To know in war how to recognize an opportunity and seize it is better than anything else,"[63] as the second phase of the Battle of Niagara Falls commenced.

The first phase of the Battle of Niagara Falls near the village of Bridgewater Mills had been disastrous start for what was to be another plume in Scott's hat. Berton elucidates Scott's predicament further when he writes:

> For Scott is in trouble, his three battalions torn to pieces by the cannon fire of the British. The 22nd, its colonel badly wounded, breaks and runs into the 11th in the act of wheeling. That battalion breaks too, its platoons scattering, all of its captains killed or wounded, its ammunition expended. The brigade has been reduced to a single battalion, the badly mauled 9th, reinforced by a few remnants of beaten regiments. The attack is a failure.[64]

Indeed, even the loading of single cartridge in a musket for an American soldier in 1814 was laborious and problematic. It took twelve steps to reload one musket ball and fire it according to the "French System." An experienced soldier could fire and reload three to four times in a minute, but, that changes when one's forces are being wiped out in active

combat. Specifically, the 22nd Infantry did break ranks when a canister shot exploded in their midst, and many of the soldiers in terror ran headlong into the 11th Infantry, that were already being slaughtered by Glenglarry Light Infantry and Great River Natives under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Francis Battersby.

It was the first time the Glengarries fought together as a combat unit[65], and U.S. Army Lieutenant Henry Blake wrote of that assault: "Our line was formed under such a storm of musketry & thundering artillery as you can have no idea, such a scene I hope may never again be witnessed by human beings—Thank God I escaped."[66] Many of the American soldiers were not as lucky as Blake, including Scott's horse that was shot and killed, throwing the general to the ground, bruised for the moment.[67] Hence, in Barbuto's view:

> Scott's men were taking casualties from British artillery fire. They were fast using up their ammunition. McNeil was wounded and carried to the rear. Brady received a serious wound, but remained in the saddle. Every commander in the 11th was wounded…The first phase of the battle ended with Scott's Brigade thoroughly shot up, yet nailed to its battle line in bold defiance.[68]

To reiterate, the advantage was to Drummond and his troops during the first phase in the sudden and ignominious failure by Scott and the 1st Brigade at Niagara. It was the elevation of the then unnamed hill that was the core of the British success. In his book, *On War*, Carl Von Clausewitz (1780-1831) maintains that:

> Physical force is always harder to exert in an upward than in a downward direction, and this must hold true for an engagement. We can cite three obvious reasons. First of all, high ground always inhibits the approach; second, though it does not add perceptibly to range, shooting downward, considering the geometrical relations involved, is perceptibly more accurate than shooting upward, and third, heights command a wider view.[69]

As long as the British Army controlled that cemetery ridge, they continued dominance of that arena of war. Conversely, Brown, Ripley, and Porter with their 2nd and 3rd Brigades were about to change that equation in their favor. This battle was far from being terminated, as its outcome remained uncertain, despite early circumstances that favored the British Right Division. Consequently, this alternate narrative of political logistical, and military *imbroglio* was the quintessential lynchpin for both the American and British at the Battle of Niagara Falls/Lundy's Lane.


BATTLE OF LUNDY'S LANE
25 July 1814
Initial U.S. Attack
U.S. Reinforcements
British Reinforcements
0
1
Mile
to Queenstown
PORTAGE ROAD
DRUMMOND
RIALL
LUNDY'S LANE
Militia
1st
89th
41st
8th
Militia
Militia
25th
Niagara River
Manchester
11th
22d
9th
SCOTT
Falls
Goat Island
Rapids
21st
23d
1st
RIPLEY
Chippewa

CHAPTER THREE

THE LAST MAN STANDING

> In this fearful and tremendous stage of the contest, the British forces both regular and militia, finding themselves pressed by an overwhelming force, simultaneously closed round the guns, apparently determined to contest their possession with the last drop of British blood on the ground, fully assured of their importance to a favorable termination of the engagement—in short, both armies appeared to be roused to a state of desperation for victory.
>
> Captain David Thompson of the Royal Scots

It was approximately 9 P.M., and the sight of the remaining survivors dispersed throughout the combat zone of Scott's First Brigade disheartened Brown. Conversely, Drummond had made a tactical error by exposing his artillery that faced the American Army at its center, whereupon Brown seized that opportunity and ordered Colonel James Miller (1776-1851), and his 21st Infantry to attack, capture, or destroy the enemy battery train. Looking over the dense gunpowder smoked battlefield at what must have seen to be a *Dante* inspired level of hell, Miller responded, "I will try, sir!"[1] Miller's mission became the focal point for the remaining phases of the Battle of Niagara Falls, or Lundy's Lane, and its tactical and logistical chaos, which led to a controversial ending. Indeed, Barbuto, himself writes:

> Brown arrived on the battlefield to see Scott's diminished command and hundreds of dead, wounded, and stragglers. He also saw opportunity. Finally, he had the British in the open. As Ripley's Second Brigade arrived, Brown ordered them to form line between Scott's soldiers and the British. The 1st Infantry formed on the left, Colonel James Miller's 21st Infantry was in the center, and Major Daniel McFarland's 23d Infantry was on the right centered on Portage Road. Brown well understood that the British guns on the crest of the low ridge were the key to the enemy's defense. He ordered Ripley's Brigade to assault in the darkness. Miller would attack the guns directly while Nicholas and McFarland would protect the flanks of the 21st Infantry.[2]

The 1st Infantry were new arrivals from Buffalo, New York, with a troop complement of around 150, and due to a lack of proper communication, their commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Nicholas (1787-1856) was not debriefed as to the situation at the cataract of Niagara. His regiment was not a part of either brigade, so they marched nearly four miles in the night, and their arrival coincided with the order to storm the British battery. Consequently, Brown planned for the 1st Infantry to augment Miller's 21st assault on the British high ground—his obscure orders: "break to the left and form a line facing the enemy on the heights with a view of drawing his force an attracting his attention."[3] Nicholas' orders were couriered by Colonel William McRee (1787-1833), who might have skewed Brown's orders due to the tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving situation. Nevertheless, Nicholas obeyed Brown's command and marched his troops directly toward the British line.

As they closed on the enemy fortifications, the British gunners opened fire, resulting in some American casualties. Nicholas made a command decision to withdraw his forces from harm's way, and they all took cover behind a house out of the British musket range. His directive did not countermand Brown's obtuse authorization, but his retrograde was haphazard. In Graves's lenses, "The retreat was disorderly, and the officers of the First Infantry spent valuable time rallying and re-forming their men."[4] Obviously agitated by Nicholas' withdrawal, Brown later wrote, "To my great mortification, this regiment after a discharge or two gave way and retired before some distance it could be rallied."[5]

Ironically, Nicholas' prudent decision to save his troops diverted the British attention from their center, where Miller and his 21st approached cautiously and surreptitiously towards them. Under the cover of darkness and gunpowder smoke, Miller and his soldiers reached the bottom of the slope from the British battery. Curiously, they did not encounter any skirmishers or sentries. Lossing described the sequence:

> They approached undiscovered to a point within two rods of the battery, where gunners were seen with their lighted matches waiting for the word to fire. In whispers Miller ordered his men to rest their pieces across the fence, take good aim, and shoot the gunners. This was promptly done, and not a man left to apply the matches. A British line, formed for the protection of the cannon, were lying near in a strong position, and immediately opened a most destructive enfilading fire, which slew many of the gallant Miller's men.[6]

A rod in surveyor's parlance is 16.5 feet, or the approximate length of an average medium sedan in the present-day. At a distance of thirty-three feet, troops employing grapeshot and bayonets mauled each other, thus, the higher casualty quotient. Ever seeking to expound on his conceptual filter of history, Scott wrote in his *Memoirs*:

> By desire, [I] ...that the heaviest battalion in the reserve, the 21st, which he had instructed at Buffalo, and was now commanded by Colonel Miller, should, supported by the remainder of Ripley's brigade, charge up the lane, take the enemy in flank, and roll his whole crumbled line back into the wood. To favor this important movement, Scott, with the added force of Jesup, now back in line, ordered the attack, in front, to be redoubled; guided Brown, with Miller, through the darkness, to the foot of the lane, and then rejoined his own forces.[7]

Lossing's narrative, omitted the participation of one Captain John Norton (c. 1760-1826), who was a Mohawk chieftain and a former missionary, who had persuaded some of the Iroquois Nation warriors to stay with the British. During Miller's almost quiet attack, Norton was conversing with two British officers when one of them

exclaimed, "What body of men it might be that were approaching?"[8] On horseback, Norton galloped toward Miller's line to verify their identity just as they opened fire. Amazingly, Norton was not wounded in the fusillade; however, Miller's troops were losing men and ground to the British counter-offensive. Moreover, the British retaliatory attack, was encumbered by "the horses attached to the guns being startled ran with their limbers through the ranks of our troops, overturning all in our way," which was according to Norton.[9]

That infelicity rewarded Miller and his 21st a lull in the fighting. As was the case with these interludes, the 89th Foot under orders of Drummond, retreated, then quickly returned with renewed vigor and reinforcements charged up the knoll again, as U.S. Captain Benjamin Ropes (1772-1845) detailed, "Our min [sic] fought like bull dogs, so close did they charge that the fire from their discharges would seem to strike our faces."[10] The 21st Infantry was close to losing the high ground they had just trounced when Ripley and the 23rd Infantry arrived. Ripley's 23rd had already encountered British resistance on their right flank around Portage Road leaving many American fatalities, including Major Daniel McFarland (1787-1814). Historian John Newell Crombie cites Brown in a letter wrote to Armstrong: "After the enemy's strong position was carried by the Twenty First and detachments of the Seventeenth and Nineteenth, the First and Twenty Third assumed a new character—they could not again be shaken or dismayed. Major McFarland of the latter fell nobly at the head of his battalion."[11]

Drummond's tactical misstep was due to his lack of any fresh combat experience, as Historian Wesley B. Turner contends, "for he had last participated in battle in 1801, while the American commanders all had more recent and more relevant experience.

Mistakes could arise in the confusing conditions of darkness and from each side's uncertainty about its opponents' numbers and intentions. On the British side, an additional factor was the weariness of the troops,"[12] Moreover, opposing armies speaking the same language only added to the quagmire near Niagara Falls. The 89th would have succeeded if not for the Ripley and his reinforcements. Lieutenant Le Couteur whose company of the 104th Foot brought up the rear of the 89th asserts in his journal:

> They were hard at it. A staff officer placed our Companies in rear of the Centre of the 89th [Regiment] as we came up...While we were under this fire, Lieutenant Colonel Drummond was seated on his war horse like a knightly man of valor as He was exposed to a ragged fire from hundreds of brave Yankees who were pressing our brave 89th [Regiment]. It was an illumination of musquetry in our left front."[13]

Coincidently, the 23rd Infantry's initial attack along the Portage Road on the right flank along with the attack of the 1st Infantry on the left flank allowed the 21st to close in on the British battery train at the outset. At first, Brown had ordered Porter and his 3rd Brigade to be in reserve at the Chippewa encampment. Brown had not been impressed with Porter's Brigade on the 5th of July at the Battle of Chippewa, and Brown paralleled Scott's distrust of Porter. Due to the increased combat fire exchange, Porter and his 3rd Brigade arrived after Ripley, and took a rally position on the left flank combined with the recalled 1st Infantry, and with Jesup and the 25th reinforcing the right flank it made the second phase's advantage to the American Left Division. Furthermore, according to Lossing: The exploit of Miller elicited universal admiration. The American officers declared that it was one of the most desperate and gallant acts ever known.

> "It was the most desperate thing we ever saw or heard of," said the British officers, who were made prisoners...Meanwhile the first brigade, commanded by General Scott, had maintain its position with the greatest pertinacity under terrible assaults and destructive blows. The gallant 11th Regiment lost its commander, Major John McNeil, by severe wounds, and all of its captains.[14]

Lossing also wrote that McNeil survived his wounds, but was crippled for the remainder of his life, while Brady and several of his junior officers of the 22nd were also severely wounded or killed-in-action.[15] The *status quo ante* of the First Brigade was no longer a semblance of its former self. Only the 9th Infantry under command of Leavenworth was the last regiment of the 1st Brigade that survived relatively intact. The survivors of the 11th Infantry, 22nd, and Jesup's 25th were ordered by Brown "to form on the right of the American 2nd Brigade."[16]

The 21st had been successful in the capture of the British artillery, conversely, Drummond's horse was shot from under him and he was shot in the neck with an American .69 musket ball that missed both his carotid arteries; if either artery had been transected, Drummond would have exsanguinated quickly.[17] He was bleeding to the extent that he crudely bandaged his neck with handkerchiefs. Lieutenant Charles Anderson of the Niagara Royal Provincial Artillery, claims, "Gen. Drummond was wounded in the neck, but he was on horseback all night, and kept the command until next morning, when the surgeons extracted the ball."[18] Moreover, the 89th Foot's commander, Lieutenant Colonel Morrison, "...had been obliged to retire from the field by a severe wound..."[19] Morrison's wound was critical in Drummond's chain of command, whereas Miller and the 21st was essential in Brown's vantage point.

It was opportune when Miller and his forces took the British battery train. The American troops were emboldened by that "reversal of fortune." They would have lost their lives or freedom to their British cousins otherwise. This battle was still far from its end point. There were enough *gaffes* from both armies in this second phase, whereas the *faux pas* by the Americans—thanks to Brown, Ripley, and Porter and their particular

brigades were reduced, as they accomplished what Scott and the 1st Brigade could not in the first phase. Consequently, Miller was heartily congratulated by Brown, who declared "My dear fellow, my heart ached for you when I gave you the order, but I knew it was the only thing that would save us."[20]

The momentary lapse of musket fire exchange brought back the roar of nearby Niagara Falls to everyone's ears; it would only be a temporary cessation as Drummond was determined not to lose to the Yankee invaders, and because of faulty intelligence reports, he believed that the American forces were approximately five thousand outnumbering his troops by almost two to one. In reality, Drummond's troops outnumbered the Left Division by about the same ratio. Similarly, Captain Thompson wrote in his monograph about Brown's troop complement, "His whole force, which was never rated at less than five thousand men, was all engaged."[21]

Consider the situation. Drummond's church cemetery artillery was captured by the Americans, his second in command Riall, with many British officers as prisoners-of-war, and Morrison of the 89th Foot, who was Drummond's best regimental commander, was severely wounded, and later died from said trauma. Drummond's stress, in all probability, was what contemporary physicians refer to as the "sympathetic nervous system," or "fight or flight" syndrome. Its effects probably influenced Drummond, as this syndrome releases extra amounts of adrenalin,[22] and it occurs in extreme stress situations where one fights or flees for self-preservation. It is the psychological and emotional modules that complement the physical rise of adrenalin.[23] Therefore, a wounded and stressed Drummond needed reinforcements desperately, and Colonel Hercules Scott fulfilled that requirement.

Prior to the onset of the third phase, Colonel Scott (no relation to Winfield) and the 103rd Foot had double-timed marched from Twelve Mile Creek for a total of twenty miles. The 103rd Foot's troop strength was around fifteen hundred, also, included around two hundred troopers of Canadian Militia.[24]The British troops were fatigued, and respite was not an option as they were ordered by Drummond to attack the American held position on the eminence. The quarter moon had set and no longer illuminated the battlefield, and New York Militia Lieutenant Colonel Hugh Dobbin (1767-1855) described it as "so dark that we could not see 20 rods from us."[25] That gloaming did not ameliorate the ambient resonance of advancing British troops. General Scott describes the British Army's approach:

> Being again in collected force and in returning confidence, they cautiously advanced o recover the lost field and their battery—the horses of which had been killed or crippled before the retreat. By degrees the low commands, *halt, dress, forward!* Often repeated, became more audible in the awful stillness of the moment. At length a dark line could be seen, at a distance, perhaps, of sixty paces.[26]

The one hundred and twenty feet distance between enemies by Scott's estimation diminished to only a few yards. The British soldiers broke out first with a violent barrage at the American troops defending their captured position, which responded in kind. The intensity of the firefight made a haunting image not only for the Americans, but their British counterparts. Indeed, according to a letter in the newspaper *American Watchman*:

> They were so near each other, that the flash of the enemy's guns, as they fired volley after volley, they could, through the darkness, by the lurid glare of the flash and blaze, see the faces and even mark the countenances of their adversaries… the opposing ranks wear a blue sulphurous hue, and the men of each flash had the appearance of laughing.[27]

The close combat proximity in the murkiness and fracas led to what is now referred to as "friendly fire." Both sides experienced numerous tragic incidents of that modality. As an illustration, Berton acknowledges that:

> *Confusion!* The British reinforcements, hurried into the line in the dark, mistake friends for enemies. The Royal Scots pour a destructive fire into the Glengarry Fencibles stationed in the woods to the west of the church. The British 103rd blunders by error into the American centre and is extricated only with difficulty and heavy casualties.[28]

The 103rd also lost two of their field cannons to Miller and the 21st Infantry according to the scholar, Henry Adams.[29] Miller now had more than enough firepower to decisively win the engagement, from five to seven. All that was needed was a coordinated assault that was not aggravated by continued errors of judgment, specifically, "friendly fire." Le Couteur, whose 104th company was in a tandem formation with the 103rd explains one debacle:

> The 103d [Regiment] and us formed line, on the right Flank of the Royals and 89th, who were formed in line, and keeping in very heavy fire on the enemy, who returned it in very good style. We were told the enemy was advancing on our Front, and soon after saw a Column coming right down upon us, we were ordered to commence, and we raffled away. A Man ran down from them and called, we were firing on the Glengarry Regiment, imagine to yourself, the Consternation we were in, at this misfortune, which had also happened to the 89th and the 41st [Regiments], our lads instantly ceased, but the 103rd fired another volley, not knowing it so soon.[30]

"Friendly fire" is often seen as a consequence of the "fog of war"—the confusion inherent in warfare. That incertitude usually occurs when opposing forces are usually in close proximity; such was the *status quo* in the Battle of Niagara Falls. After resting his corps for nearly an hour, General Scott tried an experimental maneuver with his surviving troops. In his own "fight or flight" mode, Scott led his troops across the front of Miller's 21st Infantry; they mistook Scott's troops for the enemy, opened fire, and caused many

fatalities, many of whom were also caused by the British in a deadly crossfire. Berton points out:

> Now Scott finds himself with the remainder of his assault party directly in front of two British Regiments, the 103rd and the 104th. Fortunately for him, they mistake him for the British 89th. "The 89th!" warns a British officer, just as his men are about to decimate Scott's ranks. "The 89th!" call out the Americans, realizing the British mistake. Scott leads his detachment back toward his own lines, only to blunder into two more British regiments, the real Royal Scots and the 41st, who are too far forward of their own line.[31]

Ironically, according to Berton, Scott's detachment was saved by the intervention of the Glengarries who in the darkness, mistaken the 89th and the 41st for Americans, and attack them. In all that confusion, Scott and some of his soldiers are able to escape. Scott later used a metaphor that was an apt description of the "friendly fire" failures; "...each with the bandage of night on his eyes for it was now dark—after nine o'clock in the evening."[32] In Turner's viewpoint, "Perhaps the most serious tactical blunder by either side was Scott's attack with his 1st Brigade along Lundy's Lane, which brought his men between the contending armies and made the target of fire from both."[33]

Just prior to Scott's misstep in the fire zone of the 21st Infantry and the British Army, Hindman's artillery pummeled British troops using grapeshot; in contrast, they were fully unsheltered to the Royal Army's musket fire. Many of the artillerists fled their posts; a notable exception was Captain John Ritchie. Hindman on horseback ordered Ritchie to withdraw since Ritchie was already seriously wounded, but the wounded captain was in his sympathetic fight mode and refused to leave his post. The argument between the officers ended with an intense volley from the enemy that killed Ritchie and shot Hindman's horse dead leaving him alive but pinned under his mount.[34] In addition, Hindman's reserve supplies of grapeshot canisters had never arrived—the caissons had

been destroyed earlier by British artillery salvos; it was one of the many unexpected caprices that this evening of the 25th endured. Another shortcoming was the complement of military skirmishers.

In fact, the serious decline of Native Peoples on the American side, during the Battle of Niagara Falls was a major climacteric in the fray. Historian Carl Benn writes about Porter's attempt to negotiate for the Iroquois Confederation to stay:

> On 25 July Brigadier-General Porter did his best to persuade the warriors not to listen to the chiefs who wanted to withdraw but to remain in the field of glory they were sure to win in the coming battles…Nevertheless, the majority of warriors in American service upheld their agreement with their Canadian relatives and crossed back into the United States. They seem to have tried to mask their intentions from the Americans, some saying they had to go home to do their haying and to protect their families, others claiming that they would return as soon as they received their pay…Attempts to encourage them to return in strength failed, and no more than fifty warriors, mainly Algonkian Stockbridges, served with the army in Canada for the rest of the war…[35]

Curiously, it seems that most of the native warriors had the common sense to know when to stop fighting, despite the ethnocentric lens of Porter that proposed otherwise. Many survivors of the Left Division actively pursued the "glory" perspective, which Porter failed to convince the majority of the Iroquois warriors. Their reduced presence was another major setback for the American forces insofar as it illustrated a lack of skilled native skirmishers. Porter's general troop strength was also questionable.

Moreover, Porter achieved some success with his diminished 3rd Brigade troop strength of approximately 300 at the left flank of the American attack, as did Drummond, who refused to see a surgeon so he continued command of his forces. Graves cites Private Alexander McMullen of Colonel Fenton's Pennsylvania Volunteers Regiment:

> The enemy's artillery being taken about the time we of Porter's brigade arrived on the battle ground, the enemy reinforced and came down the hill directly in front of us. The brigade was just formed into a line, and I heard the voice of Porter saying to us, "Show yourselves men, and assist your brethren!" when showers of musket balls came over our heads like a sweeping hail storm. We returned fire from the whole line of the brigade… I had twenty rounds in my box when I went to the battleground, and when the firing ceased on examining my box I found the last one was in my musket.[36]

McMullen's lack of ammunition, gunpowder, and flint was ubiquitous among the soldiers on both sides. Indeed, even with reinforcements, the logistical basics were depended on recycled equipment from their *fratrum mortuorum,* and from those survivors close to death. There was a modicum of necessary ammunition that arrived on wagons—their primary mission was to remove the wounded. That being the case, the Canadian Volunteers who augmented the 3rd Brigade withdrew rapidly, because of their low reserves, increased velocity of British musket balls, and their ranking as traitors made them subject to hang if captured. All of this was due to Drummond's obsession to win at all costs, although frustrated by his lack of success at the center; the advantage was slowly turning in his favor at the left flank.

On the left flank, Dobbin received a spent musket ball that he initially misjudged to be critical, and left his post on his steed momentarily until he discovered it was minor. What was not minor was the 3rd Brigade's quick retreat due the voluminous British volleys. The brigades' retrograde was approximately 150 paces, and from McMullen's vantage point, "…we passed over the dead and dying, who were literally in heaps, especially where the British had stood in battle."[37] Colonel Nicholas viewed that the American left flank was near collapse, he pivoted his line of soldiers and fortified Porter's brigade as McMullen explains:

> Col[onel]. Nicholas had joined us that evening with a regiment of regulars, who had been kept in reserve, but now skillful manoeuvres placed themselves between us and the British and kept a destructive fire upon them until they fell back, and the firing ceased. A murmur, which ran through the ranks of the volunteer companies, who were contending for places in the rear, and the groans of the dying, was all that was heard for some minutes.[38]

The British counterattack led by a wounded Drummond was forced back; nevertheless, it was extremely costly to the American Left Division, and Drummond was still incessant that his captured battery train be recaptured.

The murkiness in the battlefield was detrimental to both American and British troops. It was the catalyst for all of the "friendly fire" tragedies. Hence, British Lieutenant Colonel William Drummond (1779-1814) added his facet, "...the ridiculous mistakes which could only occur fighting an army speaking the same language were laughable, though serious."[39]

Brown and some of his officers were on *reconnaissance,* and rode in pairs. Brown and one of his officers, *aide-de-camp* Captain Ambrose Spencer (1795-1814) called out to the regiment, "What regiment is that?" "The Royal Scots, Sir," comes the unexpected reply, and Spencer was quickly thought to impersonate a British accent, "Stand ye fast, Scotch Royals!" Spencer quickly rode back to Brown an escorted him back to relative safety of the ever shifting American line.[40] Accordingly, Colonel Drummond's analysis of the dark of night and a shared language by opposing forces was *a propos*.

Around 11 P.M., both armies were over heated, exhausted, dehydrated, and most of them coughed up gun-powdered *sputum*. This was due to the gunpowder smoke and excessive heat; not only were the smoke and heat major strands, but to load their muskets, the soldiers had to rip open paper gunpowder cartridges with their teeth.[41]

Constantly spitting to rid the bit of powder they always tasted in the process, they needed to rehydrate to the same extent of any present day professional athlete. Moreover, the American soldiers in control of the artillery ridgeline and in the rest of the battleground were almost out of ammunition. There was a respite between British assaults, for example, Barbuto explains:

> The thirsty, exhausted Americans prepared as best they could in the forty-five minutes between the second and third counterattacks. The American line, which had been fairly straight before the first attack, was now back to a horseshoe. Too many officers were wounded or dead. The men removed cartridges from the fallen. The Twenty-Fifth was so badly depleted that Jesup was forced to array his men in a single rank in order to cover his front.[42]

The second British attack lasted as long as the interval that followed. Thus, it was the standard minutiae of that battle which dictated survival mode or death for the soldiers. Drummond's Right Division, although better reinforced with troops and logistical support, they also exhibited the same appalling condition as their enemy, regardless, Drummond's "fight or flight" mode was in the former. There were still circumstances, albeit peripheral to either side in this seesaw of bloodletting near Niagara Falls.

The British Army, Canadian Fencibles, and Canadian Militia were fatigued—some of them had been fighting and marching for 12 hours. The Americans were not in much better shape. The cries of the wounded and dying who littered the dark battlefield only made things worse for the survivors of both armies. Le Couteur again writes, "Affairs just then looked very ill on our side, the Yankees were behaving nobly, and the 89th [Regiment] were giving way a little."[43] Le Couteur was unique among his fellow British officers in that he recognized the American Left Division was now on an even parity with the British Army, although, his commanding officer General Drummond was

still doubtful about his enemy's competence, as he ordered a third counterattack around 11:30 P.M.

Drummond's third onslaught increased the bloodbath's tally, which happened at its inception close to midnight. Fighting again was mostly hand-to-hand that also included many muskets that were out of cartridges relegated as clubs augmented by bayonets. To reiterate, most of the cartridges that the Americans retrieved were scrounged from their dead fellow soldiers and fallen enemy. Hindman's artillery, had near depleted grapeshot and canister shot, although they made every discharge count. Indeed, later on at Ripley's court martial an American officer testified:

> that at the expiration of the interval last mentioned, the enemy advanced a third time to recover their artillery. It was our impression that they had been reinforced, and this was confirmed by prisoners, who were taken at the time. The advance of the enemy was similar to the two preceding ones, and the fire, was again opened, by their line. Gen. Ripley's brigade reserved their fire as before…In every attack the enemy were repelled. Gen. Ripley made every possible exertion to inspire and encourage his troops; exposed his person during the hottest, of the fire of the enemy; and as he considered more than was necessary.[44]

Ripley, was an exemplar of a "hands on" senior staff officer. Specifically, he rode his wounded horse along the American lines cheering and motivating his troops at personal risk and miraculously missed being killed when two musket balls went through his hat. The British overview of the battle was distinctively different.

> Captain David Thompson (1770-1857), of the 41st Foot, contends:
>
> It was long before this crisis of the engagement that the curtains of night had enveloped the scene; but instead of that circumstance tending to abate the fury of war which had now completely drenched the field with the blood of the combatants, the rage of battle appeared only to increase as the night advanced. Still did the enemy continue to direct his strongest force against the crest of the British position; but his repeated charges were as often received and repelled by the regular, fencible, and militia forces engaged, with that intrepid gallantry for which the British army has ever been characterized.[45]

Although he noted the intensity of the battle in the dark of night despite the reality of Miller's 21st Infantry in possession of the British artillery, consequently, Thompson's description had a British Army's skew. Thus, Thompson became one of the many "seedsmen" who elevated their respective historic narrative into their legacy, and there were others who embraced the same viewpoint.

Lieutenant Anderson states, "There never was apiece of ground contended for in more courageous manner than the top of the hill at Lundy's Lane, since the time of the Romans; *Caesar* and *Pompey* never fought in a more gallant manner."[46] Anderson's imperialist lens was the standard custom of that era, and it would be abhorrent for most contemporary scholars to expound on any combat butchery as being heroic. Whereas Donald Graves in the PBS Documentary "The War of 1812," states, "It was a bad night for generals, Lundy's Lane, and that's a fact. It was a bad night for everybody!"[47]

Among the troops who experienced that bad night was one U.S. Army Captain Elihu H. Shepard (1795-1876), he states,

> Towson (as General Brown said) " illuminated the heavens with the constant blaze of his artillery," and the battle continued another hour with great slaughter on both sides. The British seemed to think they could not fight without their artillery, and returned and made two desperate efforts to retake it, but failed. They had taken off with them the horses, limbers, rammers and matches, and thus kept us from using them against themselves that night… I heard sad complaints of thirst, but not a word of fatigue or hunger.[48]

Apparently, Shepard was not at the battle when the initial British counterattack occurred to retake their artillery, hence, the reason for his notation of only two British assaults. It could also be that he wrote over a half century after the fact—his memory might have been compromised towards actual facts.

Ultimately, what is at stake here was an almost lack of crucial elements to operate the captured British battery train: Historian Kelvin F. Riley describes their functions, 1) Limber-a two wheel cart with a pintle for attaching guns when travelling or moving. Four to six horses are required. 2) Match-a hemp rope impregnated with chemicals to retain a fire and act as a slow fuse. There were two types: slow match on the linstock and port fire, and quick match used with primers.[49]

In addition, Historian Albert C. Manucy writes: Rammer was a wooden cylinder about the same diameter and length as the shot. It pushed home the powder charge, the wad, and the shot. Its handle was marked to let the loaders know when different parts of the charge were properly sealed. Thus, that avoided faulty or double loading.[50] Therefore, the only artillery that was consistently used by the Left Division was under the command of Hindman and Towson, and the British cannons were the prizes, for whichever army controlled them. Scott was determined that what was left of his 1st Brigade would retain possession of the British guns and the knoll of Lundy's Lane. According to Barbuto:

> On the far left, Scott and Leavenworth formed up the two hundred undaunted survivors of the 1st Brigade. Without waiting for orders, Scott led these brave men out from the American line. As the British sensed the oncoming assault, they opened a fierce fire that fractured the U.S. column into two pieces. The trailing portion withdrew to the American line, while the enemy destroyed the leading fragment.[51]

Among the many American fatalities was a Captain Abraham F. Hull (1786-1814) who was the son of disgraced General William Hull (1753-1825) who surrendered Detroit to the British in 1812, and he was also a cousin of Captain Isaac Hull (1773-1843) the celebrated U.S. Navy hero.[52] Scott left Leavenworth in command as he decided to reconnoiter the American right flank with Jesup and the 25th Infantry.

Barbuto describes the meeting, " While speaking with Jesup, both officers were hit. It was Jesup's third wound, but he fought on. Scott was not so fortunate. A bullet caught him in the shoulder and knocked him to the ground."[53] The essence of Barbuto's description is that Scott's participation in the Niagara Campaign was over. Graves adds in his description:

> As if Jesup did not have worries enough, Scott suddenly appeared in the Twenty-Fifth's position. While talking with Jesup, he was knocked unconscious by a musket ball in the left shoulder joint and Jesup had him carried to a nearby tree. A few minutes later, Jesup received his fourth wound, " a violent contusion in the breast by a piece of shell or perhaps the stick of a rocket" that knocked him senseless to the ground but, in a few minutes, this seemingly indestructible Kentuckian was back on his feet directing his regiment's fire.[54]

Jesup, although born in Virginia, he was reared in Kentucky from infancy, and his survival of his third and fourth wounds that did not affect his command of troops only reinforced the British Army's phobia about Kentuckians. They regarded Kentuckians' combat acumen on an even parity with Native warriors' reputation viewed by the Americans. Consequently, Scott later recalled his:

> [I] inquiring of the commander (Jesup) about a wound (in the hand) heard a call in the ranks—*Cartridges!* At the same moment a man reeling to the ground, responded—*Cartridges in my box!* The two commanders flew to his succor. The noble fellow had become a corpse as he fell. In the next second or two Scott, for a time, as insensible, lay stretched at his side, being prostrated by an ounce of musket ball through the left shoulder joint. He had been twice dismounted and badly contused, in the side by a rebound of a cannon ball, some hours before…Unable to hold his head from loss of blood and anguish, he was taken in an ambulance across the Chippewa, where the wound was staunched and dressed.[55]

The concept of a "sterile field" in treating open wound trauma would not happen until the post Pasteur period in the late nineteenth century—it was miraculous that Scott did not die from *sepsis*. Many soldiers on both sides did. Nevertheless, Barbuto, Graves,

and Scott himself all omitted a pivotal fact about Scott's parole mandate that freed him from captivity as a prisoner-of-war; Scott was paroled by the British on the stipulation that he was not to again take arms against the Royal Army—if he violated that *proviso* and was recaptured, he would be executed by firing squad.[56] Therefore, it was imperative that he be removed safely from the engagement, which his troops did on Jesup's command; Scott's *status quo* was dangerously similar to Colonel Willcocks and the Canadian Volunteers.

About the same time Scott was incapacitated by a British musket ball in his shoulder, Brown was hit by another round in his thigh; neither of them, Scott or Brown did not know that the other was wounded, therefore unable to command the Left Division. When Brown discovered that Scott was impaired, he then knew the only two senior command officers who were not wounded were Ripley and Porter. He had to choose between Ripley and Porter. Brown did not like either choice, but Ripley was the "lessor of two evils." Brown's rationale was based on Porter and his 3rd Brigade during Chippewa on 5 July that only accomplished meager success, which was quickly saved by Jesup and his 25th Infantry. According to Lossing, Ripley's initial movements on 25 July 1814 were circumspect:

> Ripley had not moved from Chippewa when the day dawned, and Brown, disappointed and angered by his tardiness, ordered his own staff to go to the commanders of corps and direct them to be promptly prepared to march. It was sunrise before the army crossed the Chippewa, and they were halted by Ripley at the Bridgewater Mills, a mile from the battle-ground, where he was informed that the enemy was again in possession of the heights at Lundy's Lane and his cannon, and was too strong to be attacked by a less force than the entire of the *Niagara* with any promise of success.[57]

Consequently, Ripley returned to headquarters at Chippewa much to Brown's outrage. Brown, "...resolved not to trust the brigadier with the command of the army any longer than necessity required."[58] Intelligence reports on enemy troop strength were as inaccurate for the Americans as well as their British opposite. Also, Ripley did not have the unthinkingly enthusiasm and eagerness to fight the British Army that Brown, Scott, and Porter possessed. Nonetheless, he was regular U.S. Army, had seniority, and was not American Militia; so, Brown made a command judgment that placed Ripley in charge of the Left Division. Although Brown did not know it at the time, his turning command over to Ripley would determine the controversial outcome of the Battle of Niagara Falls.

The intensity of Drummond's third counter assault was severe, and the American line held much to the astonishment of Drummond and his troops. The third British attack was a repeat of the first two endeavors. Graves explains, "...Drummond seems to have learned nothing from the failures of his two previous attacks and, instead of probing around Brown's flanks for weak spots, went straight for the centre of the American line."[59] Drummond still believed he was fighting an inferior enemy whose only advantage was his skewed perception that his troops were outnumbered by a two to one ratio—recapturing his battery train was his only option to survive any subsequent encounters with the Americans. Around midnight, Drummond ordered a withdrawal. The battle royal between Americans and British ended with the Americans standing on the knoll and in possession of the captured British artillery.

U.S. Captain John W. Weeks (1781-1853) maintains that the American victory, "Glorious and complete on our side, but it is with the most frequent regret I must add that every fruit of it was surrendered by that terrible fatality which wounded our Gen'l and

initiated an order to withdraw after our troops had been in quiet possession of the field for nearly an hour."[60] The orders were based initially on Jesup and Leavenworth's assessment of the battlefield. They conferred with Ripley when Brown's orders arrived confirming their evaluation. The withdrawal took an additional two hours with recovering the wounded and the issue of the British artillery.

Only one of the British cannons was recovered on orders of an exhausted Major Thomas Biddle (1790-1831).[61] When ordered to remove rest of the captured guns, Private McMullen, echoed his fellow soldiers' lament, "being tired out and half dead for want of water, the most of our faces scorched with powder, we refused to do anymore."[62] There were insufficient numbers of horses to remove the wounded, and not any limbers to remove the guns, so, McMullen's insubordination to an equally "burnt out" Biddle and his fellow officers was overlooked.[63]

Brown's orders to Ripley included that they return to the battlefield by dawn to take possession of the British guns and the battlefield. Ripley ordered a cadre to guard the remaining artillery pieces. Ripley based that order on faulty intelligence, which had Drummond and his troops withdrawn from the area. Thus, Ripley's assignment of a small guard detachment was not the only error in the Niagara kill zone. They were distributed on an even parity with both armies.

Many historians have used a myriad of descriptions for the Battle of Niagara Falls. Specifically, Fredriksen analyzes, "If the Battle of Chippewa was reminiscent of a medieval joust, then Lundy's Lane should be compared to a bar-room brawl."[64] Then Graves argues, "For a brief moment, the battle hung in the balance; and then, as the British and Canadians on the flanks pulled back, the centre followed and the guns

remained in American hands. Drummond's final attack had failed."[65] Finally, in Lossing's view, he maintains, "Thus ended the sanguinary Battle of Niagara, sometimes called *Lundy's Lane*, and sometimes *Bridgewater*. It has few parallels in history in its wealth of gallant deeds."[66] Frederiksen and Lossing's metaphors were at variance with documentary evidence, conversely, Graves expatiated on primary sources. But above all, the narratives of the actors at the battle revealed the establishment of the parallel historiographies. In a letter to Prévost, Drummond writes about his version of the battle:

> In the reiterated and determined attacks which the enemy made upon our centre for the purpose of gaining at once the crest of the position and our guns, the steadiness and intrepidity displayed by the troops allotted for the defence of that post were never surpassed; they consisted of the 89th Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, and, after the Lieutenant-Colonel had been obliged to retire from the field by a severe wound, by Major Clifford: a detachment of the Royal Scots under Lieut. Hemphill, and after he was killed, Lieut. Fraser; a detachment of the 8th (or King's) under Captain Campbell; light company, 41st Regiment, under Captain Glew, with some detachments of militia under Lieutenant-Colonel Parry,103rd Regiment. These troops repeatedly, when hard pressed, formed round the colours of the 89th Regiment, and invariably repulsed the attacks made against them.[67]

Drummond's pronouncement was *fait accompli* for generations of Canadian historians, although, he was not the sole messenger. Lieutenant Le Couteur writes:

> The General rallied them himself, and made them and the Royals advance to within 50 yards of the enemy's line, we and the Grenadiers of the 103rd [Regiment] on their right and the Glengarry on the left at the same time giving Three cheers, we poured in a terrible fire on them for an hour, when they began to give way, and finally ran.[68]

(The three cheers were for the then King George III, which was the standard operating procedure prior to any charge of British Infantry.) Drummond and Le Couteur's missives were in contradiction of Captain Shepard's vantage point:

> About two hours after the firing ceased, I accompanied General Brown's aid-de-camp, Austin, over the field by moonlight. The dead and wounded had been removed from that bloodstained field, which had so lately been the scene of such frightful conflict and slaughter, and naught was heard but the roar of Niagara and the tread of our horses. The ground was nearly covered with the debris of battle, dead horses, torn clothes, broken arms, cartridge wrappers and torn-off ends of cartridges, for about three quarters of a mile, which was the whole distance on the road where so many brave men fell. We lingered about the neighborhood until after daylight, expecting General Ripley to return with our army, but were disappointed; he did not return.[69]

Shepard's claim that the American dead were removed that evening rests upon the questionable assumption that the area he surveyed had *in toto*, all of the American dead. There were other reliable accounts to the contrary. As for the rest of the contradictions, if the Left Division had been able to remove all of the captured British cannons, then Drummond would not have had the physical proof to reinforce his micromanaged narrative. Drummond's historical parallel stream created an image that the British were in control of their battery train for the majority of the conflict.

Hence, when Miller responded to Brown's order to capture the British artillery with the immortalized "I will try, sir!"[70] It caused a cacophony of historic narratives that continues to present-time. One description was by Captain McDonald, who testified at Ripley's court martial on 15 March 1815:

> After the last attack, the second brigade for three fourths, or one half an hour, remained on the hill with very little change of position: its left was perhaps thrown back. In the interim, General Ripley despatched [sic] the witness with orders to General Porter, to send fifty or one hundred volunteers of his command, directing them to report to Col. McRee, and remove the captured artillery from the heights to the camp on the Chippewa, He delivered the orders, saw the volunteers detached, and marched on the hill. —Owing to there being no drag-ropes for the artillery, no horses on the ground, and the guns being unlimbered, it was found impracticable to remove them, and the volunteers were then employed in removing the wounded.[71]

McDonald and Shepard's perception as to time perception and sequence of events are inconsistent. According to Mark Peterson, " One of the principle functions of perception is to limit information to matters of significance, to things we can or must deal."[72] As a result, McDonald gave the logistical problems of removing the British artillery without assigning blame to exhausted enlisted personnel; thus, he had an altered lens for the passage of time, as was the case in Shepard's filter, which was probably skewed due to his mental and physical burnout.

Indeed, fatigue was the ubiquitous influence felt by soldiers on either side. Fredriksen was correct insofar as the sluggishness of both sides were akin to his metaphor of the barroom brawl, although, the soldiers' tactical movements displayed were not. There were additional maneuvers *post hoc* by both sides, which added to the historic controversy. When Ripley ordered his corps to guard the captured British ordnance he assumed that the British Army had retreated from the combat zone—he was incorrect.

Captain Joseph Glew (1783-1838) led a company of the 41st Foot and they reconnoitered the knoll and discovered it was lightly guarded by American troops. This was after a few hours when the conflict had terminated. British Private Shadrack Byfield (1790-1874?) describes the onslaught:

> We then moved on the field of action…It being night we could not discover what regiment it was…Our bugle then sounded, for the company to drop. A volley was the fired upon us which killed two corporals and wounded a sergeant and several of the men. The company then arose, fired and charged. The enemy quitted their position; we followed and took three field pieces.[73]

Byfield further notes capture of American troops by his company of the 41st Foot. Anglo-Canadian historians ignored Byfield's episodic narrative for generations by design, or omission. The most notable in that regard was General Ernest A. Cruikshank

(1853-1939), a Canadian military historian who reinforced Drummond's perspective on his embellishment that the British Army had retaken their captured artillery after scant minutes as opposed to some hours.[74]

Ironically, it was Donald E. Graves' due diligence in researching primary sources that finally revealed Byfield's anecdote, which placed him in the academic crosshairs of many of his peers who were content with the ongoing mythos. Indeed, Graves was also highly critical for Drummond's lack of skirmishers in his counterattacks on the Lundy's Lane knoll that resulted in repeated failures. Graves' revelations only took almost two centuries in adding to the historic discourse, even though, he was not alone in his critique; there were British contemporaries of Drummond that took issue with his military tactics—Colonel Scott and Lieutenant Le Couteur.

Scott argues, "Gen'l Drummond commanded in the action, but I am sorry to say I could not then or now observed the smallest appearance of generalship."[75] Le Couteur during the battle points out, " One circumstance I never forgot, as a lesson in war. Gen [era] l. Drummond rode up to the 103rd [Regiment]. ' My lads will you charge the Americans?' He put a question instead of giving an order—they fired instead of charging."[76] Despite these criticisms, Drummond was lionized as much as any present day media celebrity, moreover, the knoll where the focus of battle occurred was renamed Drummond Hill in his honor. *Kudos* also went to the American generals by U.S. Army reports to the American press. The 4 August 1814 edition of the *Providence Patriot* reads:

> ...the concentrated forces of Upper Canada, under Lieut. Gen. Drummond and Major-Gen. Riall, were met by our troops near the Falls of Niagara, and a long, desperate and sanguinary battle took place. Our army having drove them from every position they attempted to hold—after having stormed their battery, carried all their artillery, and kept possession of the ground for more than three hours, retired to their camp in good order, without having been disturbed by the enemy...Gen. Brown received severe wounds, and is now confined by them at this place...Gen. Scott, his aid and brigade-major, were all severely wounded... The loss on either side is immense...Our army has fallen back to Erie.[77]

The inference of the U.S. Army's officer report was that the U.S. Army always had possession of the captured British Artillery. Therefore, questionable rhetoric was equally distributed on both sides, which, to paraphrase Captain Thompson, "...roused to a state of desperation for victory."[78] Indeed, Miller's response, "I'll try, sir!" was the overall effect that both armies experienced in this debatable engagement, and it led to the parallel narratives that are still prevalent currently.


Lake Ontario
Newark
Fort Niagara
Youngstown
Four Mile Cr
Fort George
Niagara R
to Burlington Heights
Queenston
Lewiston
Tuscarora Village
Queenston Heights
NEW YORK
Manchester
Lundy's Lane
25 Jul
Fort Schlosser
Niagara Falls
Goat Island
Chippewa
5 Jul
Chippewa
Chippewa River
Street's Creek
UPPER CANADA
Grand Island
Cook's Mill
19 Oct
Niagara R
Lyons Creek
Black Creek
Frenchman's Cr
NIAGARA RIVER
OPERATIONAL AREA
5 July–19 October 1814
Battle Site
0
5
Miles
Conjocta Creek
Fort Erie
15 Aug
17 Sep
Black Rock
Buffalo
Lake Erie

CHAPTER FOUR

CONCLUSION

STRIKE THE SET

Troops are made to let themselves be killed.

Napoleon Bonaparte

No boast of a "great victory," but in my opinion
it was nearly equal on both sides.

Lieutenant Colonel Hercules Scott
12 August 1814

It is so easy to fight battles on paper, so different from fighting them successfully on the ground.

U.S. Army General John Gibbon

On 26 July 1814, the dawn of the sun rose, and the fetor of the wounded and the dead that permeated the air was beyond description. Brown had ordered Ripley to return with troops to that arena of gore by early dawn—Ripley failed to follow Brown's orders to the letter. Ironically, Ripley's disobedience led to a rigid dichotomy between parallel chronicles to the Battle of Niagara Falls, and this thesis is the intersection of those annals. Moreover, these national military narratives were the master histories for generations of American and Canadian historians. But neither of these postulations was accurate, since neither side won the engagement—it was a drawn battle. Or in the words of Historian Donald R. Hickey, the diverse narratives "construct a history that we are comfortable with that meets certain deep-seated needs."[1] The story of the Battle of Niagara Falls, though marked by these divergent chronicles, was ultimately incorrect as shown in this study through various actors' lenses of that era.

U.S. Army Surgeon Ezekiel W. Bull noted the absence of any British troops present despite the fact a few hours earlier for the British Army's recapture of three British artillery guns, as he surveyed the Battle of Niagara Falls battlefield at dawn:

> The dead had not been removed during the night, and such a scene of carnage I had never beheld. Redcoats and Bluecoats were intermingled promiscuously three deep around the hill…carcasses of sixty or seventy horses disfigured the scene. I went a mile or so beyond this point and saw no enemy.[2]

By mid-morning British troops had retaken command of the knoll and they also observed the bloodbath. Sergeant James Commins of the 8th Foot recalled, "The morning light ushered to our view a shocking spectacle, Men and horses lying promiscuously together, American and English laid upon one another, occasioned by our advance and retreat."[3] Had Ripley arrived with troops as ordered by Brown to retake the field at dawn when Bull held his inspection, then Drummond's narrative would have been a regrettable apology to Prévost instead of a pronouncement of victory.

Ripley finally sent troops to reclaim the British battery train, after an indignant and wounded Brown wanted Ripley to retake the knoll at dawn, and ordered him to comply immediately. A U.S. Army company reconnoitered the battlefield and observed the British troops disposing of the dead without any inclination to resume fighting—they were depleted on an even parity with their American counterparts. Canadian Militia Lieutenant Duncan Clark (1785-1862) described the grim "policing" of the battlefield, "The American dead were collected and piled up on a hill in three heaps of something upwards of 30 lifeless bodies, each with a layer of dried oak rails, the torch was applied and the whole reduced to ashes."[4] This was standard operating procedure for most of the

American KIA, and it dated back to the Roman era.[5] A notable exception was the case of U.S. Army Captain Hull, and it was because of Lieutenant Le Couteur's intervention:

> Close by me lay a fine young man, the son of American general Hull. He was mortally wounded, and I gave him some brandy and water, and wished Him to give me His watch, rings, and anything He wished sent to his family. He told me abut Himself and to come to Him in the morning when He would give them to me in charge. When I got to Him, he was a beautiful Corpse, stripped stark naked, amidst a host of friends and foes.[6]

Le Couteur supervised Hull's burial, which later included a gravestone after the end of the war. As for the unauthorized removal of Hull's uniform and personal effects, it was customary for both sides and continued in other wars until the twentieth century.

So, from his vantage point, Ripley sensed the pointlessness of such an endeavor of attack; even so, he would have to contend with a chagrined Brown. Therefore, Ripley prudently gathered consensus from his fellow officers prior to returning to Brown; it was an early nineteenth-century military equivalent of "cover your *gluteus maximus*!" Ripley also had Porter in concurrence for his decision not to attack when he returned to Brown at Chippewa. Brown was not amused, as Barbuto illuminates further:

> On 26 July, Brown's plan to advance to Burlington Heights was irretrievably shattered. Brown had had his chance to destroy the British Army in the open, and he failed. Worst yet, the new commander in the field, Ripley, had voluntarily relinquished the defensive line of the Chippawa River and had surrendered control of the western shore of the Niagara Valley all the way to Fort Erie. Drummond's army was badly injured, but by no means was it shattered…Although there was still a lot of fight in both forces, the balance of combat power on the Niagara Peninsula had swung from the invaders to the defenders.[7]

It was Ripley's presupposition that all American troops be evacuated from Canadian soil across the Niagara to Black Rock. Not only did Brown oppose evacuating soldiers from Canada, he still wanted Ripley to return and recapture the British Artillery Train.

Hence, Ripley used the support of his fellow officers including Porter to respectfully object to Brown's directive. According to some accounts, Brown allegedly told Ripley, "Sir, you will do as you please."[8] Before Brown, Scott, and Jesup were evacuated to Buffalo, New York, he summoned General Edmund P. Gaines (1777-1849), stationed at Sacketts Harbor, to take command of the Left Division.[9] Brown's tolerance of Ripley was at an end, although, Gaines replacement of Ripley was contingent on the communications and transportations modes of that era; until then, Ripley remained in command of the Left Division. Ripley ordered a withdrawal from the Chippewa camp with Fort Erie as the destination.

The Left Division fell back to Fort Erie, first, deliberately destroying British fortifications along the Chippewa River en route, and a task, which included burning bridges in their rear. Because they lacked the necessary horses and wagons, they abandoned or destroyed baggage and provisions that allowed room for the wounded. According to Captain Ropes, "The men had the liberty to take what they pleased, We threw the rist [sic] into the rivere [sic]."[10]

Drummond described the American withdrawal to Chippewa as "retreated in great disorder towards Fort Erie, where his egress from British territory might be more easy..."[11] This was yet another example of his continued mindset that the American Army was not on an even parity with the Right Division. Indeed, Barbuto maintains, "Even after the battle, Drummond persisted in the belief that his soldiers were more steadfast and skilled than the Americans."[12] The British Army also withdrew from the killing field, after burying their dead and burning American dead in funeral pyres.

The wounded, obviously, became a high priority on both sides. Berton described a British doctor's quandary in his treatment of wounded patients through the lens of Dr. William Dunlop (1792-1848) at Fort George:

> The casualties lie in tiered berths from which they must be moved in order to have their wounds dressed—an excruciating operation…There is no time for niceties. Limbs that might be saved are amputated to forestall gangrene. The heat is stifling, the flies thick. Maggots breed in open wounds, causing dreadful irritation. For two days and nights, Dunlop seldom sits down, pausing only to eat and change his clothes.[13]

Dunlop's marathon of emergency medical treatment was for 220 patients according to Berton. To reiterate, the level of early nineteenth-century trauma care was closer to the Middle Ages than to present day. Moreover, amputation of an arm would take approximately two minutes while a leg above the knee about ten minutes—both without any anesthesia save any alcohol libation when it was available.[14] This was standard operating procedure for both sides, as was the number of wounded.

Medical "facilities" were also overrun on the American side. Dr. William E. Horner (1793-1853) explains that he had "the sole attendance and dressing of one hundred and seventy-three sick and wounded. My fingers became so sore from incessant dabbing in water and pus that I could seize nothing without pain."[15] Indeed, infectious disease was the number one killer: dysentery, typhoid, pneumonia, malaria, measles, and small pox.[16] All without the benefits of antibiotics, or vaccines, which were mostly not available for another century. Those nineteenth century historians who believed in glory and heroism in battle might have modified their propositions if they had meticulously researched medical combat reports from that epoch. Then there were the casualty tallies.

Graves explains that the American loses were "174 killed, 572 wounded, 79 captured, and 29 missing."[17] Also, Graves further notes the British loses were "84 killed, 559 wounded, 169 captured and 55 missing."[18] The higher American mortality rate was due to British artillery salvos, and the missing were probably KIA without any identifiable remnants of bodies to confirm death. In addition, there were the prisoners of war, *inter alias,* General Riall was the highest-ranking captured enemy combatant on either side in the War of 1812. His wounded arm was amputated at the U.S. Military hospital in Buffalo, New York.

Unexpectedly, Riall then shared the same room with General Scott; although a former POW, he demanded that Riall receive better medical treatment for "the honor of the army is concerned with this."[19] Scott's medical condition was precariously dire as opposed to Riall. Historian John S. D. Eisenhower contends, "Winfield Scott was hovering near death. The musket ball that hit him at Lundy's Lane passed through his left shoulder and shattered the bone. Yet, despite his excruciating pain, he never lost some degree of control over the events immediately surrounding him."[20]

Moreover, Historian Benson J. Lossing further elaborated Scott's condition, "Scott suffered intensely, and for a month his recovery was considered doubtful. He was finally removed to the house of a friend (Mr. Brisbane) in Batavia, where kind nursing made his convalescence rapid."[21] Overall, their behavior to each other was cordial—the war was over for them, despite that, the campaign on the Niagara Peninsula continued. Tangentially, there was the schism in the American Army's chain of command between the Left and Right Division commanders, which extended to the Secretary of War and the

Commander-in-Chief. Armstrong had been a frustrated micro-manager of his generals while Madison was *laissez-faire* in that regard.

On 27 July 1814, Armstrong received a letter from the Right Division's commanding officer, General George Izard, dated 19 July 1814: "I look with some uneasiness to the westward. Should any accident occur in that quarter, ought I not move to the St. Lawrence, and threaten the rear of Kingston?"[22] Izard had been promoted to the rank of Major General on 24 January 1814.[23] His garnered rank made him the senior officer of both the Right and Left Divisions by Armstrong, nevertheless, the Right Division was being held in reserve and a buffer at Plattsburg, New York.

The Right Division's training was equivalent to the Left Division prior to the summer of 1814. Fredriksen comments on Izard's tenure as the commanding general: "I will not conceal from you my disappointment," he confided to James Monroe, "on taking command of what was called an army in this quarter. Instead of a force respectable by its numbers and discipline, I found the wretched and ragged remains of what had under gone the fatigues of last winter's deplorable attempt at the enemy's frontier."[24] From May until July 1814, Izard trained his troops that numbered roughly 5,000, and he used the *Blue Book* by Von Steuben instead of *Règlement.* Sadly, he was not as acutely successful as General Scott due to the lack of veteran officers.[25] Even though he was just as anxious as Scott to get into the fray, which was exemplified by his missive to Armstrong. The Secretary of War, nevertheless, had the same plan for Izard—attack the St. Lawrence and threaten the rear of Kingston. Although, there was a *caveat* to Armstrong's command for Izard—the British were coming!

Intelligence reports to Izard indicated that the Royal Army's troop strength in Lower Canada was roughly 10,000, and a majority were seasoned veterans from the Napoleonic Wars.[26] Although, Izard originally wanted to attack Lower Canada, he realized that a British invasion of the United States would begin at Plattsburgh, New York, as it was part of the Saranac River. Armstrong's command decision dictated that Izard and the Right Division move to Sacketts Harbor to implement a St. Lawrence assault. (That order left Plattsburgh open to British troops led by Prévost, which led to the Royal Army's defeat due to a blunder by the Royal Navy.[27]) Notwithstanding, Armstrong believed Izard's information was erroneous, and he still believed the American Army would still be victorious. All of this was still contingent on the communications and transportations modalities of that generation, which continued throughout the war.[28]

The dilemma of logistics in moving troops, supplying them with equipment and supplies was not the only *fiascos* experienced by both armies—there was also the topography of the Niagara Peninsula. The conditions of roads circa 1814 were dreadful, even by contemporary standards, as they were not close to any major city on either side of the border. Historian Jeffrey Kimball points out, "Numerous post roads, migration paths, droving trails, and traces linked the littoral paths with the northern frontier. Most were 'natural highways' that followed primitive Indian and animal trails through mountain passes and river valleys."[29] In addition, climate and geography exacerbated the problem, as Kimball maintains,

> The northern part of the country had warmer summers, colder winters, and more precipitation than western Europe…Surface configuration varied from mountains of great and moderate relief to plateaus, hill lands, and rolling plains, mostly covered with dense forest and interspersed with swamps, lakes, streams, and rivers.[30]

In present day American military jargon, Kimball's description of the environment is the anagram FUBAR or a SNAFU! Moreover, a clay layer was normally tiered roughly six inches below any road in the Niagara Peninsula, which compounded the mud conditions when the rains or snow came. (It would not be alleviated until the advent of railroads and steamboats decades later.) This situation was compounded by skewed communications in regard to any accurate intelligence reports.

Intelligence reports were still misinterpreted by both the American and British Armies. Ripley was under the assumption that Drummond's Right Division were close to assaulting the American Left, notwithstanding, Drummond still believed that the American Army outnumbered his forces by a two to one ratio, therefore, he kept peripheral *reconnaissance* on the American Army's retreat. Drummond would not attack until he was properly reinforced with additional troops, which occurred on 1 August 1814 with the arrival of the De Watteville Regiment and the remainder of the 41st Foot.[31]

Ironically, Drummond did not comprehend that his forces would outnumber Ripley's troops by a one point five to one ratio. British Troops totaled approximately 3, 150, while Ripley's forces were about 2,200.[32] The advantage was for Drummond's Right Division since any additional American troops and supplies were still contingent on Chauncey and the U.S. Navy's arrival, which coincidently, also happened on 1 August. In spite of that, Ripley's troop retrograde to Fort Erie a week earlier was laborious, as Fredriksen argues, "Thus, retreat from Lundy's Lane was something of a mixed blessing. It insured that the next confrontation with Drummond would be behind Fort Erie's impenetrable walls, where numbers counted for less."[33]

Drummond's additional troop complement was skewed insofar as the majority of the DeWatteville Regiment were not British subjects. Admittedly, the regiment was comprised mostly of Frenchmen, Spaniards, Germans, and Poles, although they all were veteran soldiers, they lacked the perseverance for the British Army's mission in Canada.[34] They were former Napoleonic prisoners of war who were made the same offer as Irish-American POWs years earlier, join or die. Along with the survivors of Chippewa and Niagara Falls, many of them perished in the extended British siege of Fort Erie, which became Drummond 's "Waterloo."

Military victories or defeats were coeval with the actors' belief that their side prevailed, and generations of historians sustained these chronicles. Captain Shepard concurred with his opposite Lieutenant Colonel Hercules Scott[35] as he expounded his recollection: "This sanguinary battle having been fought without any very apparent advantage to either army, all due honors were paid the dead without the least molestation. All who had escaped wounds appeared thankful, and those who had received any seemed equally thankful that they were no worse."[36] In the partial *dénouement* of the Battle of Niagara Falls/Lundy's Lane, Scott, and Shepard to a lessor degree were outliers. The nationality of the historian predicts the historian's judgment about which side won at the ridgeline of Lundy's Lane.

A matter of considerable significance for historians is the psychological consequence of the "Halo Effect." Psychologist Edward L. Thorndike (1874-1949) coined the phrase, and wrote a paper almost a century ago in which he points out some of the parameters,

I. Physical Qualities. Physique, bearing, neatness, voice, energy, and endurance.

II. Intelligence. Accuracy, ease in learning, ability to grasp quickly the point of a commanding officer, to issue clear and intelligent orders, to estimate a new situation, and to arrive at sensible decision in a crisis.
III. Leadership. Initiative, force, self-reliance, decisiveness, tact, ability to inspire men to command their obedience, loyalty and co-operation.
IV. Personal Qualities. Industry. Dependability, loyalty, readiness to shoulder responsibility for his own acts, freedom from conceit and selfishness, readiness and ability to co-operate.[37]

Thorndike's study used U.S. Army officers as subjects to evaluate their subordinate officers and enlisted personnel. Thorndike demonstrated that the "Halo Effect" is a cognitive bias in which one's overall impression of a person influences how we perceive that individual through our conceptual filters of intelligence and emotion.[38] It is a prevalent lens among all human beings, and is still used currently in all aspects of multi-media, *exempli gratia*, any product sales or personage through commercials.[39]

Historians who were contemporaries of the Battle of Niagara Falls always described Drummond, Scott, Brown, and Porter, and others by the criteria that reflect Thorndike observations. Even if they were critical of certain military decisions by the commanding and subordinate officers, they always held them in high regard based on their appearance, physique, and intelligence. To take a case in point, General Scott's height, intelligence, and appearance, which many of his fellow officers gave him the *sobriquet*, "Old Fuss and Feathers."[40] Scott, also praised fellow officers, even when he personally despised them.

It was and is a skewed analysis that illustrates an individual was judged based on their traits of general appearance, intelligence, among others. Just as important, was that tendency for successive generations of historians to lionized Scott based on the "Halo Effect," and Historian Charles W. Elliott was one of the last scholars to do so in his

biography of Scott.[41] This was also applicable to Drummond and other officers on the opposing side. It changed somewhat from the 1960s, where there was an incremental divergence with scholars' perspective on the Battle of Niagara Falls, the War of 1812, and its actors, as it was augmented by other social sciences.

Human beings prior to the establishment of state systems were what to many anthropologists and sociologists refer to as "Hunter-Gathers."[42] To put it another way, war encompasses predators and prey in roles alternating as to which battle was engaged. Its origins are in the thousands of years for the actors when agriculture and animal husbandry was not the criterion. Similarly, many social scientists are largely congruent in this contention, for the sake of example, in an academic paper, "The Evolution of War and its Cognitive Foundations," by Anthropologist John Tooby and Psychologist Leda Cosmides, maintain:

> Although humans now nearly universally live in state systems, our minds were formed during tens or hundreds of thousands of generations in small, horizontally organized hunter-gatherer bands. The special psychological mechanisms to deal with coalitional aggression that evolved then are with us now, and influence modern human behavior in a wide variety of contests.[43]

Thus, the Battle of Niagara Falls/Lundy's Lane was under the aegis of these evolutionary parameters that dictated how soldiers would behave in combat, which was established by its intensity of the hostility experienced by both sides. It was also psychological gratifying for the male "Hunters" in their bloodlust, as was demonstrated at the Battle of Niagara Falls; the extent of this had been the continuing narratives in human chronicles—it is the nature of any war. Equally, the chief metric is not what happened and why but how 19th century chroniclers—and recent historians—have employed metaphors of hunter and prey, for example, to "explain" the complexity of combat.

The intricacies of historic military chronicles take many different forms in their analyses, and the most recent premise was about the War of 1812 in that it was a *bellum civile.* Thus, some current historians from either side of the 49th parallel have described the War of 1812 as a civil war. Prominent among them, American Historian Alan Taylor, explains, "The War of 1812 was a civil war between competing visions of America: one still loyal to the empire and the other defined by its republican revolution against that empire."[44] Taylor's point is that the North American continent's border was not invariant as many past scholars noted. In fact, Taylor also believed that the socio-political lens of the populace on either side of that then permeable boundary was striving to create the same type of civilization on this North American continent. Taylor is mistaken because he overlooks that the War of 1812 was between a former colony and a current colony rather than a divided nation. Taylor was not an anomaly in this regard.

Canadian Historian Victor Suthren also believed that the War of 1812 was a civil war, as demonstrated in his article, "A Canadian Perspective on the War of 1812," in which he writes, "Picking the lesser of two evils, French Canadians served willingly in regular British regiments and militia formations, and fought well in the successful repulse of American forces."[45] The crux of Suthren's argument was that the British overlords guaranteed French-Canadian participation by exploiting the latter's fear that French Canadians would be made Anglo and Protestant if the Americans won. This type of propaganda was not unique then or in present day circumstances, as evidenced by a British parallel narrative, which described the Battle of Niagara Falls/Lundy's Lane as the Anglo-Canadian "Gettysburg" that reinforced Suthren's premise that the War of 1812

was a civil war. The criteria applied to Taylor was also *apropos* for Suthren, whose postulation was an overview of the Battle of Niagara Falls/ Lundy's lane.

The Canadian paradigm's origin of "Gettysburg" for the Battle of Niagara Falls is open to conjecture. Demonstrably, it occurred at least a generation or more after the American Civil War, and has been taught in Canadian public schools for most of the twentieth century. All of this speculation begs one question: is the use of the Gettysburg comparison accurate? There are some similarities and some incongruities; first, the former, to take a case in point, both battles were fought on an open field with an eminence on a cemetery controlled by the enemy. Admittedly, both campaigns according to Historian William Weber, "…were meeting engagements where advancing forces, incompletely deployed for battle, engaged enemy forces at unexpected times and places."[46] Indeed, Civil War Historian Earl J. Hess cites Abner Doubleday, "It seems to me there was a lack of judgment in preparations, and it was badly managed as a military movement."[47]

Although Doubleday's assertion was about Gettysburg, it was within the context of the Battle of Niagara Falls/Lundy's Lane, as was Weber's analysis of comparing the two engagements: "In both cases, key subordinate commanders made critical errors that unraveled larger strategic plans. Further, the invading armies' efforts to gain a critical tactical advantage by turning the enemy's left flank also proved unsuccessful."[48] Both historians expertly delineated the uniformity of these conflicts roughly fifty years apart, and it does give some credence to the Canadian premise, although, the results of these two battles were not concurrent.

The Gettysburg paradigm, which continues as a latter-day tenet, used the image of the Royal Army as being victorious over the invading American Army at the Battle of Niagara/ Lundy's Lane. Their rationale was based on some contentions: that the American Army, although vastly improved, was still not on an even parity with their opposite British Army; the Battle of Niagara Falls, like Gettysburg was the lynchpin for Canadian freedom with the British Empire; the United States after being defeated at the cataract of Niagara would never accept its defeat for that battle and the War of 1812, and would always be antagonistic to Canada in spite of it. The lens used by Anglo Canadian scholars in this regard is most curious. To reiterate, both battles were somewhat in parallel, as Weber explains:

> The Left Division's assault against the British artillery and infantry positions on the hilltop at Lundy's lane and "Pickett's Charge" against the center of the Union Army on Cemetery Ridge are usually depicted as the climatic engagements of their respective battles. Poor planning and flawed execution doomed both, though, as nether side had on hand the necessary reinforcements to hold those positions.[49]

Weber's claim that both battles were doomed rests upon the assumption that their outcomes were sacrosanct, whereas in reality they were incongruous—Pickett's Charge was a major defeat for the Confederate Army, and it was a drawn game for the Left Division. Therefore, Weber's postulation was in agreement with the Canadian modality of Gettysburg, and it was also in error. In other words, Canadian scholars adapted Gettysburg as their metaphor for a supposed victory at the Battle of Niagara Falls. That inaccuracy was also applicable for the American side.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the ending of the Battle of Niagara Falls/Lundy's Lane reinforced the myth that the United States had won the battle, when in reality it was a deadlock. It resulted in a retreat to Fort Erie as Barbuto points out: "Now, on 27 July, the

remnants of the Left Division huddled around a tiny fort where the waters of Lake Erie flowed into the Niagara. The British, in overwhelming numbers, might appear at any moment. Gone were the determined Brown, the bold Scott, and a host of fine officers."[50] On the British side, in a letter to a friend, Lieutenant Le Couteur wrote on 27 July, " ...I never passed so awful a night as that of the action. The stillness of the evening after the firing ceased, the Groans of the dying and wounded...I could not sleep tho' I was quite fatigued...A soldier's life is very horrid sometimes."[51] In Le Couteur's letter he also concluded that the British Army had won the engagement, which was based on his "party line." Le Couteur's premise was starkly juxtaposed with the American supposition, if the Left Division won the altercation, then, its retrograde to Fort Erie would not have been paramount for the survivors. Many of the survivors also retreated to Black Rock, New York. Thus, neither side won, especially with a shortage of officers and enlisted personnel.

Captain Howard had missed the Battle of Niagara Falls, but he had heard the extensive cannonade from across the Niagara River at Buffalo, New York, along with his fellow frustrated officers, who did not have access to boats to join the carnage. Howard, himself, had been reassigned to a recruiting station in his home state of Connecticut, and awaited deployment orders from Brown.[52] He wrote his wife Sarah about that and some of the survivors:

> On the morning of the 27th, my Lieut. Seymour, arrived with a boatload of the dead and wounded. Among the former I found my dear friend and companion Captain Joseph Kinney, who received a musket ball through the breast...On the 27th July 1814 I buried my old friend Jos. Kinney 2nd Captain 25th Infantry ... and several others in the burial place on the flats of Buffaloe. [sic][53]

In his missive, Howard alluded to a tiered *status quo* between American officers and enlisted personnel, especially for the dead and wounded, as the priority was for officers over the enlisted troops who were mostly evacuated to Fort Erie instead of Black Rock. According to Graves, "The wounded American enlisted personnel had to suffer the agonies of a nearly twenty-mile ride in unsprung [sic] and uncovered vehicles to Fort Erie…"[54] It made the officers' survival ratio higher since boats instead of horse pulled wagons moved them,[55] and most of them were treated in private homes by wives, mothers, and sisters rather than field hospitals; it was equally applicable to British enlisted wounded who were evacuated to Fort George.[56] Hence, It was an early nineteenth-century instance of the "Halo Effect."

As noted earlier, the consequences of many historians' predilection for writing nationalistic military narratives reflects their respective cultural lenses, rather than an accurate analysis. For most of the nineteenth-century, it was important for scholars to promote their respective myths when it came to the Battle of Niagara Falls, or Lundy's Lane. It was only a version of *modus tollens,* or "indirect proof" as it is sometimes called. Philosopher David H. Sanford defines it as, "[*Modus*] *tollens* is always an abbreviation for *modus tollendo tollens*, the mood by denying denies."[57] For instance, British Captain Thompson maintains, "Both the belligerent armies have offered their claims for victory in this engagement—upon what grounds the American general could propose such a claim are best known to himself."[58]

Moreover, Thompson's scrutiny of Brown, was reflected in his relegation of the American general's position into a *reductio ad absurdum*, "The result of the action, compared with General Brown's first instructions as set forth in his despatches [sic] to

the American secretary of war, contradicts in most pointed terms even the slightest suggestion of a victory on the part of American arms."[59] Although, in retrospect, Thompson compared the sanguinary intensity of the Battle of Niagara Falls to two Peninsula War engagements he also participated in— *San Sebastián* and *Quatre Bras* as being equivalent.[60] Ironically, the latter was also a drawn game as was the Battle of Niagara Falls. Conversely, U.S. Captain Shepard points out:

> It is difficult to bring the imagination to realize the tremendous roar of the Falls of Niagara, the thunders of the artillery, the crash of musketry, and the shouts of battle, and yet consider the actors sane who could voluntarily participate in it with pleasure. Yet such was the case on that day. No one was ever charged with dereliction of duty on that memorable occasion, or with failing to exert his whole ability to achieve a victory.[61]

Consequently, both parallel historic streams of the clash have been trends throughout the nineteenth century and up to the latter part of the twentieth century. Only recently have some current scholars have had perspectives that were not aligned with their national images.

American Historian John C. Fredriksen, for the case of the victor in the Battle of Niagara postulated his theory: "For argument's sake, what if the Left Division had 'won' Lundy's Lane by retaining both Drummond's cannon and the heights? Glory might have proved fleeting as the British received a steady flow of reinforcements while the Americans obtained none."[62] In contrast, the reinforcements that Drummond acquired were former P.O.W.s from the Napoleonic War, and their loyalty was dubious at best; therefore, Fredriksen's rationale was based in an "either-or" slant without considering all material possibilities—he committed the fallacy of false dilemma. Fredriksen was not unique, in this regard, as there were other inconsistencies committed by present-day historians.

There have been two words used by some modern historians in the description of which side won the Battle of Niagara Falls—strategy and tactics—reflecting a quest to find a reliable metric for judgment. According to Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini (1779-1869), strategy and tactics (which he subdivides in two: grand tactics, or operations, and tactics, how armies move on the battlefield)[63] American Military Historian Joseph W.A. Whitehorne describes the fray's aftermath, "The ultimate tragedy was that General Brown's shock-induced instructions transformed the U.S. tactical victory into s strategic British victory—a victory made more significant considering the United States' inability to sustain an adequate replacement system."[64] In his thesis, Graves argues, "The Battle of Lundy's Lane ended in a tactical stalemate…",[65] although in a recent interview for the PBS documentary "The War of 1812," he maintains overall, for that battle and the War of 1812 in general, "…the British Army won…because the British soldier always did what was expected of him to do."[66]

Indeed, Barbuto declares, "By traditional measurements, a claim to victory can be made by both sides."[67] After he gave data and analysis as to which side had the strategic advantage, Barbuto concludes, "Although there was still a lot of fight in both forces, the balance of combat power on the Niagara Peninsula had swung from the invaders to the defenders. Given these results, the conclusion is inescapable that the British won the battle of Lundy's Lane."[68] Finally, Berton begs the question, "After all, what advantage did the Battle of Lundy's Lane give to Brown's army, apart from raising American morale?"[69]

Thus, all of these conclusions of those historians are based in locutions of Strategy and Tactics, which had an academic skew. Even here, however, historians seem

to replace a their lens of jingoistic nationalism with a scientist's scope, ignoring easily demonstrated examples that tactical defeat or victory often ignores the larger context in which a battle was fought. Jomini explains, "War in its *ensemble* is not a science, but an art. Strategy, particularly, may indeed be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of the positive sciences, but this is not true of war viewed as a whole."[70] Jomini's point is that dispassionate retrospective analysis of strategy or tactics might have all the hallmarks of the world of science, but the historian's retrospective judgment must also calculate the impact of diplomatic settlements and cultural memories that exist independent of an otherwise clear demonstration of which army yielded a particular battlefield.

Similarly, tactics, according to Jomini, fell under the same purview, "Tactics is the art of using these masses at the points to which they shall have been conducted by well-arranged marches… the art of making them act at the decisive moment and at the decisive point of the field of battle."[71] As a result, the meaning of these words has augmented the academic *imbroglio* of the Battle of Niagara Falls by these historians. These findings challenge many historians' common assumption that the microcosm of the Battle of Niagara Falls was the *de jure* macrocosm for the entire Niagara Campaign.

The Battle of Niagara Falls was a tragedy in the sense that it was a needless sacrifice of lives and should not have taken place. The United States and Great Britain found only mental defeat and exhaustion, despite their respective narratives to the contrary. For latter-day Americans, its significance was dwarfed by the Battle of New Orleans, and as for the Anglo-Canadians, the Battle of Lundy's Lane as they so named it, was of considerable magnitude on an even parity with the Battle of Gettysburg. Both of these perspectives, according to Hickey, "construct a history that we are comfortable with

that meets certain deep-seated needs."[72] Cultural memory translates aspects of an unnecessary fight into a high drama that supports cultural and national imperatives. What happened is less important that what is remembered and how that memory supports evolving agendas. The recollection of Niagara Falls/Lundy's Lane became a cultural script along the border and buttressing larger national mythologies. What actually happened and why became less important than the competing legends. If the Battle of Niagara Falls were made into a feature film, then its convoluted narrative encompassing all manner of digressions would place it equal to Soviet Director Sergei Bonadarchuk's 1969 epic adaptation of Leo Tolstoy's *War and Peace*.[73]

Thus, the story of the Battle of Niagara Falls, or, Lundy's Lane, as seen through various actors' lenses of that era evolved steadily and naturally, or to quote Historian J.C.A. Stagg, "developed two parallel streams of historiography about the place of the War of 1812 in their national narratives, with little thought being given to the possibility that the streams might, or should intersect."[74] This thesis, in four chapters, delivers the intersection of these respective historiographies of the Battle of Niagara Falls as *sui generis*.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I
Order of Battle and Strength, U.S. Army, Left Division, Battle of Chippewa, 5 July 1814

Commanding Officer	Major-General Jacob Brown
Divisional Staff	
Aides to General Brown	Captain Loring Austin
	Captain Ambrose Spencer
Adjutant General	Colonel Charles K. Gardner
Assistant Adjutant General	Major Roger Jones
Chief Engineer	Lt. Colonel William McRee
Assistant Engineer	Major Eleazer D. Wood
Quartermaster	Captain John Camp
Acting Inspector General	2nd Lieutenant Edward B. Randolph
First Brigade (1319 men)	
Commanding Officer	Brigadier-General Winfield Scott
Aide to General Scott	1st Lieutenant William Jenkins Worth
Brigade Major	Lieutenant J.D. Smith
9th/22nd Infantry (549)	Major Henry Leavenworth
11th Infantry (416)	Major John McNeil
25th Infantry (354)	Major Thomas S. Jesup
Second Brigade (992 men)	
Commanding Officer	Brigadier-General Eleazar Ripley
Aide	1st Lieutenant William MacDonald
Brigade Major	1st Lieutenant Newman S. Clarke
21st Infantry (651)	Major Joseph Grafton
23rd Infantry (341)	Major Daniel McFarland

Note: Only Captain Benjamin Ropes's of the 21st Infantry was actively engaged during the action. The 21st included an "orphan" company each of the 17th and 19th Infantry Regiments. Cited in Donald E. Graves, *Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa 5 July 1814* (Toronto, ON; Dunburn Press Ltd., 1994) 163

Third Brigade (926 men)	
Commanding Officer	Brigadier-General Peter B. Porter, New York Militia
Aide to General Porter	Major Jacob Dox, New York Militia
Brigade Major	Major John Stanton, New York Militia

5th Pennsylvania Regiment (540)	Major James Wood, Pennsylvania Militia
Native Warriors (386)	Lt. Colonel Erastus Granger

Artillery (327 men)
Major Jacob Hindman's Battalion, Corps of Artillery

Captain Thomas Biddle	est. 3 x 12-pder guns (80)
Captain John Ritchie	2 x 6-pdr guns, 1x 5.5 in. howitzer (96)
Captain Nathan Towson	2 x 6-pdr guns, 1x 5.5 in. howitzer (89)
Captain Alexander Williams	est. 3 x 18-pdr guns (62)
Artillery Reserve	(unknown numbers and calibres)

Note: Only Towson and Ritchie's companies, and one 12-pder gun of Biddle's company came into action on 5 July 1814. Cited in Graves, *Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa 5 July 1814* (Toronto, ON; Dunburn Press Ltd., 1994) 164.

Cavalry (70 men)

Captain Samuel D. Harris's Company, U.S. Light Dragoons

Recapitulation of Number of U.S. Troops Present at Chippewa

	Present	Engaged in Action
First Brigade:	1319	1319
Second Brigade:	992	80*
Third Brigade:	540	200
Native Warriors:	386	300
Artillery:		
Towson's Company	89	89
Biddle's Company	80	25**
Ritchie's Company	96	96
Williams' Company	62	-
Totals	3564	2109

* Ropes's company of the 21st Infantry
** As Biddle brought only one of his three guns into action, this is an estimate.

Sources: Donald E. Graves, *Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa 5 July 1814* (Toronto, ON; Dunburn Press Ltd., 1994) 163-165 cites Henry Adams, *History,* IV, Book VIII, 35-37; "U.S. Unit Strength as Shown by Ration Abstracts for the Months, July 1814 through September 1814," contained in Whitehorne, Fort Erie, Annex D, 115; Graves, *Lundy's Lane*, Appendix A; Porter to Stone, 26 May 1840, *Doc. Hist.* II, 356; Cates, "Ropes," 117

APPENDIX II
Order of Battle and Strength, British Army in Canada, Right Division, Battle of Chippewa, 5 July 1814

Right Division

Commanding Officer	Major-General Phineas Riall
Aide to General Riall	Captain J.H. Holland

Infantry (1560 men)

1st Foot (Royal Scots)(500)	Lt. Colonel John Gordon
8th Foot (King's Regiment) (400)	Major Thomas Evans
100th Foot (460)	Lt. Colonel George Hay, the Marquis of Tweeddale
2nd Lincoln Militia Regiment (200)	Lt. Colonel Thomas Dickson

Artillery (est. 70 men)

Captain James Mackonochie's Brigade, Captain James Maclachlane's Company, Royal Artillery

3 x 6-pdr. field guns	Lieutenant Edmund Sheppard
2 x 24-pdr. field guns	Lieutenant R.S. Armstrong
1 x 5.5 in. howitzer	Lieutenant T. Jack

Cavalry (est. 70 men)

Troop, 19th Light Dragoons	Major Robert Isle

Native Warriors (est. 300 men)

Western Nations (100)
Grand River Nations (200)

Recapitulation of Number of British Troops in Action at Chippewa

British Regulars	1360
Infantry	est. 70
Artillery	est. 70
Cavalry	est. 70
Canadian Militia	est. 200
Native Warriors	est. 300
Total	2000

Sources: Donald E. Graves, *Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa 5 July 1814* (Toronto, ON; Dunburn Press Ltd., 1994) 166-167 cited Abstract of Weekly Distribution Return of the Right Division, 22 June 1814, Cruikshank, *Doc. Hist.*, I, 28; Riall to Drummond, 6 July 1814, NA, RG 8 I, vol. 684, 51; Drummond to Prevost, 10 July 1814, Cruikshank, *Doc. Hist.,* I, 35; Drummond to Prevost, 12 July 1814, Cruikshank, *Doc. Hist.,* I, 35; Merritt, *Journal,* 55-56.

APPENDIX III
Weapons & Weapons Performance at Chippewa, 5 July 1814

1. Infantry Weapons

a. British Short Land Musket, India Pattern

Furniture:	Brass
Caliber of bore:	75 (.75 of an inch)
Projectile:	Soft lead ball, weighing just over one ounce.
Range	
Theoretical Maximum:	250 yards
Effective Maximum	
Volley (100 rounds):	150 yards
Single round:	100 yards
Favored Range:	50-75 yards
Weight:	9.5 lbs. without bayonet
Optimum Effect at 30 Yards:	Penetrate 3/8 inch of iron or 5 inches of seasoned oak
Rate of Fire by Trained Infantry	
Optimum:	4-5 rounds per minute
Actual:	2-3 rounds per minute
Rate of Misfire:	20-40% depending on conditions

b. American 1795 Springfield, or Later Variants

Furniture:	Steel
Caliber of bore:	.69
Projectile:	Soft lead ball, weighing just under one ounce.
Range	
Theoretical Maximum:	less than 250 yards
Effective Maximum	
Volley (100 rounds):	less than 150 yards
Single round:	less than 100 yards
Favored Range:	50-75 yards
Weight:	11 lbs. without bayonet
Effect:	Less than that of the British musket depending on type of round used, (e.g. ball or buck and ball.)
Rate of Misfire:	Same as British weapon

Note: Depending on quality of powder and flint, the touchholes of these muskets had to manually cleared every fifteen to twenty rounds and the flint replaced every ten to fifteen rounds. After fifteen repeated rounds the barrel became too hot to handle comfortably. Graves, *Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa 5 July 1814* (Toronto, ON; Dunburn Press Ltd., 1994) 169

2. Artillery Weapons

a. British

i. Brass 24-pdr gun:

Weight on Carriage:	4963 lbs.
Number of Horses in Team:	6-8
Service Life:	500-600 rounds at service charge
Gun Detachment	
Trained Gunner:s	3
Assistants:	5
Caliber	
Bore:	5.8 in./148mm
Projectile (Round Shot):	5.53 in.
Weight of Projectile (Round Shot):	24 lbs./52.8 kg
Range	
Round Shot	
Theoretical Maximum:	2000 yds.
Effective Maximum:	1000-1200 yds.
Favored Range:	800-1000 yds.
Canister:	600 yds.
Effectiveness:	Under optimum conditions, a 24-pr round shot could penetrate 40 human beings.
Rate of Fire:	One round per minute.
Ammunition Scales:	Probably 60-70 rounds, 75% round shot, with more in immediate supply.

ii. Brass 6-pdr gun:

Weight of Gun, Carriage, and Limber:	3080 lbs.
Number of Horses in Team:	4-6
Service Life:	500-600 at service charge
Gun Detachment	
Trained Gunners:	2-3
Assistants:	3-4
Caliber	
Bore:	3.66 in./83mm
Projectile (Round Shot):	3.49 in.

Weight of Projectile (Round Shot):	6 lbs./13.2kg
Range	
Round Shot	
Theoretical Maximum:	1000 yds.
Effective Maximum:	600-800 yds.
Favored Range:	200-600 yds.
Canister:	200-600 yds.
Effectiveness:	Under optimum conditions, a 6-pr round shot could penetrate 19 human beings.
Rate of Fire:	1-2 rounds per minute.
Ammunition Scales:	40 round shot and 10 rounds of canister with the gun and limber. The ammunition carriage contained 92 round shot, 18 canister, and 20 shrapnel rounds.

iii. Brass 5.5 inch howitzer:

Weight of Howitzer (Carriage and Limber):	3052 lbs.
Number of Horses in Team:	4-6
Service Life:	500-600 at service charge
Gun Detachment	
Trained Gunners:	2-3
Assistants:	3-4
Caliber of bore:	5.5 in./139.7 mm
Range	
Theoretical Maximum:	1000 yds.
Effective Maximum:	600-800 yds.
Favored Range:	600-600 yds.
Rate of Fire:	1 round per minute.
Ammunition Scales:	16 shells and 4 canister rounds with the howitzer and limber. A further 46 shells, 6 canisters, and shrapnel carried with the ammunition wagon.

b. American

i. Iron 6-pdr. Gun:

Weight of Gun and Carriage:	2000 lbs.
Number of Horses in Team:	4-6
Service Life:	1000 at service charge. (Est.)
Gun Detachment	
Trained Gunners:	3
Assistants:	6
Caliber	
Bore:	3.66 in./83mm
Projectile (Round Shot):	3.49 in.
Weight of Projectile (Round Shot):	6 lbs./13.2kg
Range and Effectiveness:	See figures for British brass 6-pdr gun.
Rate of Fire:	1-2 rounds per minute.
Ammunition Scales:	18 round shot on carriage and 62 round shot and 30 canister rounds in their caissons.

ii. Iron 5.5 inch howitzer:

Weight of Howitzer and Carriage:	2100 lbs.
Number of Horses in Team	4-6
Service Life	1000 at service charge (Est.)
Gun Detachment	
Trained Gunners:	2-3
Assistants:	3-4
Caliber of bore:	5.5 in./139.7 mm
Range, Effectiveness, Rate of Fire:	Same as British brass 5.5 howitzer.

Sources: Muskets: Donald E. Graves, *Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa 5 July 1814* (Toronto, ON; Dunburn Press Ltd., 1994) 168-171 cites Howard Blackmore, *British Military Firearms, 1650-1850* (London, 1961); René Chartrand, *Uniforms and Equipment of the United States Forces in the War of 1812* (Youngstown, NY, 1992); William Duane, *American Military Library, 2 Vols.* (Philadelphia, 1809); William Greener, *The Gun; or, A Treatise on the Various Descriptions of Small Firearms* (London, 1808); James Hicks, *Notes on U.S. Ordnance* (Mt. Vernon, 1940); B.P. Hughes, *Firepower, Weapons Effectiveness on the Battlefield*, 1630-1850 (London, 1974)

Sources: Artillery: Graves cites Ralph W. Adye, *The Bombardier and the Pocket Gunner* (London, 1813); Henri Othon De Scheel, *Treatise on Artillery* (Philadelphia, 1800); Jean-Jacques Baseline de Gassendi, *Aide-Memoire, à l'usage des Officiers de l'artillerie de France* (Paris, 1801) 2 vols.; [Amos Stoddard], *Exercise for the Garrison and Field Ordnance, Together with Manoeuvres of Horse Artillery* (Philadelphia, 1809) 2 vols. (*Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa 5 July 1814* (Toronto, ON; Dunburn Press Ltd., 1994) 172

APPENDIX IV

Order of Battle and Strength, U.S. Army, Left Division, Battle of Niagara Falls, 25 July 1814

Commanding Officer:	Major-General Jacob Brown
Divisional Staff	
Aides to General Brown:	Captain Loring Austin Captain Ambrose Spencer
Adjutant General:	Colonel Charles K. Gardner
Assistant Adjutant General:	Major Roger Jones
Chief Engineer:	Lt. Colonel William McRee
Assistant Engineer:	Major Eleazer D. Wood
Quartermaster:	Captain John Camp
Acting Inspector General:	2nd Lieutenant Edward B. Randolph
First Brigade (est. 1080 men)	
Commanding Officer:	Brigadier-General Winfield Scott
Aide to General Scott:	1st Lieutenant William Jenkins Worth
Brigade Major:	Lieutenant J.D. Smith
Ninth Infantry (200)	Major Henry Leavenworth
Eleventh Infantry (200)	Major John McNeil
Twenty-Second Infantry (300)	Colonel Hugh Brady
Twenty-Fifth Infantry (380)	Major Thomas S. Jesup
Second Brigade (est. 882 men)	
Commanding Officer:	Brigadier-General Eleazar Ripley
Aide:	1st Lieutenant William MacDonald
Brigade Major:	1st Lieutenant Newman S. Clarke
First Infantry (150):	Lt. Colonel Robert C. Nicholas
Twenty-First Infantry (432):	Lt. Colonel James Miller
Twenty-Second Infantry (300):	Major Daniel McFarland

Note: The 1st Infantry only arrived with the division and was later placed in the 2nd Brigade. Single companies of the 17th Infantry under Captain John Chunn and the 19th Infantry under Lieutenant David Riddle were attached to the 21st Infantry on 25 July 1814. (Donald E. Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead!,* 1997) 257-258

Third Brigade (546 men)

Commanding Officer:	Brigadier-General Peter B. Porter, New York Militia
Aide to General Porter:	Major Jacob Dox, New York Militia
Brigade Major:	Major John Stanton, New York Militia
New York Militia Regiment (250):	Lt. Colonel Hugh W. Dobbin
5th Pennsylvania Regiment (Fenton's Pennsylvanians) (246):	Major James Wood, Pennsylvania Militia
Canadian Volunteers (50):	Lt. Colonel Joseph Willcocks, U.S.Volunteers

Note: Half of the New York Regiment was at Lewiston on 25 July 1814 under the regimental commander, Colonel Philetus Swift, N.Y. Militia. Colonel James Fenton, commander of the Pennsylvania Regiment was on leave on 25 July 1814. (Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead!,* 1997, 258)

Corps of Artillery (est. 200 gunners in action)

Commanding Officer:	Major Jacob Hindman
Captain Thomas Biddle	(probably three 12-pdr. guns)
Captain John Ritchie	(two 6-pdr. guns, one 5.5 in. howitzer)
Captain Nathan Towson	(two 6-pdr. guns, one 5.5 in. howitzer)
Lieutenant David B. Douglas	Company of Sappers, Bombardiers, and Miners.

Note: Only Biddle, Ritchie, and Towson's companies came into action on 25 July 1814. Towson accompanied Scott's 1st Brigade...(Donald E. Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead!,* 1997) 258

Cavalry (70 men)

Captain Samuel D. Harris's Company, U.S. Light Dragoons

Captain Claudius V. Boughton's Company, New York Volunteer Dragoons

Note: Harris commanded both mounted units at the battle. (Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead!,* 1997) 258

Recapitulation of U.S. Troops Present at Lundy's Lane

1st Brigade	1080
2nd Brigade	882
3rd Brigade	546
Artillery	est. 200 and nine guns
Cavalry	70
Total	2778

Note: The last full muster of the Left Division was made on 23 July 1814, two days before the battle. On that day, the division possessed 5009 officers and men, of which 4232 were fit for duty. Of this latter total, Brown estimated that he had about 2800 men available for action on 25 July 1814 after deducting the garrisons of Buffalo, Fort Erie, Schlosser and Lewiston as well as those units left in camp during the battle (two companies of Volunteers, one company of artillery, the company of sappers, bombardiers and miners, and the companies on picket.) … The numbers and calibers of the artillery in Hindman's battalion constitute a problem…it seems like Towson and Ritchie's companies constituted half-divisions, each equipped with two 6-pdr. guns, and one howitzer, while Biddle's company constituted another half-division and was probably equipped with three 12-pdr. guns. It is therefore probable that the American artillery brought nine guns into action at Lundy's Lane. (Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead!),* 1997, 259

APPENDIX V

Order of Battle and Strength, British Army in Canada, Right Division, Battle of Lundy's Lane, 25 July 1814

Commander, Upper Canada:	Lt. General Gordon Drummond
Commanding Officer, Right Division:	Major General Phineas Riall

Staff

Aides to Lt. General Drummond:	Captain William Jervois Captain Robert Loring
Aide to General Riall:	Captain J.H. Holland
Deputy Adjutant General:	Lt. Colonel John Harvey
Assistant Adjutant General:	Major John Glegg
Deputy Assistant Adjutant General:	Lieutenant Henry Moorsom
Assistant Quartermaster General:	Major John Maule
Deputy Assistant Quartermaster General:	Lieutenant John LeBreton

PEARSON'S FORCE (est. 1157 men)

Commanding Officer: Lt. Colonel Thomas Pearson

2nd or Light Brigade (est. 857 men)

19th Provincial Light Dragoons (squadron, 95 men):	Major Robert Isle
Provincial Light Dragoons (30 men):	Captain W.H. Merritt, Militia
Glengarry Light Infantry (376 men):	Lt. Colonel Francis Battersby
Incorporated Militia Battalion of Upper Canada (336 men):	Lt. Colonel William Robinson
Royal Artillery (est. 20 men) Two brass 6-pdr. Guns One brass 5.5 inch howitzer	

1st Militia Brigade (est. 300 men)

Lt. Colonel Love Parry

1st Lincoln Regiment, detachment:	-
2nd Lincoln Regiment, detachment:	Major David Secord, Militia
4th Lincoln Regiment, detachment:	-
5th Lincoln Regiment, detachment:	Lt. Colonel Andrew Bradt, Militia
2nd York Regiment, detachment:	Major Titus G. Simons, Militia

Force of Mohawk Warriors (est. 50 men): Captain John Norton

MORRISON'S FORCE FROM THE FORTS AT THE RIVER MOUTH (est. 761 men)

1st Foot (3 companies, 171):	Captain William Brereton
8th Foot (1 company, est. 65):	Captain Francis Campbell
41st Foot (light company):	Captain Joseph B. Glew
89th Foot (8 companies, 425):	Lt. Colonel Joseph W. Morrison & Major Miller Clifford
Royal Artillery (est. 40):	Captain James Machlachlane, RA
Two 24-pdr. Brass guns:	Lieutenant Richard Tomkyns, RA
Congreve Rocket Section:	Sergeant Austin, RMA

Force of Mohawk and Western Warriors (numbers unknown, possibly 400-500)

COLONEL HERCULES SCOTT'S FORCE (est. 1720 men)

1st Brigade (est. 1070 men)	Colonel Hercules Scott
8th Regiment of Foot (5 companies, 275 men):	Major Thomas Evans
103rd Regiment of Foot (7 companies, 635 men):	Major William Smelt
104th Regiment of Foot (2 companies, 120 men):	Captain Richard Leonard
Royal Artillery (est. 40)	
Three 6-pdr. Brass guns:	Captain James Mackonochie, RA
Reserve, (est. 400 men)	
1st Foot (7 companies, 400 men):	Lt. Colonel John Gordon
2nd Militia Brigade (est. 250 men):	Lt. Colonel Christopher Hamilton

1st Norfolk Regiment, detachment
2nd Norfolk Regiment, detachment
1st Essex Regiment, detachment
1st Middlesex Regiment, detachment
Caldwell (Western) Rangers, detachment

Recapitulation:

	British Regulars	Canadian Regulars	Militia	Totals
Pearson's Force:	115	742	300	1157
Morrison's Force:	761	-	-	761
Hercules's Scott's Force:	1350	120	250	1720
Totals:	2226	852	550	3638

Note: Because they were long service units recruited for the war, Merritt's Provincial Light Dragoons and the Incorporated Militia have been counted as "Canadian Regulars" along with the Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles and 104th Foot, British units recruited in Canada. Drummond's large force of Indian warriors did not see much action in the battle and have not been included in the totals above.

Ascertaining the correct number and calibres of the British artillery at Lundy's Lane is a problem…The balance of the evidence seems to suggest that they were five pieces of artillery on the hill in the first stages of the battle and that one of them was a howitzer. With the addition of Hercules Scott's three 6-pdr. guns that would make a total of eight British artillery pieces in the action. This is the number that Lieutenant David Douglas of the American Army, who was able to inspect the captured ordnance several times, states was on the hill. (Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead!,* 1997) 262- 263

Sources on Organization and Strength of the Right Division:

Return and Distribution of Ordnance, Carriages, etc., I April 1814, WO 44, vol. 250, 530,Public Records Office, London; Weekly Distribution of Right Division, 8 July 1814, Ernest A. Cruikshank, *Documentary History of the Campaigns upon the Niagara in 1812-1814,* (Welland, Canada: Tribune Press, 1896-1908, 9 vols.), I, 50…Duncan Clark, The Battle of Lundy's Lane, MG 19, A34, National Archives of Canada; Shadrach Byfield "Recollections," in John Gellner, Ed., *Recollections of the War of 1812: Three Eyewitness Accounts,* (Toronto, Baxter Publishing, 1964) 38;…William James, *A Full and Correct Account of the Military Occurrences of the Late War Between Great Britain and the United States,* (London: Black, 1818, 2 vols.), II, 141-142;… "XI. The Militia of Norfolk, Oxford, and Middlesex," Canadian Military Institute Selected Papers 15, 1907, 66-67. (Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead!,* 1997) 263- 264

Notes

Chapter One

QOUTE: J.C.A. Stagg, *The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 12

[1] Donald R. Hickey, *Don't Give Up The Ship! Myths of the War of 1812*, (Urbana & Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 2006) 71

[2] Ibid. xvii

[3] Raphael P. Thian, *Notes Illustrating the Military Geography of the United States, 1813-1880* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1881) 31-34

[4] To James Madison from Camillus M. Mann, 19 December 1813," Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/03-07-02-0101 [last update: 2016-03-28]). Source: *The Papers of James Madison*, Presidential Series, vol. 7,*25 October 1813–30 June 1814*, ed. Angela Kreider, J. C. A. Stagg, Mary Parke Johnson, Anne Mandeville Colony, and Katherine E. Harbury. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2012) 121–124

[5] Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1907) 129

[6] Donald R. Hickey, *Don't Give Up The Ship! Myths of the War of 1812*, (Urbana & Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 2006) 149

[7] James Ripley Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior: Major James Wilkinson* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938) 263-276.

[8] Ronald J. Dale, *The Invasion of Canada: Battles of the War of 1812*, (Toronto, James Lorimer & Company LTD.,2001,2013) 56-57

[9] J. Mackay Hitsman, *The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History,* (Toronto, University of Toronto, 1965) 206

[10] Daniel Clark, Jr., *Proof of the Corruption of Gen. James Wilkinson, and of His Connexion with Aaron Burr, with a Full Reputation of His Slanderous Allegations in a Relation to the Character of the Principal Witness Against Him* (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1809), 41

[11] Donald O. Stewart, *American Emperor* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011) 299

[12] James Ripley Jacobs, *Tarnished Warrior: Major-General James Wilkinson* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938), 269

[13] Au Bureau Du Journal Militaire, *Règlement Concernant Exercise Et Les Manoeuvres De Infanterie,* (Paris, 1791) title page

[14] Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieutenant General Scott*, Vol I, (New York, 1864) 34-35

[15] Mark A. Schuster, M.D., Ph.D., et al., "A National Survey of Stress Reactions after the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks" (New England Journal of Medicine; 345:1507-1512| November 15, 2001) http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejm200111153452024#t=article

[16] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 123

[17] Donald R. Hickey, *Don't Give Up The Ship! Myths of the War of 1812*, (Urbana & Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 2006) 254

[18] Donald E. Graves, *The Battle of Lundy's Lane: On the Niagara in 1814* (Baltimore, Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993) 31-32

[19] U.S. Army War College, Carlise, PA; *Battle of Chippewa*, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ahec/ahecfiles/Warof1812BattleofChippawa, 1

[20] Donald E. Graves, *Soldiers of 1814: American Enlisted Men's Memoirs Of The Niagara Campaign*, (Youngstown, New York, Old For Niagara Association, 1995) 2-3

[21] Winfield Scott to John Armstrong, 27 April 1814, RG 107, Secretary of War, Letters Received, *National Archives*

[22] United States Congress, *American State Papers. Class V: Military Affairs*, vol. 1 525

[23] http://www.donaldheald.com/pages/books/30555/united-states-military-winfield-scott/rules-and-regulations-for-the-field-exercise-and-manoeuvres-of-infantry

[24] Benjamin J. Lossing, *Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812*, Vol II, (New York, Harper Brothers, 1868, republished Gretna, LA, 2001) 614

[25] Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2012) 383

[26] Scott's General Orders, 23 June 1814, George Howard Order Book, Manuscript Division, New York Historical Society

[27] James Evelyn Pilcher, M.D., Ph.D., L.H.D, Ed., *The Surgeon Generals of The Army Of The United States of America,* Carlisle PA, The Association of Military Surgeons, 1905) 27

[28] Charles W. Elliot, *Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man*, (New York, Macmillan, 1937) 157

[29] 'Bathurst, Henry (1762–1834)', *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/bathurst-henry-1751/text1945, published first in hardcopy 1966, accessed online 12 June 2016

[30] http://www.historyhome.co.uk/pms/l-pool.htm

[31] John K. Mahon, The *War of 1812,* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1972, 1991) 12

[32] John R. Grodzinski, *Defender of Canada: Sir George Prevost and the War of 1812* (Norman, OK; University of Oklahoma Press, 2013) 146

[33] Ibid. 147

[34] Kenneth Stickney, "DRUMMOND, Sir GORDON," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 8, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed June 12, 2016, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/drummond_gordon_8E.html

[35] Ibid.

[36] David S. Heidler & Jeanne T. Heidler, Eds. *Encyclopedia of the War of 1812* (Santa Barbara, California, ABC-CLIO, 1997) 145

[37] John R. Grodzinski, *Defender of Canada: Sir George Prevost and the War of 1812* (Norman, OK; University of Oklahoma Press, 2013) 146

[38] Howard L. Blackmore, *British Military Firearms, 1650-1850,* (New York, Arco Publishing, 1968) 277

[39] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa 5 July 1814* (Toronto, Dunburn Press, 1994) 48

[40] http://www.militaryheritage.com/musket17.htm

[41] J.E. Cookson, *The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997) 30-32

[42] Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies,* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2012) 56

[43] Harry L. Coles, *The War of 1812,* Chicago, (University of Chicago Press, 1965) 152

[44] *Aberdeen Journal,* 22 June 1814.

[45] Ruth Marsh & Dorothy S. Truesdale, "War on Lake Ontario: 1812-1815" *Rochester History Vol. IV,* (October, 1942, No. 4, Rochester Public Library) 16

[46] John D. Morris, *Sword of the Border: Major General Jacob Brown, 1775-1828,* (Kent Ohio: Kent State University Press, 2000) 89

[47] Jacob Brown to Isaac Chauncey Letter, 21 June 1814, cited in Ernest Cruikshank, "Brown's Documents," *The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier* (Welland ,Ontario, 1898-1908) 39, Digitized 2010, University of Pittsburgh Library System at http://www.archive.org/details/documentaryhisto01inlund

[48] Isaac Chauncey to Jacob Brown Letter, 25 June 1814, Ibid., 40

[49] Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieutenant General Scott* (New York, Sheldon, 1864) 113

[50] Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict* (Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1995) 222

[51] Gregory V. Kloten, Ed., George Howard to Sarah Howard, 8 June 1814, *Captain George Howard, United States Army: The Chronicles of a Connecticut Yankee on the Northern Frontier in the War of 1812*, (Youngstown New York; Old Fort Niagara Association, 2013) 109

[52] Donald E. Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane*, Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, 1997, p. 116

[53] Donald E. Graves, "Joseph Willcocks and the Canadian Volunteers: An Account of Political Disaffection In Upper Canada during the War of 1812" (Masters Thesis, Carlelton University, 1982) 87-88

[54] Ibid. 7-8

[55] Winfield Scott to John Armstrong, 17 May 1814, RG 107, Secretary of War, Letters Received, National Archives

[56] Winfield Scott to Jacob Brown, 23 May 1814, *War of 1812 Collection*, Clements Library, University of Michigan

[57] C. Edward Skeen, "Mr. Madison's Secretary of War," *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 100, No. 3 (Jul., 1976), p. 350, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20091078

[58] Samuel White, *A History of American Troops during the Late War* (Baltimore, Samuel White, 1829) 12

[59] Eleazer W. Ripley, *Facts Relative To The Campaign On The Niagara In 1814* (Boston, Patriot Office, 1815) 5

[60] Pierre Berton, *Flames Across the Border: 1813-1814* (Toronto, Anchor Canada, 1981) 317

[61] Gregory V. Kloten, Ed., George Howard to Sarah Howard, 11 July 1814,*Captain George Howard, United States Army: The Chronicles of a Connecticut Yankee on the Northern Frontier in the War of 1812*, (Youngstown New York; Old Fort Niagara Association, 2013). 111

[62] Richard V. Barbuto, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Niagara Campaigns, 1812-1814* (Fort Leavenworth KS; Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014) 138

[63] Donald E. Graves, *Red Coats & Grey Jackets* (Toronto, Dunburn Press, 1994) 67

[64] Gregory V. Kloten, Ed., George Howard to Sarah Howard, 11 July 1814,*Captain George Howard, United States Army: The Chronicles of a Connecticut Yankee on the Northern Frontier in the War of 1812* (Youngstown New York; Old Fort Niagara Association, 2013) 111

[65] John R. Etling, *Amateurs to Arms! A Military History of the War of 1812*, (Chapel Hill, NC; De Capo Press, 1991) 155

[66] Allan Peskin, *Winfield Scott and the Profession of Arms* (Kent, OH; The Kent State University Press, 2003) 41

[67] Ernest A. Cruikshank, Ed., *The Documentary History of The Niagara Campaign On The Niagara Frontier In 1814*, (Welland, Ontario, 1893) 3, Digitized 2010, University of Pittsburgh Library System at http://www.archive.org/details/documentaryhisto01inlund

[68] http://www.goodreads.com/quotes/50543-there-is-no-greater-danger-than-underestimating-your-opponent

[69] George F.G. Stanley, *War of 1812: Land Operations*, (Toronto, Macmillan, 1983) 312

[71] Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieutenant General Scott* (New York, Sheldon, 1864) 126

[72] http://www.ralphkeyes.com/quote-verifier/

[73] Peter B. Porter to William L. Stone, 26 May 1840, Ernest Cruikshank, Ed., *The Documentary History of The Niagara Campaign On The Niagara Frontier In 1814*, Vol. 9 (Welland, Ontario, 1893) 362,Digitized 2010, University of Pittsburgh Library System at http://www.archive.org/details/documentaryhisto01inlund

[74] http://www.history.army.mil/news/2014/140700a_chippewa.html

[75] Richard V. Barbuto, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Niagara Campaigns, 1812-1814* (Fort Leavenworth KS; Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014) 140

[76] Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieutenant General Scott* (New York, Sheldon, 1864) 127-128

[77] Donald E. Graves, *Red Coats & Grey Jackets*, (Toronto, Dunburn Press, 1994) 82

[78] There are no British sources documenting this quote. Scott states Riall's quotation in his memoirs. See *Memoirs of Lieutenant General Scott,* (New York: Sheldon, 1864) I:128-9.

[79] Donald E. Graves, *Soldiers of 1814: American Enlisted Men's Memoirs Of The Niagara Campaign*, (Youngstown, New York, Old For Niagara Association, 1995) 33

[80] Ernest Cruikshank, Ed., *The Documentary History of The Niagara Campaign On The Niagara Frontier In 1814*, (Welland, Ontario, 1893) 48, Digitized 2010, University of Pittsburgh Library System at http://www.archive.org/details/documentaryhisto01inlund

[81] Pierre Berton, *Flames Across the Border: 1813-1814*, (Toronto, Anchor Canada, 1981) 325

[82] Richard V. Barbuto, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Niagara Campaigns, 1812-1814,* Fort Leavenworth KS; Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014, p. 141

[83] Gerald T. Altoff, *Amongst My Best Men: African Americans in the War of 1812,* (Put-in-Bay, OH; The Perry Group, 1996) 103

[84] Robert Ewell Greene, *Black Defenders of America: 1775-1973* (Chicago, Johnson Publishing Company, 1974) 30-39

[85] Victor Suthren, "A Canadian Perspective on the War of 1812," (http://www.pbs.org/wned/war-of-1812/essays/canadian/)

[86] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Merry Hearts Make Light Days*, (Ottawa, Ontario; Carleton University Press, 1994) 133-135

Chapter Two

QUOTE: Thomas S. Jesup, 8 September 1814, Jesup Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

[1] http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/500403.html

[2] Gregory V. Kloten, Ed., George Howard to Sarah Howard, 10 July 1814, *Captain George Howard, United States Army: The Chronicles of a Connecticut Yankee on the Northern Frontier in the War of 1812*, (Youngstown New York; Old Fort Niagara Association, 2013) 113

[3] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 189

[4] Samuel White, *A History of American Troops during the Late War, under the Command of Cols. Fenton And Campbell* (Baltimore, Samuel White, 1829) 26

[5] Donald E. Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814* (Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, Reprinted 2000 with corrections,) 93

[6] Thomas Ridout, 10 July 1814, cited in: Lady Matilda Edgar, Ed., *Ten Years in Upper Canada in War and Peace, Being the Ridout Letters* (Toronto, Williams Briggs, 1890) 289

[7] John C. Fredriksen, "Niagara 1814: The United States Army Quest For Tactical Parity In The War of 1812 And Its Legacy," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Providence, Rhode Island; Phillips Memorial Library, Providence College, May 1993) 62

[8] Gordon Drummond to George Prévost, 15 July 1814, cited in William Wood, Ed., *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812*, Vol. 3, (Toronto, Champlain Society, 1920-1928) 131

[9] Richard W. Stewart, Ed., *American Military History: The United States Army And The Forging of A Nation, 1775-1917*, Vol I, 2nd Edition (Washington D.C., Center of Military History United States Army, 2005) 6-7

[10] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 189-190

[11] Ernest A. Cruikshank, "Record of the Services of Canadian Regiments in the War of 1812 — Part IX, The Lincoln Militia," *Canadian Military Institute*, Selected Papers, 13, 1904, p. 34

[12] Pierre Berton, *Flames Across the Border: The Canadian-American Tragedy, 1813-1814,* (Boston, Atlantic-Little, 1981) 255-256

[13] Morris Zaslow, Ed., *The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812* (Toronto, MacMillan, 1964) 234-235

[14] Donald E. Graves, "Joseph Willcocks And The Canadian Volunteers: An Account of Political Disaffection in Upper Canada During The War of 1812,"(Master's Thesis, Carelton University, 1982) 91-92

[15] Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indians* Allies (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2012)391

[16] Richard V. Barbuto, Ed., *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 195-196

[17] Gregory V. Kloten, Ed., George Howard to Sarah Howard, 23 July 1814, *Captain George Howard, United States Army: The Chronicles of a Connecticut Yankee on the Northern Frontier in the War of 1812*, (Youngstown New York; Old Fort Niagara Association, 2013) 117

[18] John C. Frederiksen, Ed., *The War of 1812 in Person, Fifteen Accounts by United States Army Regulars, Volunteers, and Militiamen*, (Jefferson, NC; MacFarland, 2010) 35

[19] Ruth Marsh & Dorothy S. Truesdale, "War On Lake Onatrio: 1812-1815," (*Rochester History*, Vol. IV, Rochester, NY; October, 1942, No. 4) 18

[20] Duncan Clark Memoir, *Duncan Clark Papers,* MG19, National Archives of Canada

[21] Benson J. Lossing, *Lossing's Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812*, Vol. II, (Gretna, LA; Pelican, First Published 1868, 2001) 815

[22] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Merry Hearts Make Light Days*, (Ottawa, Ontario; Carleton University Press, 1994) 173

[23] Ibid.

[24] Benson J. Lossing, *Lossing's Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812*, Vol. II, (Gretna, LA; Pelican, First Published 1868, 2001) 816

[25] George F.G. Stanley, *The War of 1812: Land Operations*, (Ottawa, Macmillan, 1983) 318-319

[26] Donald E. Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814*, (Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, Reprinted 2000 with corrections) 111-112

[27] Jeffrey P. Kimball, "Strategy on the Northern Frontier, 1814," (Ph. D. Dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1969) 227

[28] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814*, (Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, Reprinted 2000 with corrections) 111

[29] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 211

[30] Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies*, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2012) 353

[31] Ibid. 356

[32] Donald E. Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814*, (Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, Reprinted 2000 with corrections) 113

[33] Ibid., 114

[34] Robert P. Watson, *America's First Crisis: The War of 1812*, (Albany, NY; State University of New York Press, 2014) 256

[35] David B. Douglas Memoir, Clements Library, University of Michigan

[36] Pierre Berton, *Flames Across the Border: The Canadian-American Tragedy, 1813-1814,* (Boston, Atlantic-Little, 1981) 332

[37] Robert P. Watson, *America's First Crisis: The War of 1812*, (Albany, NY; State University of New York Press, 2014) 256

[38] C.P. Lucas, Ed., *The Canadian War of 1812*, (Toronto, Clarendon Press, 1906) 177

[39] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000, p. 215

[40] Robert P. Watson, *America's First Crisis: The War of 1812*, (Albany, NY; State University of New York Press, 2014) 256

[41] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 214-215

[42] Edward D. Mansfield, *The Life of General Winfield Scott*, (New York, A.S. Barnes & CO., 1846) 125-126

[43] Wesley B. Turner, *British Generals in the War of 1812*, (Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999) 125

[44] Donald E. Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814*, (Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, Reprinted 2000 with corrections) 129

[45] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 213

[46] Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieutenant General Scott*, (New York, Sheldon, 1864) 140-141

[47] Lester W. Smith, Ed., "A Drummerboy in the War of 1812: Memoirs of Jarvis Frary Hanks," *Niagara Frontier*, 7 , Summer, 1960, p.57

[48] *The New York Times,* "Stress and Anxiety," 5 October 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/health/guides/symptoms/stress-and-anxiety/the-body's-response.html

[49] Edward D. Mansfield, *Life And Times of General Winfield Scott, Including The Siege Of Vera Cruz, The Battle of Cerro Gordo, And The Battles In The Valley of Mexico, To The Conclusion Of Peace, And His Return To The United States*, (New York, A.S. Barnes & CO., 1852) 101

[50] Jeffrey Kimball, "The Battle of Chippawa: Infantry Tactics in the War of 1812," *Military Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter, 1967-1968), p. 173-174, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1984326

[51] Richard V. Barbuto, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Niagara Campaigns, 1812-1814,* (Fort Leavenworth KS; Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014) 145

[52] Thomas O'Conner, *An Impartial And Correct History Of The War Between The United States Of America, And Great Britain; Declared by a Law of Congress, June 18, 1812, and concluded by a ratification and exchange of a treaty of Peace, at the City of Washington, Feb. 17, 1815. Comprising A Particular Detail Of The Naval And Military Operations, And A Faithful Record Of The Events produce During The Contest*, 2nd Edition, (New York, John Low, 1815) 252

[53] Richard V. Barbuto, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Niagara Campaigns, 1812-1814,* (Fort Leavenworth KS; Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014) 26

[54] Ibid. 27

[55] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 218

[56] James J. Talman, Ed., *Loyalist Narratives from Upper Canada*, (Toronto, Champlain Society, 1946) 307

[57] Thomas S. Jesup, 25 September 1852, "Who captured General Riall," *Historical Magazine,* 8, July 1870, p. 54

[58] Benjamin J. Lossing, *Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812*, Vol II, (New York, Harper Brothers, 1868, republished Gretna, LA, 2001) 819

[59] Pierre Berton, *Flames Across the Border: The Canadian-American Tragedy, 1813-1814,* (Boston, Atlantic-Little, 1981) 334-335

[60] Donald E. Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814*, (Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, Reprinted 2000 with corrections) 141

[61] Thomas S. Jesup, 25 September 1852, "Who captured General Riall," *Historical Magazine,* 8, July 1870, p. 55

[62] Donald E. Graves, *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814*, (Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, Reprinted 2000 with corrections) 145

[63] http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/500403.html

[64] Pierre Berton, *Flames Across the Border: The Canadian-American Tragedy, 1813-1814,* (Boston, Atlantic-Little, 1981) 335

[65] Spencer C. Tucker, James R. Arnold, Roberta Wiener, *The Encyclopedia Of The War of 1812: A Political, Social, and Military History, Vol.* I, (Santa Barbara, CA; ABC-CLIO, 2012,) 303

[66] Hugh Brady, "The Battle of Lundy's Lane," *Historical Magazine* 10 (September, 1866) 272

[67] Ibid

[68] Richard V. Barbuto, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Niagara Campaigns, 1812-1814,* (Fort Leavenworth KS; Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014) 146

[69] Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War,* Edited & Translated by Michael Howard & Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 1984) 352

[14] Benson J. Lossing, *Lossing's Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812*, Vol. II, (Gretna, LA; Pelican, First Published 1868, 2001) 821

[15] Ibid. 822

[16] Pierre Berton, *Flames Across the Border: The Canadian-American Tragedy, 1813-1814,* (Boston, Atlantic-Little, 1981) 337

[17] Christian de Virgilio, Ed., *Surgery: A Case Base Clinical Review*, (Torrance, CA; Springer NY; Springer Science & Business Media, 2015) 444-445

[18] Charles Anderson, *A TRUE AND INPARTIAL ACCOUNT OF THE CHIPPAWA&LUNDY'SLANE DURING THE LAST WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES*, 2nd Edition, (Niagara, John Simpson, 1841) 8, *Canadian Instituta for Historical Microreprodiictions / Institut Canadian de microraproductions historiques,* Brock University Library, 1994

[19] Ibid., p. 13

[20] James Miller to Ruth Miller, 28 July 1814, James Miller Papers, U.S. Military Academy Library

[21] David Thompson--Late of the Royal Scots, *A History of the Late War Between Great Britain And The United States of America: With a retrospective view of the causes from whence it originated,* (Niagara, U.C., T. Sewell, 1832) 235

[22] Dee Unglaub Silverthorn, *Human Physiology: An Integrated Approach* 4th Edition, (New York, Pearson, 2009) 379-386

[23] Robert E. Rothenberg, M.D., F.A.C.S., Ed., *The New Illustrated Medical Encyclopedia For Home* Use Vol. IV (New York, Arbradale Press, 1967) 1320

[24] David B. Clark, *The Red Dawn,* (Victoria, BC; Friesen Press, 2011) 221

[25] Hugh Dobbin, "Battle of Lundy's Lane," Hugh Dobbins Papers, *Geneva Historical Society*

[26] Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL.D.*, (Freeport, NY; Books for Libraries Press, First Published 1864, 1970) 143

[27] *American Watchman and Delaware Advertiser,* Letter dated 20 August 1814, Wilmington DE: Holding: Fordham University, Bronx, NY, Micro Film Service Copy - <1814:1: 1-1820 : 7: 21>

[28] Pierre Berton, *Flames Across the Border: The Canadian-American Tragedy, 1813-1814,* (Boston, Atlantic-Little, 1981) 337-338

[29] Henry Adams, New Introduction by Colonel John R. Etling, *The War of 1812,* (New York, First Cooper Square Press, 1999) 187

Chapter Three

QUOTE: David Thompson--Late of the Royal Scots, *A History of the Late War Between Great Britain And The United States of America: With a retrospective view of the causes from whence it originated*, Niagara (U.C., T. Sewell, 1832) 232-233

[1] Robert P. Watson, *America's First Crisis: The War of 1812* (Albany, NY; State University of New York Press, 2014) 258

[2] Richard V. Barbuto, *Staff Ride Handbook for the Niagara Campaigns, 1812-1814* (Fort Leavenworth KS; Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014) 146-147

[3] Ernest Cruikshank, "Brown's Documents," *The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier*, (Welland , Ontario, 1898-1908) 82, Digitized 2010, University of Pittsburgh Library System at http://www.archive.org/details/documentaryhisto01inlund

[4] Donald E. Graves, *The Battle of Lundy's Lane: On the Niagara in 1814* (Baltimore, Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993) 134-135

[5] Jacob Brown to John Armstrong, 7 August 1814. cited in Ernest Cruikshank, "Brown's Documents," *The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier*, Vol. VIII, (Welland ,Ontario, 1898-1908) 98, Digitized 2010, University of Pittsburgh Library System at http://www.archive.org/details/documentaryhisto01inlund

[6] Benson J. Lossing, *Lossing's Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812*, Vol. II, (Gretna, LA; Pelican, First Published 1868, 2001) 820

[7] Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL.D.*, (Freeport, NY; Books for Libraries Press, First Published 1864, 1970) 142

[8] Carl F. Klinch & James J. Talman, Eds., *The Journal of Major John Norton*, (Toronto, Champlain Society, 1970) 358

[9] Ibid.

[10] Mary R. Cate, Ed., "Benjamin Ropes' Autobiography," (*Essex Historical Collections* 91, April 1955) 120

[11] John Newell Crombie, "The Papers of Major Daniel McFarland: A War Hawk," Vol. 51, (*The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine,* April 1968) 122

[12] Wesley B. Turner, *British Generals in the War of 1812*, (*Montreal,* McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999) 125-126

[13] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War of 1812 Journal Of Lieutenant John Le Couteur, 104th Foot*, (Ottawa, Ontario; Carleton University Press, 1994) 174

[30] John Le Couteur to William Robinson, 27 July 1814, cited in Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Merry Hearts Make Light Days*, (Ottawa, Ontario; Carleton University Press, 1994) 178

[31] Pierre Berton, *Flames Across the Border: The Canadian-American Tragedy, 1813-1814,* Boston, Atlantic-Little, 1981, p. 340

[32] Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL.D.*, Freeport, NY; Books for Libraries Press, First Published 1864, 1970, p. 141-142

[33] Wesley B. Turner, *British Generals in the War of 1812*, (*Montreal,* McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999) 125

[34] Jacob Hindman to Charles K. Gardner, 29 July 1814, War of 1812 Collection, Lilly Library, Indiana University

[35] Carl Benn, *The Iroquois In The War of 1812*, (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1998) 168

[36] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Soldiers of 1814: American Enlisted Mens' Memoirs Of The Niagara Campaign*, (Youngstown NY; Old Fort Niagara Association, 1995) 71-73

[37] Ibid., p. 73

[38] Ibid.

[39] William Drummond letter in *Edinburgh Annual Register* 17, Part I, 1814, p. 334

[40] Robert P. Watson, *America's First Crisis: The War of 1812*, (Albany, NY; State University of New York Press, 2014) 259

[41] Robert Henderson, "Loading and Firing a French Musket in the Age of Napoleon," http://www.militaryheritage.com/loading1777frenchmusket.htm

[42] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000, p. 225

[43] Donald E. Graves, Ed., Le Couteur to Robinson 27 July 1814, *Merry Hearts Make Light Days*, Ottawa, Ontario; Carleton University Press, 1994, p. 178

[44] Nicholas Baylies, Ed., *Court Marital Transcript of Captain McDonald, 15 March, 1815* in *Eleazer Wheelock Ripley, of The War of 1812, Major General in the United States Army—Member of Congress—Etc.*, (Des Moines, IA; Brewster & Co., 1890) 43

[45] David Thompson--Late of the Royal Scots, *A History of the Late War Between Great Britain And The United States of America: With a retrospective view of the causes from whence it originated*, Niagara, U.C., T. Sewell, 1832, p. 233

[46] Charles Anderson, *A TRUE AND INPARTIAL ACCOUNT OF THE CHIPPAWA&LUNDY'SLANE DURING THE LAST WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES*, 2nd Edition, *Niagara*, John Simpson, 1841, p. 7,

Canadian Instituta for Historical Microreprodiictions / Institut Canadian de microraproductions historiques, Brock University Library, 1994

[47] Donald E. Graves Interview PBS "The War of 1812," 2011, WNED, 1:18:40-1:18:48

[48] Elihu H. Shepard, *The Autobiography of Elihu H. Shepard, Formerly Professor of Languages in St. Louis College* (St. Louis, MO; G. Knapp & Co., 1869) 70

[49] Kelvin F. Riley, *Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars: 1792-1815* (London, Green Hill Books, 2004) 306

[50] Albert C. Manucy, *Artillery Through the Ages: A Short Illustrated History of Cannon, Emphasizing Types Used in America,* (Washington D.C.; National Park Service Publications, 1949, reprinted 1985) 74

[51] Richard V. Barbuto, *The Canadian Theater 1814: The U.S. Army Campaigns Of The War of 1812* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2014) 31

[52] Ibid.

[53] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 226

[54] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *The Battle of Lundy's Lane: On the Niagara in 1814*, Baltimore, Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993, p. 180

[55] Winfield Scott, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL.D.*, Freeport, NY; Books for Libraries Press, First Published 1864, 1970, p. 144-145

[56] "The War of 1812 on the Niagara Frontier: Battles at Queenston Heights, Chippawa, Lundy's Lane," VHS (Niagara Falls ON; Lundy's Lane Historical Museum, 1990)

[57] Benson J. Lossing, *Lossing's Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812*, Vol. II, (Gretna, LA; Pelican, First Published 1868, 2001) 823

[58] Ibid.

[59] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *The Battle of Lundy's Lane: On the Niagara in 1814*, (Baltimore, Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993) 177-178

[60] John W. Weeks to Samuel A. Pearson, 1 August 1814, Weeks Family Papers, Baker Library, Dartmouth College

[61] James Hall, " Biographical Sketch of Major Thomas Biddle," (*Illinois Monthly Magazine 1,* September, 1831) 556

[62] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Soldiers of 1814: American Enlisted Mens' Memoirs Of The Niagara Campaign*, (Youngstown NY; Old Fort Niagara Association, 1995) 78

[63] Ibid.

[64] John C. Fredriksen, "Niagara 1814: The United States Army Quest For Tactical Parity In The War of 1812 And Its Legacy," (Dissertation, Providence, Rhode Island; *Phillips Memorial Library*, Providence College, May 1993) 150

[65] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *The Battle of Lundy's Lane: On the Niagara in 1814*, (Baltimore, Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993) 181

[66] Benson J. Lossing, *Lossing's Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812*, Vol. II, (Gretna, LA; Pelican, First Published 1868, 2001) 824

[67] Gordon Drummond to George Prévost, 27 July 1814, cited in E. Cruikshank, *The Documentary History Of The Campaign On The Niagara Frontier in 1814* (Welland, ON; 1898-1908) 92, Digitized 2010, University of Pittsburgh Library System at http://www.archive.org/details/documentaryhisto01inlund

[68] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War of 1812 Journal Of Lieutenant John Le Couteur, 104th Foot*, (Ottawa, Ontario; Carleton University Press, 1994) 178

[69] Elihu H. Shepard, *The Autobiography of Elihu H. Shepard, Formerly Professor of Languages in St. Louis College* (St. Louis, MO; G. Knapp & Co., 1869) 71

[70] Robert P. Watson, *America's First Crisis: The War of 1812* (Albany, NY; State University of New York Press, 2014) 258

[71] Nicholas Baylies, Ed., *Court Marital Transcript of Captain McDonald, 15 March, 1815* in *Eleazer Wheelock Ripley, of The War of 1812, Major General in the United States Army—Member of Congress—Etc.*, (Des Moines, IA; Brewster & Co., 1890) 44

[72] Mark Peterson, "Witnesses' Perception of Meaning" (Santa Monica, CA; The Rand Corporation, 1977) 1 http://130.154.3.8/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P5975

[73] Shadrack Byfield, *A Narrative Of A Light Company Soldier's Service, In the 41st Regiment of Foot, During the Late American War* (Bradford, Wilts, U.K., Published by John Bubb, 1840) 90

[74] Gordon Drummond to George Prévost, 27 July 1814, cited in E. Cruikshank, *The Documentary History Of The Campaign On The Niagara Frontier in 1814* (Welland, ON; 1898-1908) 90

[75] Hercules Scott to James Scott, 12 August 1814, Hercules Scott Papers. MG 24, National Archives of Canada

[76] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War of 1812 Journal Of Lieutenant John Le Couteur, 104th Foot*, (Ottawa, Ontario; Carleton University Press, 1994) 175

[77] *Providence Patriot*, "Another Great Land Victory," 4 August 1814

[78] David Thompson--Late of the Royal Scots, *A History of the Late War Between Great Britain And The United States of America* (U.C., T. Sewell, 1832) 233

Chapter Four

QOUTE: Albert, Marrin, *Napoleon and the Napoleonic Wars* (Harmondsworth: Viking Penguin Publishers, 1991) 152. Hercules Scott's letter addressed to James Scott,12 August 1814, Hercules Scott Papers, MG 24, National Archives of Canada. George R. Stewart, *Pickett's Charge: A Micro History of the Final Attack at Gettysburg, July 3, 1863* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959) 282

[1] Donald R. Hickey, *Don't Give Up The Ship! Myths of the War of 1812* (Urbana & Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 2006) xvii

[2] "The War of 1812 on the Niagara Frontier Battles at Queenston Heights, Chippawa, Lundy's Lane," VHS, (Niagara Falls ON; Lundy's Lane Historical Museum, 1990)

[3] Norman C. Lord, "The War on the Canadian Frontier, 1812-1814: Letters written by Sergeant James Commins, 8th Foot" (*Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 18 Winter 1939) 209

[4] Duncan Clark Papers, MG 19, National Archives of Canada

[5] Paul Robinson, *Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient Greece to Iraq* (London & New York, Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2006) 54-56

[6] Donald E. Graves, Ed., 25-26 July 1814, *Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War of 1812 Journal Of Lieutenant John Le Couteur, 104th Foot*, (Ottawa, Ontario; Carleton University Press, 1994) 175-176

[7] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 225

[8] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814* (Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, Reprinted 2000 with corrections,) 191

[9] Jacob Brown to John Armstrong, 5 August 1814, cited in Ernest A. Cruikshank, ed., *Documents Relating to the Invasion of the Niagara Peninsula by the U.S. army Commanded by General Brown* (Niagara, ON; Niagara Historical Society, 1920) 55

[10] Cate, "Ropes Autobiography," 121

[11] David Thompson, *History of the Late War Between Great Britain and the United States of America* (Niagara, U.C.; T Sewell, 1832) 237

[12] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 231

[13] Pierre Berton, *Flames Across the Border: 1813-1814* (Toronto, Anchor Canada, 1981) 344

[14] Military Medicine in the War of 1812, www.pbs.org/wned/war-of-1812/essays/military-medicine

[15] W.E. Horner, "A Military Hospital at Buffalo, New York, in the Year, 1814," *Medical Examiner and Record of Medical Service* 16 (December, 1852) 767

[16] Military Medicine in the War of 1812, www.pbs.org/wned/war-of-1812/essays/military-medicine

[17] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814* (Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, 1997) 174

[18] Ibid. 173

[19] Charles W. Elliot, *Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man* (New York; Macmillan, 1937) 179

[20] John S.D. Eisenhower, *Agent of Destiny: The Life and Times of General Winfield Scott,* (Norman, OK; University of Oklahoma Press, 1997) 96

[21] Benjamin J. Lossing, *Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812*, Vol II, (New York, Harper Brothers, 1868, republished Gretna, LA, 2001) 825

[22] George Izard, *Official Correspondence with the Department of War, relative to the Military Operations of the American Army under the Command of Major General Izard, on the Northern Frontier of the United States in the Years 1814 and 1815* (Philadelphia; T. Dobson, 1816) 55-56

[23] Francis B. Heitman, *Historical Register And Dictionary of the United States Army, From Its Organization, September 29, 1789, To March 2, 1903* Vol. I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903) 566

[24] John C. Fredriksen, "The War of 1812 in Northern New York: General George Izard's Journal of the Chateauguay Campaign," (*New York History*, Vol. 76, No. 2, New York State Historical Association, April 1995) 181 http://www.jstor.org/stable/23181703

[25] Jeffrey Kimball, "Strategy on the Northern Frontier, 1814," (Ph. D. Dissertation. Louisiana State University, 1969) 247

[26] John C. Fredriksen, "Niagara 1814: The United States Army Quest For Tactical Parity In The War of 1812 And Its Legacy," (Ph. D. Dissertation, Providence College, 1993) 175

[27] Kenneth J. Hagen, *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power* (New York, Simon & Schuster, 1991) 88

[28] William B. Skelton, "High Army Leadership in the Era of the War of 1812: The Making and the Remaking of the Officer Corps," (The William & Mary Quarterly, Vol 51, No. 2, Published by Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, April 1994) 265 at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2946862 Accessed: 21-09-2016 16:45 UTC

[29] Jeffrey Kimball, "Strategy on the Northern Frontier, 1814," (Ph. D. Dissertation. Louisiana State University, 1969) 40

[30] Ibid. 48

[31] Ibid. 243

[32] Ibid.

[33] John C. Fredriksen, "Niagara 1814: The United States Army Quest For Tactical Parity In The War of 1812 And Its Legacy," (Ph. D. Dissertation, *Providence College,* 1993) 158

[34] John Livingston, *Sketches of Eminent Americans* (New York; Craighead, 1854) 409

[35] Hercules Scott's letter addressed to James Scott, 12 August 1814, Hercules Scott Papers, MG 24, National Archives of Canada.

[36] Elihu H. Shepard, *The Autobiography of Elihu H. Shepard, Formerly Professor of Languages in St. Louis College* (St. Louis, MO; G. Knapp & Co., 1869) 71

[37] Edward L. Thorndike, "A Constant Error in Psychological Ratings," (*Journal of Applied Psychology; 4,* 1920) 27

[38] Ibid. 29

[39] Ries, Al, "Understanding Marketing Psychology and the Halo Effect: What Apple's iPod and Motorola's Razr Can Teach Us," Advertising Age, 17 April 2006, at http://adage.com/article/al-ries/understanding-marketing-psychology-halo-effect/108676/ accessed 12 February 2017

[40] Walter A. McDougall, *Throes of Democracy: The American Civil War Era 1829-1877* (New York, Harper, 2008) 234

[41] Major Charles W. Elliot (Ret.), *Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1937)

[42] HRAF EXPLAINING HUMAN CULTURE, http://hraf.yale.edu/ehc/summaries/hunter-gatherers

[43] John Tooby & Leda Comides, "The Evolution of War and its Cognitive Foundations," (*Institute for Evolutionary Studies Technical Report 88-1*, 1988) 10

[44] Alan Taylor, *The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies*, (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2012) 12

[45] Victor Suthren, "A Canadian Perspective on the War of 1812," (http://www.pbs.org/wned/war-of-1812/essays/canadian/)

[46] William Weber, *Neither Victor nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812* (Washington D.C., Potomac Books, 2013) 55

[47] Earl J. Hess, *Pickett's Charge: The Last Attack at Gettysburg* (Chapel Hill NC; University of North Carolina Press, 2001) 386

[48] William Weber, *Neither Victor nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812* (Washington D.C., Potomac Books, 2013) 56

[49] Ibid. 61

[50] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 233

[51] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Merry Hearts Make Light Days: The War of 1812 Journal Of Lieutenant John Le Couteur, 104th Foot*, (Ottawa, Ontario; Carleton University Press, 1994) 179

[52] Gregory V. Kloten, Ed., George Howard to Sarah Howard, 27 July 1814, *Captain George Howard, United States Army: The Chronicles of a Connecticut Yankee on the Northern Frontier in the War of 1812* (Youngstown New York; Old Fort Niagara Association, 2013) 118

[53] Ibid. 118-119

[54] Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814* (Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, Reprinted 2000 with corrections) 197

[55] Ibid. 204

[56] Ibid. 197

[57] David. H. Sanford, *If P, Then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning* 2nd Edition (London; Routledge, 2003) 39

[58] David Thompson--Late of the Royal Scots, *A History of the Late War Between Great Britain And The United States of America: With a retrospective view of the causes from whence it originated*, Niagara (U.C., T. Sewell, 1832) 236

[59] Ibid.

[60] Ibid. 233-234

[61] Elihu H. Shepard, *The Autobiography of Elihu H. Shepard, Formerly Professor of Languages in St. Louis College* (St. Louis, MO; G. Knapp & Co., 1869) 68

[62] John C. Fredriksen, "Niagara 1814: The United States Army Quest For Tactical Parity In The War of 1812 And Its Legacy," (Ph.D. Dissertation, Providence, Rhode Island; *Phillips Memorial Library*, Providence College, May 1993) 158

[63] Antoine Henri (Baron) de Jomini, *The Art of War* (Originally Publish in French, 1836, Tr. By G.H. Mendell & W.P. Craighill, Philadelphia; J.P. Lippincott, 1862; Rockville, MD, Arc Manor, 2007) 7

[64] Joseph W.A. Whitehorne (Lieutenant Colonel USA-Ret.) *While Washington Burned: The Battle for Fort Erie 1814* (Mount Pleasant, SC; Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1992) 37

[65] Donald E. Graves, "Joseph Willcocks and the Canadian Volunteers: An Account of Political Disaffection In Upper Canada during the war of 1812" (Masters Thesis, Carlelton University, 1982) 93

[66] Donald E. Graves Interview, PBS "The War of 1812," 2011, WNED, 1:47-1:47:20

[67] Richard V. Barbuto, *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* (Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000) 229

[68] Ibid.

[69] Pierre Berton, *Flames Across the Border: 1813-1814*, (Toronto, Anchor Canada, 1981) 342

[70] Antoine Henri (Baron) de Jomini, *The Art of War* (Originally Publish in French, 1836, Tr. By G.H. Mendell & W.P. Craighill, Philadelphia; J.P. Lippincott, 1862; Rockville, MD, Arc Manor, 2007) 242

[71] Ibid. 243

[72] Donald R. Hickey, *Don't Give Up The Ship! Myths of the War of 1812* (Urbana & Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 2006) xvii

[73] Jonathan Crow, "Watch War and Peace: The Splendid, Epic Film Adaptation of Leo Tolstoy's Grand Novel (1969) June 2, 2015, at http://www.openculture.com/2015/06/watch-war-and-peace-the-splendid-epic-film-adaptation-of-leo-tolstoys-grand-novel-1969.html, accessed 2 March 2017

[74] J.C.A. Stagg, *The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent*, (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 12

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

Books

Au Bureau Du Journal *Réglement concernant l'exercise et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie, du I.er août* 1791, Paris

Anderson, Charles, *A TRUE AND INPARTIAL ACCOUNT OF THE CHIPPAWA & LUNDY'S LANE DURING THE LAST WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES*, 2nd Edition, Niagara, John Simpson, 1841

Byfield, Shadrack, *A Narrative Of A Light Company Soldier's Service, In the 41st Regiment of Foot, During the Late American War,* Bradford, Wilts, U.K., Published by John Bubb, 1840

Clark, Jr., Daniel, *Proof of the Corruption of Gen. James Wilkinson, and of His Connexion with Aaron Burr, with a Full Reputation of His Slanderous Allegations in a Relation to the Character of the Principal Witness Against Him* (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1809

Clausewitz, Carl Von, *On War,* First Published 1832, Edited & Translated by Michael Howard & Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ; Princeton University Press, 1984

de Jomini, Antoine Henri (Baron), *The Art of War* , Originally Publish in French, 1836, Tr. By G.H. Mendell & W.P. Craighill, Philadelphia; J.P. Lippincott, 1862; Rockville, MD, Arc Manor, 2007

Fredriksen, John C., Ed., *The War of 1812 in Person, Fifteen Accounts by United States Army Regulars, Volunteers, and Militiamen*, Jefferson, NC; MacFarland, 2010

Graves, Donald E., Ed., *The War of 1812 Journal of Lieutenant John Le Couteur: Merry Hearts Make Light Days*, Ottawa, Ontario; Carleton University Press, 1994

———. Ed., *Soldiers of 1814: American Enlisted Men's Memoirs Of The Niagara Campaign*, Youngstown, New York, Old For Niagara Association, 1995

Howard, George, Kloten, Gregory V., Ed., *Captain George Howard, United States Army: The Chronicles of a Connecticut Yankee on the Northern Frontier in the War of 1812*, Youngstown New York; Old Fort Niagara Association, 2013

Izard, George, *Official Correspondence with the Department of War, relative to the Military Operations of the American Army under the Command of Major General Izard, on the Northern Frontier of the United States in the Years 1814 and 1815,* Philadelphia; T. Dobson, 1816

Norton, John, Klinch, Carl F. & Talman, James J., Eds., *The Journal of Major John Norton*, (Toronto, Champlain Society, 1970

O'Conner, Thomas, *An Impartial And Correct History Of The War Between The United States Of America, And Great Britain; Declared by a Law of Congress, June 18, 1812, and concluded by a ratification and exchange of a treaty of Peace, at the City of Washington, Feb. 17, 1815. Comprising A Particular Detail Of The Naval And Military Operations, And A Faithful Record Of The Events produce During The Contest*, 2nd Edition, New York, John Low, 1815

Ripley, Eleazer W., *Facts Relative To The Campaign On The Niagara In 1814,* Boston, Patriot Office, 1815

———. Baylies, Nicholas, Ed., *Eleazer Wheelock Ripley, of The War of 1812, Major General in the United States Army—Member of Congress—Etc.*, Des Moines, IA; Brewster & Co., 1890

Scott, Winfield, *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL.D,* 2 Vols., New York, Sheldon and Company, 1864

———. *Memoirs of Lieut.-General Scott, LL.D.*, 2 Vols., Freeport, NY; Books for Libraries Press, First Published 1864, 1970

Shepard, Elihu H., *The Autobiography of Elihu H. Shepard, Formerly Professor of Languages in St. Louis College,* St. Louis, MO; G. Knapp & Co., 1869

Talman, James J. Ed., *Loyalist Narratives from Upper Canada*, Toronto, Champlain Society, 1946

Thompson, David --Late of the Royal Scots, *A History of the Late War Between Great Britain And The United States of America: With a retrospective view of the causes from whence it originated*, Niagara, U.C., T. Sewell, 1832

Tilton, James, M.D., *ECONOMICAL OBSERVATIONS ON MILITARY HOSPITALS: AND THE PREVENTION AND CURE OF DISEASE INCIDENT TO AN ARMY, ADDRESSED I. TO MINISTERS Of STATE AND LEGISLATURES, II.TO COMMANDING OFFICERS, III. TO THE MEDICAL STAFF,* Wilmington, DE; Printed by James Wilson, 1813

White, Samuel *A History of American Troops during the Late War, Under The Command of Cols. Fenton and Campbell,* Baltimore, Samuel White, 1829

Wood, William Ed., *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812*, 4 Vols., Toronto, Champlain Society, 1920-1928, at https://archive.org/details/selectbritishdoc13wood accessed 25 July 2016

Archives and Journals

Brown, Jacob, "Letter to Isaac Chauncey, 21 June 1814," cited in Ernest Cruikshank, "Brown's Documents," *The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier,* Welland ,Ontario, 1898-1908

———. "Letters to John Armstrong, 5 August 1814, 7 August 1814," cited in Ernest Cruikshank, "Brown's Documents," *The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier,* Welland ,Ontario, 1898-1908

Cate, Mary R., Ed., "Benjamin Ropes' Autobiography," (*Essex Historical Collections* 91, April 1955

Chauncey Isaac, "Letter to Jacob Brown Letter, 25 June 1814," cited in Ernest Cruikshank, "Brown's Documents," *The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier,* Welland ,Ontario, 1898-1908

Crombie, John Newell, "The Papers of Major Daniel McFarland: A War Hawk," Vol. 51, *The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine,* April 1968.

Cruikshank, Ernest A., "Record of the Services of Canadian Regiments in the War of 1812 — Part IX, The Lincoln Militia," Canadian Military Institute, Selected Papers, 13, 1904

———. *The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier* (Welland, Ontario, 1898-1908), 9 Vols., Digitized 2010, University of Pittsburgh Library System at http://www.archive.org/details/documentaryhisto01inlund

Clark, Duncan, "Memoir," Duncan Clark Papers, MG19, National Archives of Canada.

Congress of the United States, *American State Papers. Class V: Military Affairs*, Vol. I

Dobbin, Hugh, "Battle of Lundy's Lane," Hugh Dobbins Papers, Geneva Historical Society

Douglas, David B., "Memoir," Clements Library, University of Michigan

Drummond, Gordon, "Letter to George Prévost, 15 July 1814," cited in William Wood, Ed., *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812*, Vol. 3, Toronto, Champlain Society, 1920-1928

———. "Letter to George Prévost, 27 July 1814," cited in E. Cruikshank, *The Documentary History Of The Campaign On The Niagara Frontier in 1814* (Welland, ON; 1898-1908

Hall, James, " Biographical Sketch of Major Thomas Biddle," Illinois Monthly Magazine 1, September, 1831

Harvey, John, "Letter to Phineas Riall, 23 March 1814," cited in Ernest Cruikshank, "Brown's Documents," *The Documentary History of the Campaign Upon the Niagara Frontier,* Welland ,Ontario, 1898-1908

Hindman, Jacob, "Letter to Charles K. Gardner, 29 July 1814," War of 1812 Collection, Lilly Library, Indiana University

Horner, W.E., "A Military Hospital at Buffalo, New York, in the Year, 1814," *Medical Examiner and Record of Medical Service* 16, December, 1852

Howard, George, "Scott's General Orders, 23 June 1814," George Howard Order Book, Manuscript Division, New York Historical Society

———. "Letters to Sarah Howard, 8 June 1814, 10 July 1814, 11 July 1814, 23 July 1814, 27 July 1814," Kloten, Gregory V., Ed., *Captain George Howard, United States Army: The Chronicles of a Connecticut Yankee on the Northern Frontier in the War of 1812*, Youngstown New York; Old Fort Niagara Association, 2013

Jesup, Thomas S., 8 September 1814, Jesup Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress.

———. 25 September 1852, "Who captured General Riall," *Historical Magazine,* 8, July 1870

Le Couteur, John, "Letter to William Robinson, 27 July 1814," cited in Donald E. Graves, Ed., *Merry Hearts Make Light Days*, Ottawa, Ontario; Carleton University Press, 1994

Lord, Norman C., "The War on the Canadian Frontier, 1812-1814: Letters written by Sergeant James Commins, 8th Foot" *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 18 Winter 1939

Mann, Camillus M., "Letter to James Madison, 19 December 1813," Founders Online, National Archives, accessed http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/03-07-02-0101 [last update: 2016-03-28]).

Miller, James "Letter to Ruth Miller, 28 July 1814," James Miller Papers, U.S. Military Academy Library

Porter, Peter B., "Letter to William L. Stone, 26 May 1840," Ernest Cruikshank, Ed., *The Documentary History of The Niagara Campaign On The Niagara Frontier In 1814*, Vol. 9, Welland, Ontario, 1893

Ridout, Thomas, 10 July 1814, cited in: Lady Matilda Edgar, Ed., *Ten Years in Upper Canada in War and Peace, 1805-1815, Being the Ridout Letters* (Toronto, Williams Briggs, 1890

Scott, Hercules. "Letter to James Scott, 12 August 1814," Hercules Scott Papers. MG 24, National Archives of Canada

Scott, Winfield, "Letter to John Armstrong, 27 April 1814," RG 107, Secretary of War, Letters Received, National Archives

———. "Letter to John Armstrong, 17 May 1814," RG 107, Secretary of War, Letters Received, National Archives

———. "Letter to Jacob Brown, 23 May 1814," War of 1812 Collection, Clements Library, University of Michigan

Smith, Lester W., Ed., "A Drummer-boy in the War of 1812: Memoirs of Jarvis Frary Hanks," *Niagara Frontier*, 7, Summer, 1960

Weeks, John W., "Letter to Samuel A. Pearson, 1 August 1814," Weeks Family Papers, Baker Library, Dartmouth College

Newspapers

Aberdeen Journal, Editorial: "British Vengeance Against the United States, Long Overdue," 22 June 1814

American Watchman and Delaware Advertiser, "Soldier's Description of the Close Quarters Battle," Letter dated 20 August 1814, Wilmington DE

Baltimore National Museum and Weekly Gazette, "Letter to James Madison," 19 December 1813

Edinburgh Annual Register 17, Part I, "William Drummond's Letter," 1814

Providence Patriot, "Another Great Land Victory," 4 August 1814

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

Adams, Henry,. New Introduction by Colonel John R. Etling, *The War of 1812,* New York, First Cooper Square Press, 1999

Altoff, Gerald T., *Amongst My Best Men: African Americans in the War of 1812*, Put-in-Bay, OH; The Perry Group, 1996

Barbuto, Richard V., *Niagara 1814: America Invades Canada,* Lawrence KS, University of Kansas Press, 2000

———. *The Canadian Theater 1814*, Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington D.C., 2014

———. *Staff Ride Handbook for the Niagara Campaigns, 1812-1814,* Fort Leavenworth KS; Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014

Bathurst, Henry (1762-1834), cited in *Australian Dictionary of Biography*, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/bathurst-henry-1751/text1945, published first in hardcopy 1966, accessed online 12 June 2016

Benn, Carl, *The Iroquois In The War of 1812*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1998

Berton, Pierre, *Flames Across the Border: 1813-1814,* Toronto, Anchor Canada, 1981

Blackmore, Howard L., *British Military Firearms, 1650-1850*, New York, Arco Publishing, 1968

Clark, David B., *The Red Dawn,* Victoria, BC; Friesen Press, 2011

Coles, Harry L., *The War of 1812*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1965

Cookson, J.E., *The British Armed Nation, 1793-1815,* Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997

Dale, Ronald J., *The Invasion of Canada: Battles of the War of 1812*, Toronto, James Lorimer & Company LTD., 2001, 2013

de Virgilio, Christian, Ed., *Surgery: A Case Base Clinical Review*, Torrance, CA; Springer NY; Springer Science & Business Media, 2015

Edgar, Lady Matilda, Ed., *Ten Years in Upper Canada in War and Peace 1805-1815, Being the Ridout Letters*, Toronto, Williams Briggs, 1890

Eisenhower, John S.D., *Agent of Destiny: The Life and Times of General Winfield Scott,* Norman, OK; University of Oklahoma Press, 1997

Elliot, Charles W., *Winfield Scott: The Soldier and the Man*, New York, The MacMillan Company, 1937

Etling, John R., *Amateurs to Arms! A Military History of the War of 1812*, Chapel Hill, NC; De Capo Press, 1991

Graves, Donald E., *The Battle of Lundy's Lane: On the Niagara in 1814,* Baltimore, Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1993

———., *Red Coats & Grey Jackets: The Battle of Chippawa, 5 July 1814*, Toronto, Dunburn Press, 1994

———. *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814,* Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, 1997

———. *Where Right and Glory Lead! The Battle of Lundy's Lane, 1814,* Toronto, Robin Brass Studio, Reprinted 2000 with corrections

Greene, Robert Ewell, *Black Defenders of America: 1775-1973,* Chicago, Johnson Publishing Company, 1974

Grodzinski, John R., *Defender of Canada: Sir George Prevost and the War of 1812,* Norman, OK; University of Oklahoma Press, 2013

Hagen, Kenneth J., *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power,* New York, Simon & Schuster, 1991

Heidler David S., & Jeanne T. Heidler, Eds., *Encyclopedia of the War of 1812,* Santa Barbara, California, ABC-CLIO, 1997

Heitman, Francis B., *Historical Register And Dictionary of the United States Army, From Its Organization, September 29, 1789, To March 2, 1903,* 2 Vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903

Hess, Earl J., *Pickett's Charge: The Last Attack at Gettysburg,* Chapel Hill NC; University of North Carolina Press, 2001

Hickey, Donald R., *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict,* Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1995

———., *Don't Give Up The Ship! Myths of the War of 1812,* Urbana & Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 2006

Hitsman, J. Mackay, *The Incredible War of 1812: A Military History,* Toronto, University of Toronto, 1965

Jacobs, James Ripley, *Tarnished Warrior: Major-General James Wilkinson,* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938

Livingston, John, *Sketches of Eminent Americans,* New York; Craighead, 1854

Lossing, Benson J., *Lossing's Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812,* 2 Vols., Gretna, LA; Pelican, First Published 1868, 2001

Lucas, C.P., Ed., *The Canadian War of 1812,* Toronto, Clarendon Press, 1906

Mahon, John K., *The War of 1812,* Gainesville; Florida, University of Florida Press, 1972, 1991

Mansfield, Edward D., *The Life of General Winfield Scott*, New York, A.S. Barnes & CO., 1846

———., *Life And Times of General Winfield Scott, Including The Siege Of Vera Cruz, The Battle of Cerro Gordo, And The Battles In The Valley of Mexico, To The Conclusion Of Peace, And His Return To The United States*, New York, A.S. Barnes & CO., 1852

Manucy, Albert C., *Artillery Through the Ages: A Short Illustrated History of Cannon, Emphasizing Types Used in America,* Washington D.C.; National Park Service Publications, 1949, reprinted 1985

Marrin, Albert, *Napoleon and the Napoleonic Wars,* Harmondsworth: Viking Penguin Publishers, 1991

McDougall, Walter A., *Throes of Democracy: The American Civil War Era 1829-1877,* New York, Harper, 2008

Peskin, Allan, *Winfield Scott and the Profession of Arms,* Kent, OH; The Kent State University Press, 2003

Pilcher, James Evelyn, M.D., Ph.D., L.H.D, Ed., *The Surgeon Generals of The Army Of The United States of America,* Carlisle PA, The Association of Military Surgeons, 1905

Riley, Kelvin F., *Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars: 1792-1815,* London, Green Hill Books, 2004

Robinson, Paul, *Military Honour and the Conduct of War: From Ancient Greece to Iraq,* London & New York, Routledge, Taylor & Francis, 2006

Rothenberg, Robert E., M.D., F.A.C.S., Ed., *The New Illustrated Medical Encyclopedia For Home* Use Vol. IV, New York, Arbradale Press, 1967

Sanford, David. H., *If P, Then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of Reasoning* 2nd Edition, London; Routledge, 2003

Silverthorn, Dee Unglaub, *Human Physiology: An Integrated Approach* 4th Edition, New York, Pearson, 2009

Stagg, J.C.A., *The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2012

Stanley, George F.G., *War of 1812: Land Operations*, Toronto, Macmillan, 1983

Stewart, Donald O., *American Emperor,* New York, Simon & Schuster, 2011

Stewart, George R., *Pickett's Charge: A Micro History of the Final Attack at Gettysburg, July 3, 1863,* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959

Stewart, Richard W. Ed., *American Military History: The United States Army And The Forging of A Nation, 1775-1917*, Vol. I, 2nd Edition, Washington D.C., Center of Military History United States Army, 2005

Taylor, Alan, *The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2012

Thian, Raphael P., *Notes Illustrating the Military Geography of the United States, 1813-1880,* Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1881

Tucker, Spencer C., James R. Arnold, Roberta Wiener, *The Encyclopedia Of The War of 1812: A Political, Social, and Military History, 3 Vols.*, Santa Barbara, CA; ABC-CLIO, 2012

Turner, Wesley B., *British Generals in the War of 1812*, Montreal & Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999

———. *The War of 1812: The War That Both Sides Won*, Toronto, Dundurn Press, 2000

Upton, Emory, *The Military Policy of the United States,* Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1907

U.S. Army War College, Carlise, PA; *Battle of Chippewa,* http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ahec/ahecfiles/Warof1812BattleofChippawa, 1

Watson, Robert P., *America's First Crisis: The War of 1812*, Albany, NY; State University of New York Press, 2014

Weber, William, *Neither Victor nor Vanquished: America in the War of 1812,* Washington D.C., Potomac Books, 2013

Whitehorne Joseph W.A., *While Washington Burned: The Battle for Fort Erie 1814,* Mount Pleasant, SC; Nautical & Aviation Publishing Company of America, 1992

Zaslow, Morris, Ed., *The Defended Border: Upper Canada and the War of 1812* Toronto, MacMillan, 1964

Archives and Journals

Bloy, Marjorie,. "Lord Liverpool [Hawkesbury] (1770-1828)," at http://www.historyhome.co.uk/pms/l-pool.htm, Accessed: 12 May 2016

Crow, Jonathan, "Watch War and Peace: The Splendid, Epic Film Adaptation of Leo Tolstoy's Grand Novel (1969) June 2, 2015, at http://www.openculture.com/2015/06/watch-war-and-peace-the-splendid-epic-film-adaptation-of-leo-tolstoys-grand-novel-1969.html, Accessed: 2 March 2017

Ember, Carol R., "Hunter-Gatherers (Foragers)," HRAF at http://hraf.yale.edu/ehc/summaries/hunter-gatherers accessed 22 October 2016

Fredriksen, John C., "The War of 1812 in Northern New York: General George Izard's Journal of the Chateauguay Campaign," *New York History*, Vol. 76, No. 2, New York State Historical Association, April 1995 181 at http://www.jstor.org/stable/23181703 , Accessed: 7 June 2016

Henderson, Robert, "Loading and Firing a French Musket in the Age of Napoleon," http://www.militaryheritage.com/loading1777frenchmusket.htm, Accessed: 22 March 2016

Kimball, Jeffrey, "The Battle of Chippawa: Infantry Tactics in the War of 1812," *Military Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter, 1967-1968), at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1984326 , Accessed: 5 July 2016

Lynch, Christopher, "Aphorisms from Art of War by by Niccolò Machiavelli," at http://www.press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/500403.html, Accessed: 15 July 2015

Marsh, Ruth & Dorothy S. Truesdale, "War on Lake Ontario: 1812-1815" *Rochester History Vol. IV*, October, 1942, No. 4, Rochester Public Library

Peterson, Mark, "Witnesses' Perception of Meaning," Santa Monica, CA; The Rand Corporation, 1977 1 at http://130.154.3.8/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P5975, accessed 13 July 2015

Ries, Al, "Understanding Marketing Psychology and the Halo Effect: What Apple's iPod and Motorola's Razr Can Teach Us," Advertising Age, 17 April 2006, at http://adage.com/article/al-ries/understanding-marketing-psychology-halo-effect/108676/, Accessed: 12 February 2017

Schuster, Mark A., M.D., Ph.D., et al., "A National Survey of Stress Reactions after the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks," New England Journal of Medicine; 345:1507-1512| November 15, 2001 at

http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/nejm200111153452024#t=article, Accessed: 22 November 2016

Skeen, C. Edward., "Mr. Madison's Secretary of War," *The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, Vol. 100, No. 3, July, 1976 at http://www.jstor.org/stable/20091078, Accessed: 3 September 2013

Skelton, William B., "High Army Leadership in the Era of the War of 1812: The Making and the Remaking of the Officer Corps," The William & Mary Quarterly, Vol 51, No. 2, Published by Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, April 1994 at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2946862, Accessed: 21-09-2016 16:45 UTC

Stickney, Kenneth, "DRUMMOND, Sir GORDON," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, vol. 8, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 2003–, accessed June 12, 2016, http://www.biographi.ca/en/bio/drummond_gordon_8E.html

Suthren, Victor, "A Canadian Perspective on the War of 1812," at http://www.pbs.org/wned/war-of-1812/essays/canadian/, Accessed: 10 June 2016

Thorndike, Edward L., "A Constant Error in Psychological Ratings," *Journal of Applied Psychology; 4,* 1920

Tooby, John & Leda Comides, "The Evolution of War and its Cognitive Foundations," *Institute for Evolutionary Studies Technical Report 88-1*, 1988

Newspapers

The New York Times, "Stress and Anxiety," 5 October 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/health/guides/symptoms/stress-and-anxiety/the-body's-response.html

Theses and Dissertations

Graves, Donald E., "Joseph Willcocks And The Canadian Volunteers: An Account of Political Disaffection in Upper Canada During The War of 1812," Master's Thesis, Carelton University, 1982

Fredriksen, John C., "Niagara 1814: The United States Army Quest For Tactical Parity In The War of 1812 And Its Legacy," Ph.D. Dissertation, Providence, Rhode Island; Phillips Memorial Library, Providence College, May 1993

Kimball, Jeffrey P., "Strategy on the Northern Frontier, 1814," Ph. D. Dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1969